Narrative:

On jul/xa/00, westwind ii was returning to new orleans after picking up passenger at teb. I was acting as PIC in the left seat while my co-captain was in the right seat. Approaching new orleans, we were given radar vectors to intercept the localizer for lakefront airport. We did this, although we had the airport visually. The time was shortly after AX00 pm and lakefront control tower had closed. New orleans approach control advised us of a baron on short final to lakefront, which would pose no problems. Approach control also advised us of additional traffic inbound from the east, a saratoga. We advised approach that we were looking. We had a TCASII target but wanted to be sure it was the same traffic. Approach control switched us to advisory frequency with cancellation of IFR instructions. We switched to advisory frequency approximately 7-8 mi from the airport. Since the tower was closed, we broadcasted our location with intentions for a straight-in approach to runway 18R to lakefront traffic. Established on the localizer for runway 18R, I also intercepted the GS for a stabilized approach to the runway. At alger intersection (the FAF) we had been watching the traffic and picked up his lights. The spacing at this time looked good visually and on TCASII, thus allowing us to land before the saratoga. The saratoga reported a left base for runway 18R. We advised the saratoga again of our location and that with our faster speed, we would continue our approach and land since it appeared we would be first to the airport. The saratoga remarked that 'something was going to have to give.' we were descending from 300 ft to the runway when the saratoga reported 300 ft. I looked to my left, noted the saratoga and completed the landing on runway 18R. After rollout, I made a left on runway 9/27 planning to intercept taxiway D to FBO. Prior to clearing runway 18R, we heard the saratoga clearing the runway at intersection K. I looked to my left and noted the saratoga clearing the runway. I was amazed that he had landed behind us. At this time, new orleans approach called to see if we had landed. We advised him that we were clearing the runway and to cancel IFR. As we intercepted taxiway D, first officer and I noticed the saratoga taxiing at an extremely fast speed, on the inner strip between the control tower and cpr hangar, toward FBO. The speed was so fast that we thought he would become airborne again. I made a comment on advisory frequency about his actions. Nearing the intersection of taxiway D and the inner strip, we stopped to let the saratoga pass since there was no way he could have stopped the aircraft to prevent a collision. The saratoga made a left turn in to FBO at an extremely fast speed, which was witnessed by the lineman at FBO. We were surprised that the landing gear did not collapse. After completing our taxi and shutdown checks, we deplaned our passenger and luggage. The saratoga had parked at the rear corner of the ramp and was unloading cargo into a van. After unloading his cargo, the pilot secured his aircraft and was walking into the FBO. I stopped him on the ramp to discuss the safety of his actions but he was totally apathetic to everything that happened. The discussion ended with a heated verbal exchange and the pilot retiring to the pilot lounge. Once inside the FBO, I called approach control to discuss the incident. The controller that handled us told me that the saratoga had been IFR from the east and that he had issued him a heading of 270 degrees for spacing. At that time, the saratoga canceled IFR and proceeded VFR to lakefront. The controller noticed the saratoga land shortly after us and was concerned enough to verify our landing and clearing of the runway. The controller remarked that the saratoga didn't appear to give an inch for spacing. I requested that they keep any tapes that they may have and was advised that they keep then for 16 days. Conclusion: I believe this pilot to be very unprofessional, unsafe, and a hazard to himself and others in aviation. This pilot apparently doesn't care about right-of-way rules in aviation, wake turbulence, landing or taxi safety, or safety for linemen at the FBO. Apparently this is a regular flight for this saratoga, however, he may be operating an illegal part 135 operation since no charter certificate number could be found on his aircraft. Safety in aviation should be a major concern of all pilots. In the future, if faced with another pilot like the one mentioned above and hearing the comment he made while airborne or similar, I will give additional consideration for a missed approach or a go around. It is a shame there are pilots that take aviation so lightly. Should you want to discuss this incident any further, please contact me at the telephone number listed above.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF A WESTWIND II CPR JET AND A PIPER SARATOGA ATX CARGO ACFT HAVE AN NMAC ON SHORT FINAL AT NIGHT TO A CLOSED TWR ARPT RWY. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE SARATOGA CUT OFF THE WESTWIND TO THE TIE-IN TXWY WHEN IT TAXIED AT A HIGH SPD PAST THEM WHEN EXITING THE RWY.

Narrative: ON JUL/XA/00, WESTWIND II WAS RETURNING TO NEW ORLEANS AFTER PICKING UP PAX AT TEB. I WAS ACTING AS PIC IN THE L SEAT WHILE MY CO-CAPT WAS IN THE R SEAT. APCHING NEW ORLEANS, WE WERE GIVEN RADAR VECTORS TO INTERCEPT THE LOC FOR LAKEFRONT ARPT. WE DID THIS, ALTHOUGH WE HAD THE ARPT VISUALLY. THE TIME WAS SHORTLY AFTER AX00 PM AND LAKEFRONT CTL TWR HAD CLOSED. NEW ORLEANS APCH CTL ADVISED US OF A BARON ON SHORT FINAL TO LAKEFRONT, WHICH WOULD POSE NO PROBS. APCH CTL ALSO ADVISED US OF ADDITIONAL TFC INBOUND FROM THE E, A SARATOGA. WE ADVISED APCH THAT WE WERE LOOKING. WE HAD A TCASII TARGET BUT WANTED TO BE SURE IT WAS THE SAME TFC. APCH CTL SWITCHED US TO ADVISORY FREQ WITH CANCELLATION OF IFR INSTRUCTIONS. WE SWITCHED TO ADVISORY FREQ APPROX 7-8 MI FROM THE ARPT. SINCE THE TWR WAS CLOSED, WE BROADCASTED OUR LOCATION WITH INTENTIONS FOR A STRAIGHT-IN APCH TO RWY 18R TO LAKEFRONT TFC. ESTABLISHED ON THE LOC FOR RWY 18R, I ALSO INTERCEPTED THE GS FOR A STABILIZED APCH TO THE RWY. AT ALGER INTXN (THE FAF) WE HAD BEEN WATCHING THE TFC AND PICKED UP HIS LIGHTS. THE SPACING AT THIS TIME LOOKED GOOD VISUALLY AND ON TCASII, THUS ALLOWING US TO LAND BEFORE THE SARATOGA. THE SARATOGA RPTED A L BASE FOR RWY 18R. WE ADVISED THE SARATOGA AGAIN OF OUR LOCATION AND THAT WITH OUR FASTER SPD, WE WOULD CONTINUE OUR APCH AND LAND SINCE IT APPEARED WE WOULD BE FIRST TO THE ARPT. THE SARATOGA REMARKED THAT 'SOMETHING WAS GOING TO HAVE TO GIVE.' WE WERE DSNDING FROM 300 FT TO THE RWY WHEN THE SARATOGA RPTED 300 FT. I LOOKED TO MY L, NOTED THE SARATOGA AND COMPLETED THE LNDG ON RWY 18R. AFTER ROLLOUT, I MADE A L ON RWY 9/27 PLANNING TO INTERCEPT TXWY D TO FBO. PRIOR TO CLRING RWY 18R, WE HEARD THE SARATOGA CLRING THE RWY AT INTXN K. I LOOKED TO MY L AND NOTED THE SARATOGA CLRING THE RWY. I WAS AMAZED THAT HE HAD LANDED BEHIND US. AT THIS TIME, NEW ORLEANS APCH CALLED TO SEE IF WE HAD LANDED. WE ADVISED HIM THAT WE WERE CLRING THE RWY AND TO CANCEL IFR. AS WE INTERCEPTED TXWY D, FO AND I NOTICED THE SARATOGA TAXIING AT AN EXTREMELY FAST SPD, ON THE INNER STRIP BTWN THE CTL TWR AND CPR HANGAR, TOWARD FBO. THE SPD WAS SO FAST THAT WE THOUGHT HE WOULD BECOME AIRBORNE AGAIN. I MADE A COMMENT ON ADVISORY FREQ ABOUT HIS ACTIONS. NEARING THE INTXN OF TXWY D AND THE INNER STRIP, WE STOPPED TO LET THE SARATOGA PASS SINCE THERE WAS NO WAY HE COULD HAVE STOPPED THE ACFT TO PREVENT A COLLISION. THE SARATOGA MADE A L TURN IN TO FBO AT AN EXTREMELY FAST SPD, WHICH WAS WITNESSED BY THE LINEMAN AT FBO. WE WERE SURPRISED THAT THE LNDG GEAR DID NOT COLLAPSE. AFTER COMPLETING OUR TAXI AND SHUTDOWN CHKS, WE DEPLANED OUR PAX AND LUGGAGE. THE SARATOGA HAD PARKED AT THE REAR CORNER OF THE RAMP AND WAS UNLOADING CARGO INTO A VAN. AFTER UNLOADING HIS CARGO, THE PLT SECURED HIS ACFT AND WAS WALKING INTO THE FBO. I STOPPED HIM ON THE RAMP TO DISCUSS THE SAFETY OF HIS ACTIONS BUT HE WAS TOTALLY APATHETIC TO EVERYTHING THAT HAPPENED. THE DISCUSSION ENDED WITH A HEATED VERBAL EXCHANGE AND THE PLT RETIRING TO THE PLT LOUNGE. ONCE INSIDE THE FBO, I CALLED APCH CTL TO DISCUSS THE INCIDENT. THE CTLR THAT HANDLED US TOLD ME THAT THE SARATOGA HAD BEEN IFR FROM THE E AND THAT HE HAD ISSUED HIM A HDG OF 270 DEGS FOR SPACING. AT THAT TIME, THE SARATOGA CANCELED IFR AND PROCEEDED VFR TO LAKEFRONT. THE CTLR NOTICED THE SARATOGA LAND SHORTLY AFTER US AND WAS CONCERNED ENOUGH TO VERIFY OUR LNDG AND CLRING OF THE RWY. THE CTLR REMARKED THAT THE SARATOGA DIDN'T APPEAR TO GIVE AN INCH FOR SPACING. I REQUESTED THAT THEY KEEP ANY TAPES THAT THEY MAY HAVE AND WAS ADVISED THAT THEY KEEP THEN FOR 16 DAYS. CONCLUSION: I BELIEVE THIS PLT TO BE VERY UNPROFESSIONAL, UNSAFE, AND A HAZARD TO HIMSELF AND OTHERS IN AVIATION. THIS PLT APPARENTLY DOESN'T CARE ABOUT RIGHT-OF-WAY RULES IN AVIATION, WAKE TURB, LNDG OR TAXI SAFETY, OR SAFETY FOR LINEMEN AT THE FBO. APPARENTLY THIS IS A REGULAR FLT FOR THIS SARATOGA, HOWEVER, HE MAY BE OPERATING AN ILLEGAL PART 135 OP SINCE NO CHARTER CERTIFICATE NUMBER COULD BE FOUND ON HIS ACFT. SAFETY IN AVIATION SHOULD BE A MAJOR CONCERN OF ALL PLTS. IN THE FUTURE, IF FACED WITH ANOTHER PLT LIKE THE ONE MENTIONED ABOVE AND HEARING THE COMMENT HE MADE WHILE AIRBORNE OR SIMILAR, I WILL GIVE ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION FOR A MISSED APCH OR A GAR. IT IS A SHAME THERE ARE PLTS THAT TAKE AVIATION SO LIGHTLY. SHOULD YOU WANT TO DISCUSS THIS INCIDENT ANY FURTHER, PLEASE CONTACT ME AT THE TELEPHONE NUMBER LISTED ABOVE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.