Narrative:

I was flying captain on an air carrier #Y flight dca to bos on july xa 00. Lahso operations were on the ATIS. During our landing roll on runway 27, my first officer advised me that there was an air carrier X B757 on runway 22L. At this time we did not know if air carrier X flight was taking off, landing, or landing holding short of runway 27. We were not advised by boston tower of traffic landing runway 22 holding short of runway 27. At this time all I could do was increase braking to stop prior to runway 22. This was accomplished safely because we were very light, had this been a full flight it would have been impossible. After landing, we were instructed to switch to a different tower frequency 128.8 and hold short of rw 22L. When we switched we heard the tower ask air carrier X if they could make the turn prior to runway 27. At this time, we questioned if air carrier X was advised of traffic on 27 or if they were advised to hold short of runway 27. After the flight, I called the tower and ask them to mark the tapes. They advised me lahso operations were on the ATIS. They said they would review the tapes and I would call back at XA00 when I called back they said air carrier X or air carrier Y were not advised of lahso operations by boston tower. I feel lahso operations have a lot of inherent problems. The problems at boston airport was unavoidable because of the different tower frequencys for crossing runways. Boston tower forgot to tell us about air carrier X on runway 22 and we found out later air carrier X was not advised of us on runway 27 because of different tower frequency on crossing runways.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 CREW WAS NOT ADVISED OF LAHSO OPS BEING CONDUCTED AT BOS.

Narrative: I WAS FLYING CAPTAIN ON AN ACR #Y FLIGHT DCA TO BOS ON JULY XA 00. LAHSO OPS WERE ON THE ATIS. DURING OUR LNDG ROLL ON RWY 27, MY FO ADVISED ME THAT THERE WAS AN ACR X B757 ON RWY 22L. AT THIS TIME WE DID NOT KNOW IF ACR X FLIGHT WAS TAKING OFF, LNDG, OR LNDG HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 27. WE WERE NOT ADVISED BY BOSTON TWR OF TRAFFIC LNDG RWY 22 HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 27. AT THIS TIME ALL I COULD DO WAS INCREASE BRAKING TO STOP PRIOR TO RWY 22. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED SAFELY BECAUSE WE WERE VERY LIGHT, HAD THIS BEEN A FULL FLIGHT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE. AFTER LNDG, WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO SWITCH TO A DIFFERENT TWR FREQ 128.8 AND HOLD SHORT OF RW 22L. WHEN WE SWITCHED WE HEARD THE TWR ASK ACR X IF THEY COULD MAKE THE TURN PRIOR TO RWY 27. AT THIS TIME, WE QUESTIONED IF ACR X WAS ADVISED OF TRAFFIC ON 27 OR IF THEY WERE ADVISED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27. AFTER THE FLIGHT, I CALLED THE TWR AND ASK THEM TO MARK THE TAPES. THEY ADVISED ME LAHSO OPS WERE ON THE ATIS. THEY SAID THEY WOULD REVIEW THE TAPES AND I WOULD CALL BACK AT XA00 WHEN I CALLED BACK THEY SAID ACR X OR ACR Y WERE NOT ADVISED OF LAHSO OPS BY BOSTON TOWER. I FEEL LAHSO OPS HAVE A LOT OF INHERENT PROBLEMS. THE PROBLEMS AT BOSTON ARPT WAS UNAVOIDABLE BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENT TWR FREQS FOR CROSSING RWYS. BOSTON TWR FORGOT TO TELL US ABOUT ACR X ON RWY 22 AND WE FOUND OUT LATER ACR X WAS NOT ADVISED OF US ON RWY 27 BECAUSE OF DIFFERENT TWR FREQ ON CROSSING RUNWAYS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.