Narrative:

My crew operated a night flight from ZZZ to XXX 3 flts prior to my flight. The aircraft rejected takeoff due to failed or unsatisfactory elevator flight control check. The aircraft was worked on by 2 different mechanics and the logbook corrective action block indicated to me that they had completed their work and returned the aircraft to service. The closing statement by the second mechanic was operations check normal and he signed it and put his license number in the signoff block. There was no entry in the dmi log to indicate the aircraft had an open entry. My company's maintenance control was unaware that the original problem had not been repaired. Only by careful reading, interviewing the 2 mechanics involved, did it become obvious to maintenance control that the original discrepancy was still open and the second mechanic had signed off an unrelated write-up (but in the same flight control system). In the meantime, the aircraft had flown 3 times (by 3 different crews) with this open flight control discrepancy. It is still my opinion that there was no reason to suspect that the aircraft was not airworthy based upon the aircraft logbook corrective action signoff. Indeed, if our own maintenance control experts didn't figure this out for 2 days, why should the flcs be suspicious. This situation would never have occurred if the second mechanic to work on the aircraft had talked with the first mechanic before signing off the corrective action block and my company's maintenance control or quality control should have been more active in following up on the fix for something as critical as a flight control problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DC8 FREIGHTER WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH AN UNANSWERED AND UNCOMPLETED FLT CTL RPT.

Narrative: MY CREW OPERATED A NIGHT FLT FROM ZZZ TO XXX 3 FLTS PRIOR TO MY FLT. THE ACFT REJECTED TKOF DUE TO FAILED OR UNSATISFACTORY ELEVATOR FLT CTL CHK. THE ACFT WAS WORKED ON BY 2 DIFFERENT MECHS AND THE LOGBOOK CORRECTIVE ACTION BLOCK INDICATED TO ME THAT THEY HAD COMPLETED THEIR WORK AND RETURNED THE ACFT TO SVC. THE CLOSING STATEMENT BY THE SECOND MECH WAS OPS CHK NORMAL AND HE SIGNED IT AND PUT HIS LICENSE NUMBER IN THE SIGNOFF BLOCK. THERE WAS NO ENTRY IN THE DMI LOG TO INDICATE THE ACFT HAD AN OPEN ENTRY. MY COMPANY'S MAINT CTL WAS UNAWARE THAT THE ORIGINAL PROB HAD NOT BEEN REPAIRED. ONLY BY CAREFUL READING, INTERVIEWING THE 2 MECHS INVOLVED, DID IT BECOME OBVIOUS TO MAINT CTL THAT THE ORIGINAL DISCREPANCY WAS STILL OPEN AND THE SECOND MECH HAD SIGNED OFF AN UNRELATED WRITE-UP (BUT IN THE SAME FLT CTL SYS). IN THE MEANTIME, THE ACFT HAD FLOWN 3 TIMES (BY 3 DIFFERENT CREWS) WITH THIS OPEN FLT CTL DISCREPANCY. IT IS STILL MY OPINION THAT THERE WAS NO REASON TO SUSPECT THAT THE ACFT WAS NOT AIRWORTHY BASED UPON THE ACFT LOGBOOK CORRECTIVE ACTION SIGNOFF. INDEED, IF OUR OWN MAINT CTL EXPERTS DIDN'T FIGURE THIS OUT FOR 2 DAYS, WHY SHOULD THE FLCS BE SUSPICIOUS. THIS SIT WOULD NEVER HAVE OCCURRED IF THE SECOND MECH TO WORK ON THE ACFT HAD TALKED WITH THE FIRST MECH BEFORE SIGNING OFF THE CORRECTIVE ACTION BLOCK AND MY COMPANY'S MAINT CTL OR QUALITY CTL SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE ACTIVE IN FOLLOWING UP ON THE FIX FOR SOMETHING AS CRITICAL AS A FLT CTL PROB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.