Narrative:

On aug/xa/00 around XA35 in the morning at yng, class D airspace with a TRSA, my student and I contacted ground control and were advised that we were cleared to the north practice area to maintain 3000 ft along with our departure frequency and squawk code. The training flight was to be conducted under VFR. We were cleared for takeoff, told to fly runway heading by the tower and later by the tower to fly a heading of 360 degrees and contact departure. We contacted departure advising them we were climbing through 1700 ft. Departure replied 'radar contact.' shortly thereafter, departure told us to 'resume own navigation.' not yet at 3000 ft MSL, I realized our flight path would take us directly into clouds that were ahead. The clouds were scattered in the area. In order not to violate the VFR, 'resuming my own navigation' we began to ascend at approximately 300-400 FPM to navigation over the clouds. Still operating under VFR, outside of class D airspace, but in the TRSA at about 3600 ft MSL (in a later conversation the controller said it was more like 3700 ft MSL), departure told us of traffic and to descend immediately -- I am sure of his exact wording -- during my scan the other aircraft appeared at my 2 O'clock position on a southerly heading approximately 400 ft above us and over 2000 ft horizontal. I was aware prior to this that another aircraft was in the vicinity as a result of radio traffic. I began to descend, at the urging of the controller. After this incident, the controller advised me that I was not permitted to climb. I advised him that I was cleared to resume my own navigation. He then advised me that 'resume own navigation' did not mean I was allowed to climb, and to call the tower when I got on the ground. I advised him that I would require at least 3500 ft MSL in the practice area. To which he advised me to maintain at or above 3500 ft. At no time did my student or I feel we were in danger as I kept visual separation from the other aircraft, which I believe to have been a C172 that was holding at the youngstown VOR at 4000 ft MSL. In the past at yng, I had been given the same type of clearance from ground and the same type of clearance from departure, 'resume own navigation,' and had naved on my own both vertically and horizontally without incident or comment from the controller. In fact, upon calling the controller on the ground after completing this training flight, the controller, who would only advise me his call sign was 'xx,' told me he would have let it go had there not been the other aircraft in the area. As it looked to him on his radar screen, our 2 aircraft were to converge at 4000 ft MSL. However, prior to that, the controller allowed our aircraft to ascend for almost 2 mins without comment. We were advised of traffic for the first time according to the controller, when our aircraft was at 3700 ft MSL and the other aircraft was at 4000 ft MSL. The difference in the altitude between what the controller believed our assigned altitude was to be, 3000 ft MSL and the altitude he said we were at when he called out traffic, 3700 ft MSL, is 700 ft. That means the controller allowed us to climb without his disapproval for about 2 mins advising us only of traffic when the warning at his station sounded indicating a safety alert. This begs the question -- would he have commented if he was not so alerted? Obviously, if we were not permitted to climb based on the clearance, 'resume own navigation,' especially with traffic in the area, the controller would have alerted us of our deviation much sooner. But to allow us to climb at a rate of 300-400 FPM for almost 2 mins would indicate to any pilot that he, the pilot, was operating within the clearance limits given to him. The problem I believe stems from lack of communication between the pilot and the controller along with the definition of 'resume own navigation' under VFR. The wording of the controller's phrase 'resume own navigation' according to the aim, 'it is used when radar contact is lost after an aircraft is being vectored, or after the completion of a radar vector.' moreover, a pilot navigates in an aircraft in both the vertical and horizontal planes. A review of any navigation log exhibits columns not only for the course to be flown, but altitude as well. The current private pilot manual includes a section on altitude in the navigation chapter. Further, in order to remain VFR, one is to remain a certain distance from clouds depending on the airspace. This obviously may require one to navigate around or above clouds to remain VFR while always scanning and using the see and avoid concept. Further, the controller, after telling us to 'resume own navigation,' should have advised us of the altitude that we should be at along with the traffic in the area. For the controller to allow our aircraft to deviate for almost 2 mins from what he believed our assigned altitude was to be also contributed to the problem. If the controller had advised us early on of the deviation from what he believed our assigned altitude was to be, there is no doubt we would have complied and advised him of the meteorological conditions asking for a deviation, but in my mind, as we climbed for almost 2 mins, I believed that there was no problem as the controller did not voice any objection as was past practice at yng after receiving 'resume own navigation.' another problem may have been that the tower was understaffed as the controller told me on a subsequent phone call later that morning he could not talk to me due to the tower being understaffed that morning. In the future, if I am told by the controller to 'resume own navigation' while VFR, I will inquire as to what my altitude restrs are. I will also advise my students and fellow pilots of this occurrence and advise them to do the same.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INSTRUCTOR PLT OF A C172 CLBED ABOVE THE LAST ASSIGNED ALT IN CLASS C AIRSPACE DURING TRANSITION TO STUDENT PRACTICE AREA CAUSING CONFLICT WITH ANOTHER C172 HOLDING AT THE NEARBY VORTAC.

Narrative: ON AUG/XA/00 AROUND XA35 IN THE MORNING AT YNG, CLASS D AIRSPACE WITH A TRSA, MY STUDENT AND I CONTACTED GND CTL AND WERE ADVISED THAT WE WERE CLRED TO THE N PRACTICE AREA TO MAINTAIN 3000 FT ALONG WITH OUR DEP FREQ AND SQUAWK CODE. THE TRAINING FLT WAS TO BE CONDUCTED UNDER VFR. WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF, TOLD TO FLY RWY HDG BY THE TWR AND LATER BY THE TWR TO FLY A HDG OF 360 DEGS AND CONTACT DEP. WE CONTACTED DEP ADVISING THEM WE WERE CLBING THROUGH 1700 FT. DEP REPLIED 'RADAR CONTACT.' SHORTLY THEREAFTER, DEP TOLD US TO 'RESUME OWN NAV.' NOT YET AT 3000 FT MSL, I REALIZED OUR FLT PATH WOULD TAKE US DIRECTLY INTO CLOUDS THAT WERE AHEAD. THE CLOUDS WERE SCATTERED IN THE AREA. IN ORDER NOT TO VIOLATE THE VFR, 'RESUMING MY OWN NAV' WE BEGAN TO ASCEND AT APPROX 300-400 FPM TO NAV OVER THE CLOUDS. STILL OPERATING UNDER VFR, OUTSIDE OF CLASS D AIRSPACE, BUT IN THE TRSA AT ABOUT 3600 FT MSL (IN A LATER CONVERSATION THE CTLR SAID IT WAS MORE LIKE 3700 FT MSL), DEP TOLD US OF TFC AND TO DSND IMMEDIATELY -- I AM SURE OF HIS EXACT WORDING -- DURING MY SCAN THE OTHER ACFT APPEARED AT MY 2 O'CLOCK POS ON A SOUTHERLY HDG APPROX 400 FT ABOVE US AND OVER 2000 FT HORIZ. I WAS AWARE PRIOR TO THIS THAT ANOTHER ACFT WAS IN THE VICINITY AS A RESULT OF RADIO TFC. I BEGAN TO DSND, AT THE URGING OF THE CTLR. AFTER THIS INCIDENT, THE CTLR ADVISED ME THAT I WAS NOT PERMITTED TO CLB. I ADVISED HIM THAT I WAS CLRED TO RESUME MY OWN NAV. HE THEN ADVISED ME THAT 'RESUME OWN NAV' DID NOT MEAN I WAS ALLOWED TO CLB, AND TO CALL THE TWR WHEN I GOT ON THE GND. I ADVISED HIM THAT I WOULD REQUIRE AT LEAST 3500 FT MSL IN THE PRACTICE AREA. TO WHICH HE ADVISED ME TO MAINTAIN AT OR ABOVE 3500 FT. AT NO TIME DID MY STUDENT OR I FEEL WE WERE IN DANGER AS I KEPT VISUAL SEPARATION FROM THE OTHER ACFT, WHICH I BELIEVE TO HAVE BEEN A C172 THAT WAS HOLDING AT THE YOUNGSTOWN VOR AT 4000 FT MSL. IN THE PAST AT YNG, I HAD BEEN GIVEN THE SAME TYPE OF CLRNC FROM GND AND THE SAME TYPE OF CLRNC FROM DEP, 'RESUME OWN NAV,' AND HAD NAVED ON MY OWN BOTH VERTLY AND HORIZLY WITHOUT INCIDENT OR COMMENT FROM THE CTLR. IN FACT, UPON CALLING THE CTLR ON THE GND AFTER COMPLETING THIS TRAINING FLT, THE CTLR, WHO WOULD ONLY ADVISE ME HIS CALL SIGN WAS 'XX,' TOLD ME HE WOULD HAVE LET IT GO HAD THERE NOT BEEN THE OTHER ACFT IN THE AREA. AS IT LOOKED TO HIM ON HIS RADAR SCREEN, OUR 2 ACFT WERE TO CONVERGE AT 4000 FT MSL. HOWEVER, PRIOR TO THAT, THE CTLR ALLOWED OUR ACFT TO ASCEND FOR ALMOST 2 MINS WITHOUT COMMENT. WE WERE ADVISED OF TFC FOR THE FIRST TIME ACCORDING TO THE CTLR, WHEN OUR ACFT WAS AT 3700 FT MSL AND THE OTHER ACFT WAS AT 4000 FT MSL. THE DIFFERENCE IN THE ALT BTWN WHAT THE CTLR BELIEVED OUR ASSIGNED ALT WAS TO BE, 3000 FT MSL AND THE ALT HE SAID WE WERE AT WHEN HE CALLED OUT TFC, 3700 FT MSL, IS 700 FT. THAT MEANS THE CTLR ALLOWED US TO CLB WITHOUT HIS DISAPPROVAL FOR ABOUT 2 MINS ADVISING US ONLY OF TFC WHEN THE WARNING AT HIS STATION SOUNDED INDICATING A SAFETY ALERT. THIS BEGS THE QUESTION -- WOULD HE HAVE COMMENTED IF HE WAS NOT SO ALERTED? OBVIOUSLY, IF WE WERE NOT PERMITTED TO CLB BASED ON THE CLRNC, 'RESUME OWN NAV,' ESPECIALLY WITH TFC IN THE AREA, THE CTLR WOULD HAVE ALERTED US OF OUR DEV MUCH SOONER. BUT TO ALLOW US TO CLB AT A RATE OF 300-400 FPM FOR ALMOST 2 MINS WOULD INDICATE TO ANY PLT THAT HE, THE PLT, WAS OPERATING WITHIN THE CLRNC LIMITS GIVEN TO HIM. THE PROB I BELIEVE STEMS FROM LACK OF COM BTWN THE PLT AND THE CTLR ALONG WITH THE DEFINITION OF 'RESUME OWN NAV' UNDER VFR. THE WORDING OF THE CTLR'S PHRASE 'RESUME OWN NAV' ACCORDING TO THE AIM, 'IT IS USED WHEN RADAR CONTACT IS LOST AFTER AN ACFT IS BEING VECTORED, OR AFTER THE COMPLETION OF A RADAR VECTOR.' MOREOVER, A PLT NAVIGATES IN AN ACFT IN BOTH THE VERT AND HORIZ PLANES. A REVIEW OF ANY NAV LOG EXHIBITS COLUMNS NOT ONLY FOR THE COURSE TO BE FLOWN, BUT ALT AS WELL. THE CURRENT PVT PLT MANUAL INCLUDES A SECTION ON ALT IN THE NAV CHAPTER. FURTHER, IN ORDER TO REMAIN VFR, ONE IS TO REMAIN A CERTAIN DISTANCE FROM CLOUDS DEPENDING ON THE AIRSPACE. THIS OBVIOUSLY MAY REQUIRE ONE TO NAVIGATE AROUND OR ABOVE CLOUDS TO REMAIN VFR WHILE ALWAYS SCANNING AND USING THE SEE AND AVOID CONCEPT. FURTHER, THE CTLR, AFTER TELLING US TO 'RESUME OWN NAV,' SHOULD HAVE ADVISED US OF THE ALT THAT WE SHOULD BE AT ALONG WITH THE TFC IN THE AREA. FOR THE CTLR TO ALLOW OUR ACFT TO DEVIATE FOR ALMOST 2 MINS FROM WHAT HE BELIEVED OUR ASSIGNED ALT WAS TO BE ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO THE PROB. IF THE CTLR HAD ADVISED US EARLY ON OF THE DEV FROM WHAT HE BELIEVED OUR ASSIGNED ALT WAS TO BE, THERE IS NO DOUBT WE WOULD HAVE COMPLIED AND ADVISED HIM OF THE METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS ASKING FOR A DEV, BUT IN MY MIND, AS WE CLBED FOR ALMOST 2 MINS, I BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS NO PROB AS THE CTLR DID NOT VOICE ANY OBJECTION AS WAS PAST PRACTICE AT YNG AFTER RECEIVING 'RESUME OWN NAV.' ANOTHER PROB MAY HAVE BEEN THAT THE TWR WAS UNDERSTAFFED AS THE CTLR TOLD ME ON A SUBSEQUENT PHONE CALL LATER THAT MORNING HE COULD NOT TALK TO ME DUE TO THE TWR BEING UNDERSTAFFED THAT MORNING. IN THE FUTURE, IF I AM TOLD BY THE CTLR TO 'RESUME OWN NAV' WHILE VFR, I WILL INQUIRE AS TO WHAT MY ALT RESTRS ARE. I WILL ALSO ADVISE MY STUDENTS AND FELLOW PLTS OF THIS OCCURRENCE AND ADVISE THEM TO DO THE SAME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.