37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 482848 |
Time | |
Date | 200008 |
Day | Tue |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : sat.tracon |
State Reference | TX |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 5000 msl bound upper : 6000 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : aus.tracon tracon : sat.tracon |
Operator | general aviation : corporate |
Make Model Name | HS 125 Series 1-600 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | cruise : level |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : sat.tracon tracon : aus.tracon |
Operator | other |
Make Model Name | Mentor (T-34) |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | cruise : level |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : approach |
Qualification | controller : radar |
ASRS Report | 482848 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : approach |
Qualification | controller : radar |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | controller : separated traffic controller : issued new clearance |
Consequence | faa : investigated |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | ATC Human Performance Airspace Structure |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Inter Facility Coordination Failure |
Situations | |
ATC Facility | procedure or policy : sat.tracon |
Narrative:
The following procedure was a contributing factor in the last operational error here at sat, and I submit this in an effort to avert any more such incidents. Inherently, ZHU separates high performance aircraft departing aus and sat airspace respectively. However, sat has been forced to work aus sbound departure traffic as overflts. I say forced, because sat alliance communication has for 2 yrs unsuccessfully attempted to resolve this matter. Not only does this procedure delay aircraft, it compromises the integrity of the sat operation by unnecessarily creating conflict with sat, rnd, skf and ssf arrs and departures. The following is one of many examples that have become intolerable. Aus appreq's keeping an HS25 (aircraft X requesting FL330) at 5000 ft, below a T34 (aircraft Y landing rnd) at 6000 ft. I respond by instructing the controller that he needs to separate these aircraft in an efficient manner and according to LOA. Contrary to my instruction, he hands off these aircraft as requested creating several conflicts. I immediately turn the T34 to 180 degrees, ensuring separation. I start to step up the HS25. Step up in reference to 2 arrival carriers and 3 departure carriers, one departure, an air carrier, was delayed 20 mi to ensure safety. This procedure creates undue peril for aircraft and the sat controling workforce. Therefore, I suggest that this procedure be discontinued immediately and that ZHU do their job by separating aus and sat departures without further impeding the sat operation.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: SAT CTLR CONCERNED WITH LOA PROCS BTWN SAT AND AUS TRACONS.
Narrative: THE FOLLOWING PROC WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN THE LAST OPERROR HERE AT SAT, AND I SUBMIT THIS IN AN EFFORT TO AVERT ANY MORE SUCH INCIDENTS. INHERENTLY, ZHU SEPARATES HIGH PERFORMANCE ACFT DEPARTING AUS AND SAT AIRSPACE RESPECTIVELY. HOWEVER, SAT HAS BEEN FORCED TO WORK AUS SBOUND DEP TFC AS OVERFLTS. I SAY FORCED, BECAUSE SAT ALLIANCE COM HAS FOR 2 YRS UNSUCCESSFULLY ATTEMPTED TO RESOLVE THIS MATTER. NOT ONLY DOES THIS PROC DELAY ACFT, IT COMPROMISES THE INTEGRITY OF THE SAT OP BY UNNECESSARILY CREATING CONFLICT WITH SAT, RND, SKF AND SSF ARRS AND DEPS. THE FOLLOWING IS ONE OF MANY EXAMPLES THAT HAVE BECOME INTOLERABLE. AUS APPREQ'S KEEPING AN HS25 (ACFT X REQUESTING FL330) AT 5000 FT, BELOW A T34 (ACFT Y LNDG RND) AT 6000 FT. I RESPOND BY INSTRUCTING THE CTLR THAT HE NEEDS TO SEPARATE THESE ACFT IN AN EFFICIENT MANNER AND ACCORDING TO LOA. CONTRARY TO MY INSTRUCTION, HE HANDS OFF THESE ACFT AS REQUESTED CREATING SEVERAL CONFLICTS. I IMMEDIATELY TURN THE T34 TO 180 DEGS, ENSURING SEPARATION. I START TO STEP UP THE HS25. STEP UP IN REF TO 2 ARR CARRIERS AND 3 DEP CARRIERS, ONE DEP, AN ACR, WAS DELAYED 20 MI TO ENSURE SAFETY. THIS PROC CREATES UNDUE PERIL FOR ACFT AND THE SAT CTLING WORKFORCE. THEREFORE, I SUGGEST THAT THIS PROC BE DISCONTINUED IMMEDIATELY AND THAT ZHU DO THEIR JOB BY SEPARATING AUS AND SAT DEPS WITHOUT FURTHER IMPEDING THE SAT OP.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.