Narrative:

We (the crew) were on the 1ST day of a 4 day trip. This was our 2ND leg of the day, roc to ewr. So far the flight was uneventful. New york approach told us to 'expect ILS runway 11 ewr, circle to land runway 22R,' and 'to keep our speed up.' new york approach told us to intercept the localizer for runway 11. Eventually, new york approach said, 'cleared ILS runway 11, circle-to-land runway 22R.' I told the PNF (captain) to begin the landing checklist and we both mutually agreed to delay configuring the airplane in order to kept the airspeed fast and wait to configure until turning right downwind for runway 22R, which complies with company procedures. New york approach told us to contact newark tower. Upon checking in with the tower there was a lot of radio congestion and several radio xmissions were blocked. The PNF contacted the tower and the controller said 'cleared to land,' hesitated, and said 'oh, make it runway 11.' we accepted the landing clearance for runway 11, but due to us originally expecting ILS runway 11, circle-to-land runway 22R, we could not slow down and configure the airplane in time to make a safe landing on runway 11. The PNF tried to contact tower to let the controller know we could not land on runway 11, but the only tower frequency was so congested that the controller could not be notified of our situation. On very short final for runway 11, the PNF was able to get a word in, and told the controller we were unable to land runway 11. The controller said, 'ok, then cleared to land runway 22R.' as the airplane was turned onto a right downwind runway 22R, the controller asked if we had traffic in sight. Due to us trying to fly the airplane safely, the PNF said, 'no, we don't have the traffic in sight.' then the controller told us to climb to 1600 ft and fly a 300 degree heading. Immediately, the controller gave us a left turn to rejoin the right base (a right turn would have been better), which put the airplane in a very close base to final leg. In conclusion, the last min change in our landing clearance, radio congestion on a single tower frequency and last min warning of wake turbulence, led to a very ________ approach and landing at ewr. Reflecting back on this incident, what I would have done differently would have been to immediately refuse straight in landing for runway 11, knowing the airplane's confign, and not help ATC by accepting runway 11. I would have even initiated a go around as soon as I realized the airplane could not safely land on runway 11. ATC would then have to give us vectors, which would have given the captain and I the opportunity to settle down, reorganize and fly a normal approach. I fly into and out of ewr once a week. There is only 1 tower and ground which contributes to xmissions being blocked and confusion. There was one occasion I did not understand the taxi instructions and wanted to ask for clarification, but was unable because there was so many people on the frequency. So I waited on the taxiway until I could speak. Another example is this incident I wrote about. The PNF was unable to tell the tower we were unable to land runway 11. Multiple frequencys are needed at ewr.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FREQ CONGESTION, 2 LAST MIN RWY CHANGES, A HIGH SPD APCH, ACCEPTING AN IMPOSSIBLE CLRNC AND MULTIPLE NON PARALLEL RWYS IN USE UNDER 1 CTLR'S DIRECTION LEAD TO A VERY CONFUSED ARR AT NEWARK, NJ.

Narrative: WE (THE CREW) WERE ON THE 1ST DAY OF A 4 DAY TRIP. THIS WAS OUR 2ND LEG OF THE DAY, ROC TO EWR. SO FAR THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. NEW YORK APCH TOLD US TO 'EXPECT ILS RWY 11 EWR, CIRCLE TO LAND RWY 22R,' AND 'TO KEEP OUR SPD UP.' NEW YORK APCH TOLD US TO INTERCEPT THE LOC FOR RWY 11. EVENTUALLY, NEW YORK APCH SAID, 'CLRED ILS RWY 11, CIRCLE-TO-LAND RWY 22R.' I TOLD THE PNF (CAPT) TO BEGIN THE LNDG CHKLIST AND WE BOTH MUTUALLY AGREED TO DELAY CONFIGURING THE AIRPLANE IN ORDER TO KEPT THE AIRSPD FAST AND WAIT TO CONFIGURE UNTIL TURNING R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 22R, WHICH COMPLIES WITH COMPANY PROCS. NEW YORK APCH TOLD US TO CONTACT NEWARK TWR. UPON CHKING IN WITH THE TWR THERE WAS A LOT OF RADIO CONGESTION AND SEVERAL RADIO XMISSIONS WERE BLOCKED. THE PNF CONTACTED THE TWR AND THE CTLR SAID 'CLRED TO LAND,' HESITATED, AND SAID 'OH, MAKE IT RWY 11.' WE ACCEPTED THE LNDG CLRNC FOR RWY 11, BUT DUE TO US ORIGINALLY EXPECTING ILS RWY 11, CIRCLE-TO-LAND RWY 22R, WE COULD NOT SLOW DOWN AND CONFIGURE THE AIRPLANE IN TIME TO MAKE A SAFE LNDG ON RWY 11. THE PNF TRIED TO CONTACT TWR TO LET THE CTLR KNOW WE COULD NOT LAND ON RWY 11, BUT THE ONLY TWR FREQ WAS SO CONGESTED THAT THE CTLR COULD NOT BE NOTIFIED OF OUR SIT. ON VERY SHORT FINAL FOR RWY 11, THE PNF WAS ABLE TO GET A WORD IN, AND TOLD THE CTLR WE WERE UNABLE TO LAND RWY 11. THE CTLR SAID, 'OK, THEN CLRED TO LAND RWY 22R.' AS THE AIRPLANE WAS TURNED ONTO A R DOWNWIND RWY 22R, THE CTLR ASKED IF WE HAD TFC IN SIGHT. DUE TO US TRYING TO FLY THE AIRPLANE SAFELY, THE PNF SAID, 'NO, WE DON'T HAVE THE TFC IN SIGHT.' THEN THE CTLR TOLD US TO CLB TO 1600 FT AND FLY A 300 DEG HDG. IMMEDIATELY, THE CTLR GAVE US A L TURN TO REJOIN THE R BASE (A R TURN WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER), WHICH PUT THE AIRPLANE IN A VERY CLOSE BASE TO FINAL LEG. IN CONCLUSION, THE LAST MIN CHANGE IN OUR LNDG CLRNC, RADIO CONGESTION ON A SINGLE TWR FREQ AND LAST MIN WARNING OF WAKE TURB, LED TO A VERY ________ APCH AND LNDG AT EWR. REFLECTING BACK ON THIS INCIDENT, WHAT I WOULD HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY WOULD HAVE BEEN TO IMMEDIATELY REFUSE STRAIGHT IN LNDG FOR RWY 11, KNOWING THE AIRPLANE'S CONFIGN, AND NOT HELP ATC BY ACCEPTING RWY 11. I WOULD HAVE EVEN INITIATED A GAR AS SOON AS I REALIZED THE AIRPLANE COULD NOT SAFELY LAND ON RWY 11. ATC WOULD THEN HAVE TO GIVE US VECTORS, WHICH WOULD HAVE GIVEN THE CAPT AND I THE OPPORTUNITY TO SETTLE DOWN, REORGANIZE AND FLY A NORMAL APCH. I FLY INTO AND OUT OF EWR ONCE A WK. THERE IS ONLY 1 TWR AND GND WHICH CONTRIBUTES TO XMISSIONS BEING BLOCKED AND CONFUSION. THERE WAS ONE OCCASION I DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS AND WANTED TO ASK FOR CLARIFICATION, BUT WAS UNABLE BECAUSE THERE WAS SO MANY PEOPLE ON THE FREQ. SO I WAITED ON THE TXWY UNTIL I COULD SPEAK. ANOTHER EXAMPLE IS THIS INCIDENT I WROTE ABOUT. THE PNF WAS UNABLE TO TELL THE TWR WE WERE UNABLE TO LAND RWY 11. MULTIPLE FREQS ARE NEEDED AT EWR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.