Narrative:

On sep/sun/00, military X, flight of 4 FA18's from NAS atlanta, GA, was conducting air-refueling training at approximately XA30 at AR633A. ZTL directed military X to turn left to 270 degrees and descend to FL200. ZTL then cleared military X to work marsa with military Y in AR633A. Military X turned east at FL200 to begin a join up with military Y (tanker). Military X approximately position is the hch 070030, the tanker, military Y, was traveling east approximately 20 mi east of military X. Military X acquired a radar contact that approximated the tanker's position, based on a call from military X to military Y asking for his position from hinch mountain. Military X conducted a radar intercept to a trail position on what turned out to be a commercial plane. At approximately 2 mi, military X recognized that it was not the correct aircraft, simultaneously military Y told military X that ZTL wants military X to climb above FL200. Military X responded to military Y by radio, discontinued the intercept by maneuvering south and west of the traffic and climbing to FL200. Military X did observe the commercial traffic in a climbing right hand turn followed by a return to level flight and constant heading. There are several factors that contributed to this incident including communication breakdown, less than optimum WX conditions, traffic density and airspace clearance versus published special use airspace confines. ATC was talking to military Y on a separate frequency from military X. There were multiple requests by military X to ATC to be on the same frequency as military Y and ATC to effect flight clearance and a marsa handoff. ATC was issuing clrncs to military Y as well as military X during this time period. ZTL did not give specific clearance to military X. No altitudes or restrs were issued other than clearance to work with military Y marsa in the AR633A. Military X did not confirm operating altitudes. The handoff from ZTL to military Y was poorly handled and communicated. There were numerous aircraft within the published confines of the AR633A. Six receiving aircraft, a tanker and several civilian aircraft. This led to difficulty in affecting the rendezvous. The air refueling training evolution was scheduled in the AR633A several days in advance. The published altitude confines are FL180/FL230. Military X and military Y all submitted IFR flight plans indicating usage of the AR633A. Flight crew briefing covered the published lateral and vertical limitations of the airspace. Military X flight time from takeoff to entry into AR633A was approximately 55 mins. This seems to be plenty of time to clear the airspace. Military X understood that they were cleared to operate in 'the block', or what was perceived as the published altitude block. ATC apparently did not release the airspace as published and did not clear the airspace. This is really the biggest contributing factor to the incident. Had the airspace been cleared and issued as requested and published, there would not have been a loss of separation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT OF 4 F-18'S CONDUCTING AIR-REFUELING TRAINING LOCKED ON A COMMERCIAL ACFT INSTEAD OF THE TANKER ACFT.

Narrative: ON SEP/SUN/00, MIL X, FLT OF 4 FA18'S FROM NAS ATLANTA, GA, WAS CONDUCTING AIR-REFUELING TRAINING AT APPROX XA30 AT AR633A. ZTL DIRECTED MIL X TO TURN L TO 270 DEGS AND DSND TO FL200. ZTL THEN CLRED MIL X TO WORK MARSA WITH MIL Y IN AR633A. MIL X TURNED E AT FL200 TO BEGIN A JOIN UP WITH MIL Y (TANKER). MIL X APPROX POS IS THE HCH 070030, THE TANKER, MIL Y, WAS TRAVELING E APPROX 20 MI E OF MIL X. MIL X ACQUIRED A RADAR CONTACT THAT APPROXIMATED THE TANKER'S POS, BASED ON A CALL FROM MIL X TO MIL Y ASKING FOR HIS POS FROM HINCH MOUNTAIN. MIL X CONDUCTED A RADAR INTERCEPT TO A TRAIL POS ON WHAT TURNED OUT TO BE A COMMERCIAL PLANE. AT APPROX 2 MI, MIL X RECOGNIZED THAT IT WAS NOT THE CORRECT ACFT, SIMULTANEOUSLY MIL Y TOLD MIL X THAT ZTL WANTS MIL X TO CLB ABOVE FL200. MIL X RESPONDED TO MIL Y BY RADIO, DISCONTINUED THE INTERCEPT BY MANEUVERING S AND W OF THE TFC AND CLBING TO FL200. MIL X DID OBSERVE THE COMMERCIAL TFC IN A CLBING R HAND TURN FOLLOWED BY A RETURN TO LEVEL FLT AND CONSTANT HEADING. THERE ARE SEVERAL FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT INCLUDING COM BREAKDOWN, LESS THAN OPTIMUM WX CONDITIONS, TFC DENSITY AND AIRSPACE CLRNC VERSUS PUBLISHED SPECIAL USE AIRSPACE CONFINES. ATC WAS TALKING TO MIL Y ON A SEPARATE FREQ FROM MIL X. THERE WERE MULTIPLE REQUESTS BY MIL X TO ATC TO BE ON THE SAME FREQ AS MIL Y AND ATC TO EFFECT FLT CLRNC AND A MARSA HDOF. ATC WAS ISSUING CLRNCS TO MIL Y AS WELL AS MIL X DURING THIS TIME PERIOD. ZTL DID NOT GIVE SPECIFIC CLRNC TO MIL X. NO ALTS OR RESTRS WERE ISSUED OTHER THAN CLRNC TO WORK WITH MIL Y MARSA IN THE AR633A. MIL X DID NOT CONFIRM OPERATING ALTS. THE HDOF FROM ZTL TO MIL Y WAS POORLY HANDLED AND COMMUNICATED. THERE WERE NUMEROUS ACFT WITHIN THE PUBLISHED CONFINES OF THE AR633A. SIX RECEIVING ACFT, A TANKER AND SEVERAL CIVILIAN ACFT. THIS LED TO DIFFICULTY IN AFFECTING THE RENDEZVOUS. THE AIR REFUELING TRAINING EVOLUTION WAS SCHEDULED IN THE AR633A SEVERAL DAYS IN ADVANCE. THE PUBLISHED ALT CONFINES ARE FL180/FL230. MIL X AND MIL Y ALL SUBMITTED IFR FLT PLANS INDICATING USAGE OF THE AR633A. FLC BRIEFING COVERED THE PUBLISHED LATERAL AND VERT LIMITATIONS OF THE AIRSPACE. MIL X FLT TIME FROM TKOF TO ENTRY INTO AR633A WAS APPROX 55 MINS. THIS SEEMS TO BE PLENTY OF TIME TO CLR THE AIRSPACE. MIL X UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY WERE CLRED TO OPERATE IN 'THE BLOCK', OR WHAT WAS PERCEIVED AS THE PUBLISHED ALT BLOCK. ATC APPARENTLY DID NOT RELEASE THE AIRSPACE AS PUBLISHED AND DID NOT CLR THE AIRSPACE. THIS IS REALLY THE BIGGEST CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THE INCIDENT. HAD THE AIRSPACE BEEN CLRED AND ISSUED AS REQUESTED AND PUBLISHED, THERE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN A LOSS OF SEPARATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.