Narrative:

Error was caused by failure of toga mode to engage with toga switch and consequential loss of LNAV guidance and pitch guidance in the departure phase of flight. Company's absence of callout or procedure to immediately identify this abnormality was a contributing factor. Briefed the first officer that we would use LNAV guidance for the departure, which was programmed and reviewed in the FMC for a jfk 7 departure, bridge transition departing runway 13L. Normal procedures were followed. The toga switches set autothrottle, but evidently did not engage the flight director toga mode for takeoff. Immediately following takeoff noticed the absence of flight director commands. In transitioning to manual navigation and manipulation of aircraft without flight director, I exceeded 250 KTS in making l-hand turn to ogy nb. Angle of bank exceeded 30 degrees slightly. Crew coordination in attempting to regain normal flight director commands was lacking which let us deviate from the normal 1000 ft procedure of selecting N1 and bug 210 KTS. By not selecting N1, autothrottle was commanding full takeoff power, which I was overriding. The combinations of unexpected events, and failure to follow normal takeoff profile resulted in exceeding 250 KTS below 10000 ft. A procedure for the PNF to call out the annunciation of toga on the FMA after selecting same on the takeoff roll would help prevent a reoccurrence of this problem.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR CAPT BLAMES THE COMPANY'S LACK OF PROCS, IN THE CASE OF A TOGA FAILURE, AS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WHEN, DURING HIS CLBOUT, HE EXCEEDED 250 KIAS WHILE IN CLASS B.

Narrative: ERROR WAS CAUSED BY FAILURE OF TOGA MODE TO ENGAGE WITH TOGA SWITCH AND CONSEQUENTIAL LOSS OF LNAV GUIDANCE AND PITCH GUIDANCE IN THE DEP PHASE OF FLT. COMPANY'S ABSENCE OF CALLOUT OR PROC TO IMMEDIATELY IDENT THIS ABNORMALITY WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. BRIEFED THE FO THAT WE WOULD USE LNAV GUIDANCE FOR THE DEP, WHICH WAS PROGRAMMED AND REVIEWED IN THE FMC FOR A JFK 7 DEP, BRIDGE TRANSITION DEPARTING RWY 13L. NORMAL PROCS WERE FOLLOWED. THE TOGA SWITCHES SET AUTOTHROTTLE, BUT EVIDENTLY DID NOT ENGAGE THE FLT DIRECTOR TOGA MODE FOR TKOF. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TKOF NOTICED THE ABSENCE OF FLT DIRECTOR COMMANDS. IN TRANSITIONING TO MANUAL NAV AND MANIPULATION OF ACFT WITHOUT FLT DIRECTOR, I EXCEEDED 250 KTS IN MAKING L-HAND TURN TO OGY NB. ANGLE OF BANK EXCEEDED 30 DEGS SLIGHTLY. CREW COORD IN ATTEMPTING TO REGAIN NORMAL FLT DIRECTOR COMMANDS WAS LACKING WHICH LET US DEVIATE FROM THE NORMAL 1000 FT PROC OF SELECTING N1 AND BUG 210 KTS. BY NOT SELECTING N1, AUTOTHROTTLE WAS COMMANDING FULL TKOF PWR, WHICH I WAS OVERRIDING. THE COMBINATIONS OF UNEXPECTED EVENTS, AND FAILURE TO FOLLOW NORMAL TKOF PROFILE RESULTED IN EXCEEDING 250 KTS BELOW 10000 FT. A PROC FOR THE PNF TO CALL OUT THE ANNUNCIATION OF TOGA ON THE FMA AFTER SELECTING SAME ON THE TKOF ROLL WOULD HELP PREVENT A REOCCURRENCE OF THIS PROB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.