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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 485734 |
Time | |
Date | 200009 |
Day | Sun |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : buf.airport |
State Reference | NY |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737-300 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | other |
Flight Phase | landing : roll |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : buf.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Regional Jet CL65, Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi ground other : stopped on rwy |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 100 flight time total : 15000 flight time type : 7000 |
ASRS Report | 485734 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 140 flight time total : 15000 flight time type : 140 |
ASRS Report | 485748 |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : ground critical ground encounters other non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | ATC Human Performance Airport FAA |
Primary Problem | Airport |
Air Traffic Incident | Operational Error |
Situations | |
ATC Facility | procedure or policy : buf.tower staffing : buf.tower |
Airport | lighting : buf.airport procedure or policy : buf.airport |
Narrative:
At approximately xa:40 we were cleared to lnd following an rj on a mile final to runway 23. On approximately 1 mi final we noticed strobe lights near the end of runway 23 that disappeared as if the rj had turned off. The tower controller and the rj pilot were in conversation about where the rj's gate was. The rj appeared to be lost but no indication that he was still on the runway. We landed and started to turn off on taxiway G and noticed the rj still on the runway. The rj was pointed as if going to exit the runway but was stopped with no strobe lights on that we noticed. The rj pilot should have made a strong indication that he was on the runway and the tower controller should have been able to tell where he was. The tower controller was working 2 frequency's and said that she could not see the runway from where she was because of the terminal lights blocked her view. The tower controller should not be left alone with no supervision, the tower controller should not be working 2 frequency's, the tower controller should not 'lose' aircraft and lights should never block the view of a controller. Aircraft should always clear the runway before stopping and asking for directions. Supplemental information from acn 485748: we were cleared for approach to runway 23 at baf, and outside the outer marker we contracted tower. She cleared us to landing on runway 23. There was a crj that preceded us on the approach. The rj and the tower had a conversation about what gate the rj was parking on. At approximately 1-2 mi final, it appeared that the crj was clearing the runway. We touched down and cleared at taxiway G, and we then realized that the rj was also just now clearing the runway. The tower was asking the rj where they were, and the rj area seemed unfamiliar. The tower asked us where we were! The captain asked the tower if she could see us. Her response was no! I cannot see that end of runway because of the new terminal lights that were installed. We were not close to the crj as we cleared at G from a normal landing and turn off. The potential is there for a serious incident/accident. The tower did not adequately ATC control the crj crew was unfamiliar, and it was at night. I believe the tower lost track of both aircraft, and visibility maybe restricted at the buf tower for the approach end of runway 5. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: tower controller told reporter that the far end of runway 23 was not visible due to the glare caused by terminal lighting. Captain has reported the problem to his union air safety and his air carrier. He is also concerned that the controller appeared to lose the rj and was not aware it was still on the runway.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737-300 LANDED ON RWY 23 AT BUF WHILE AN ACR ACFT WAS STOPPED AT THE FAR END OF THE RWY.
Narrative: AT APPROX XA:40 WE WERE CLRED TO LND FOLLOWING AN RJ ON A MILE FINAL TO RWY 23. ON APPROX 1 MI FINAL WE NOTICED STROBE LIGHTS NEAR THE END OF RWY 23 THAT DISAPPEARED AS IF THE RJ HAD TURNED OFF. THE TWR CTLR AND THE RJ PLT WERE IN CONVERSATION ABOUT WHERE THE RJ'S GATE WAS. THE RJ APPEARED TO BE LOST BUT NO INDICATION THAT HE WAS STILL ON THE RWY. WE LANDED AND STARTED TO TURN OFF ON TXWY G AND NOTICED THE RJ STILL ON THE RWY. THE RJ WAS POINTED AS IF GOING TO EXIT THE RWY BUT WAS STOPPED WITH NO STROBE LIGHTS ON THAT WE NOTICED. THE RJ PLT SHOULD HAVE MADE A STRONG INDICATION THAT HE WAS ON THE RWY AND THE TWR CTLR SHOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO TELL WHERE HE WAS. THE TWR CTLR WAS WORKING 2 FREQ'S AND SAID THAT SHE COULD NOT SEE THE RWY FROM WHERE SHE WAS BECAUSE OF THE TERMINAL LIGHTS BLOCKED HER VIEW. THE TWR CTLR SHOULD NOT BE LEFT ALONE WITH NO SUPERVISION, THE TWR CTLR SHOULD NOT BE WORKING 2 FREQ'S, THE TWR CTLR SHOULD NOT 'LOSE' ACFT AND LIGHTS SHOULD NEVER BLOCK THE VIEW OF A CTLR. ACFT SHOULD ALWAYS CLR THE RWY BEFORE STOPPING AND ASKING FOR DIRECTIONS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 485748: WE WERE CLRED FOR APCH TO RWY 23 AT BAF, AND OUTSIDE THE OUTER MARKER WE CONTRACTED TWR. SHE CLRED US TO LNDG ON RWY 23. THERE WAS A CRJ THAT PRECEDED US ON THE APCH. THE RJ AND THE TWR HAD A CONVERSATION ABOUT WHAT GATE THE RJ WAS PARKING ON. AT APPROX 1-2 MI FINAL, IT APPEARED THAT THE CRJ WAS CLRING THE RWY. WE TOUCHED DOWN AND CLRED AT TXWY G, AND WE THEN REALIZED THAT THE RJ WAS ALSO JUST NOW CLRING THE RWY. THE TWR WAS ASKING THE RJ WHERE THEY WERE, AND THE RJ AREA SEEMED UNFAMILIAR. THE TWR ASKED US WHERE WE WERE! THE CAPT ASKED THE TWR IF SHE COULD SEE US. HER RESPONSE WAS NO! I CANNOT SEE THAT END OF RWY BECAUSE OF THE NEW TERMINAL LIGHTS THAT WERE INSTALLED. WE WERE NOT CLOSE TO THE CRJ AS WE CLRED AT G FROM A NORMAL LNDG AND TURN OFF. THE POTENTIAL IS THERE FOR A SERIOUS INCIDENT/ACCIDENT. THE TWR DID NOT ADEQUATELY ATC CTL THE CRJ CREW WAS UNFAMILIAR, AND IT WAS AT NIGHT. I BELIEVE THE TWR LOST TRACK OF BOTH ACFT, AND VISIBILITY MAYBE RESTRICTED AT THE BUF TWR FOR THE APCH END OF RWY 5. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: TWR CTLR TOLD RPTR THAT THE FAR END OF RWY 23 WAS NOT VISIBLE DUE TO THE GLARE CAUSED BY TERMINAL LIGHTING. CAPT HAS RPTED THE PROB TO HIS UNION AIR SAFETY AND HIS ACR. HE IS ALSO CONCERNED THAT THE CTLR APPEARED TO LOSE THE RJ AND WAS NOT AWARE IT WAS STILL ON THE RWY.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.