Narrative:

On sep/fri/00, I was involved in a DC9 #1 engine change (aircraft xyz) at ZZZ at air carrier maintenance facility. At the beginning of my shift on sep/fri/00 at XA00, the engine was in place and the mount bolts were already torqued. At approximately ZE00 on sep/fri/00 the mechanics working the aircraft asked me to look at and inspect the final hook-ups on the #1 engine, which is a step on the DC9 engine change card that was being worked. The items listed on this step are: fuel connections, fuel shutoff, fuel control, PT2, PT7, electrical connections and hydraulic connections. I thought I had looked at all items listed in this step for security but apparently I missed the connection of the PT2 line to the engine. Later that evening on sep/fri/00 (approximately AG00) I went on engine trim runs with the mechanics working the engine change. All indications were normal and within specified limits of the engine trim procedures card (JT8-D). The aircraft was released for service at approximately XH30 on sep/sat/00. At approximately XM20 on sep/sat/00 I was informed aircraft xyz had an in-flight turn-around just after takeoff because of throttle split. The line mechanic who looked at the aircraft after returning to the ramp found the PT2 line on the #1 engine was disconnected. I was the person responsible for this mistake as I was the inspector for this item and the last one to look at it. I mistakenly overlooked the connection. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the inspection job card was used and the pressure ratio probe at station #2 was listed on the card and signed off. The reporter said it was inadvertently missed. The reporter said the problem could not be discovered on engine run, as the airplane would not be moving and only static pressure would be observed. The reporter stated the incident did not involve the FAA as the company took disciplinary action.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DC9 WAS DISPATCHED AND RETURNED TO THE FIELD WITH #1 ENG PRESSURE RATIO PROBE LINE DISCONNECTED AT ENG STATION #2. LINE NOT FOUND ON ENG CHANGE INSPECTION.

Narrative: ON SEP/FRI/00, I WAS INVOLVED IN A DC9 #1 ENG CHANGE (ACFT XYZ) AT ZZZ AT ACR MAINT FACILITY. AT THE BEGINNING OF MY SHIFT ON SEP/FRI/00 AT XA00, THE ENG WAS IN PLACE AND THE MOUNT BOLTS WERE ALREADY TORQUED. AT APPROX ZE00 ON SEP/FRI/00 THE MECHS WORKING THE ACFT ASKED ME TO LOOK AT AND INSPECT THE FINAL HOOK-UPS ON THE #1 ENG, WHICH IS A STEP ON THE DC9 ENG CHANGE CARD THAT WAS BEING WORKED. THE ITEMS LISTED ON THIS STEP ARE: FUEL CONNECTIONS, FUEL SHUTOFF, FUEL CTL, PT2, PT7, ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS AND HYD CONNECTIONS. I THOUGHT I HAD LOOKED AT ALL ITEMS LISTED IN THIS STEP FOR SECURITY BUT APPARENTLY I MISSED THE CONNECTION OF THE PT2 LINE TO THE ENG. LATER THAT EVENING ON SEP/FRI/00 (APPROX AG00) I WENT ON ENG TRIM RUNS WITH THE MECHS WORKING THE ENG CHANGE. ALL INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL AND WITHIN SPECIFIED LIMITS OF THE ENG TRIM PROCS CARD (JT8-D). THE ACFT WAS RELEASED FOR SVC AT APPROX XH30 ON SEP/SAT/00. AT APPROX XM20 ON SEP/SAT/00 I WAS INFORMED ACFT XYZ HAD AN INFLT TURN-AROUND JUST AFTER TKOF BECAUSE OF THROTTLE SPLIT. THE LINE MECH WHO LOOKED AT THE ACFT AFTER RETURNING TO THE RAMP FOUND THE PT2 LINE ON THE #1 ENG WAS DISCONNECTED. I WAS THE PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS MISTAKE AS I WAS THE INSPECTOR FOR THIS ITEM AND THE LAST ONE TO LOOK AT IT. I MISTAKENLY OVERLOOKED THE CONNECTION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE INSPECTION JOB CARD WAS USED AND THE PRESSURE RATIO PROBE AT STATION #2 WAS LISTED ON THE CARD AND SIGNED OFF. THE RPTR SAID IT WAS INADVERTENTLY MISSED. THE RPTR SAID THE PROB COULD NOT BE DISCOVERED ON ENG RUN, AS THE AIRPLANE WOULD NOT BE MOVING AND ONLY STATIC PRESSURE WOULD BE OBSERVED. THE RPTR STATED THE INCIDENT DID NOT INVOLVE THE FAA AS THE COMPANY TOOK DISCIPLINARY ACTION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.