Narrative:

The following events happened on oct/fri/00, on a flight from den to lax. The WX in den was -1 degree with light freezing precipitation. There was ice on the airplane and aircraft was anti-iced with type 1 and 4. I was the PF. Taxi-out and takeoff were uneventful. Engine anti-ice was on for takeoff and airfoil anti-ice on at 1000 ft and for entire climb. All ice protection was turned off just prior to cruise altitude of FL310. During climb the flight attendants noted that it was cold in the cabin. I was the PF, but I was also paying attention to the air conditioning system. I selected 110 degrees or so on the right side in an effort to warm the cabin. The pack responded normally. A little while later it was still reported a bit cold in back, and I manually selected a temperature of 120 degrees on the right side, and again, the temperature in the system reacted normally to my input as measured by the cabin supply readout on the overhead panel. I left it at 120 degrees. I did find it odd that the cabin was still cold. I found it interesting that the temperature control valve indicator on the left side was indicating very hot, about 70% to 80% through the gauge on the hot side, but the temperature in the cockpit was normal and responding normally on the left side, which was in automatic. The temperature control valve indicator on the right was indicating normally and moving in proportion to the selected manual inputs. I noticed nothing abnormal about the flow on either side. In cruise flight, at FL310, we got a flow light. We noted that the cabin vsi was pegged at a 1500 FPM climb. My ears were popping, I had the sensation of air being drawn from my lungs, we donned our masks, and the captain took the airplane and initiated an emergency descent. I dropped the passenger oxygen masks as per the memory item on the checklist and advised ATC of our situation. Center advised us that bce was right off to the right and las was 120 mi or so away. The captain elected to go to las. I noted then that the right cabin supply temperature was at 150 degrees, the top of the gauge. I tried to lower the temperature, but it would not respond in either manual or automatic mode. I pointed the high temperature to the captain. At about that point flight attendant #1 informed us that there was smoke in the cabin. I asked ATC the length and elevation of bce and we learned that it was 7500 ft long and 7500 ft in elevation. The captain elected to go to bce, which I believed to be the right decision. With the emergency checklist complete, I did the descent checklist and we did the mechanical before landing checklist as the captain flew the airplane. I also broadcast on the CTAF for bce our intentions to land. We flew right traffic and, with maximum braking selected, landed to the south at bce. We parked about 1000 ft short of the runway. After assessing the situation we deplaned the passenger down the aft airstairs. There was an odor like hot plastic in the airplane. I won't go into detail about what happened on the ground with the passenger, etc. One more item of note is that we were unable to start the engines later. The APU was proving normal electrical power, but there was zero pneumatic pressure. Before we allowed the passenger to exit down the aft stairway, the captain had me examine the area. I noted that the glycol was streaming from the tailcone at a surprising rate. It was a constant stream, which seemed unusual after an hour of flying. 2 hours later the glycol was no longer streaming, but still dripping from the tailcone. I saw this as unusual, but no reason to not allow the passenger to use the stairs. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the first officer stated that after the postflt inspection the company failed to reveal any equipment problems to the crew. The first officer suspects that the deicing fluid was trapped because of the air condition/pressurizing equipment confign. The fluid somehow entered the intakes of the system and was trapped in the aft cone area. The readings on the left gauge were later to be determined as false reading from a bad gauge. Supplemental information from acn 487955: initial landing planned at las, 100 NM west, but MEA was only 15000 ft. An emergency was declared and men and equipment on request. Flight attendants did a superb job during the whole event. Entire crew stayed on scene to remove aircraft from runway, care for passenger transport needs, and to help supervise as no company person or maintenance were handy. Tow was needed to park aircraft as no APU pneumatic available.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN S80 FLC DIVERTS TO BCE WHEN LOSING CABIN PRESSURE AND EXPERIENCES SOME SMOKE DURING THE EMER DSCNT ON FREQ WITH ZLC, UT.

Narrative: THE FOLLOWING EVENTS HAPPENED ON OCT/FRI/00, ON A FLT FROM DEN TO LAX. THE WX IN DEN WAS -1 DEG WITH LIGHT FREEZING PRECIPITATION. THERE WAS ICE ON THE AIRPLANE AND ACFT WAS ANTI-ICED WITH TYPE 1 AND 4. I WAS THE PF. TAXI-OUT AND TKOF WERE UNEVENTFUL. ENG ANTI-ICE WAS ON FOR TKOF AND AIRFOIL ANTI-ICE ON AT 1000 FT AND FOR ENTIRE CLB. ALL ICE PROTECTION WAS TURNED OFF JUST PRIOR TO CRUISE ALT OF FL310. DURING CLB THE FLT ATTENDANTS NOTED THAT IT WAS COLD IN THE CABIN. I WAS THE PF, BUT I WAS ALSO PAYING ATTN TO THE AIR CONDITIONING SYS. I SELECTED 110 DEGS OR SO ON THE R SIDE IN AN EFFORT TO WARM THE CABIN. THE PACK RESPONDED NORMALLY. A LITTLE WHILE LATER IT WAS STILL RPTED A BIT COLD IN BACK, AND I MANUALLY SELECTED A TEMP OF 120 DEGS ON THE R SIDE, AND AGAIN, THE TEMP IN THE SYS REACTED NORMALLY TO MY INPUT AS MEASURED BY THE CABIN SUPPLY READOUT ON THE OVERHEAD PANEL. I LEFT IT AT 120 DEGS. I DID FIND IT ODD THAT THE CABIN WAS STILL COLD. I FOUND IT INTERESTING THAT THE TEMP CTL VALVE INDICATOR ON THE L SIDE WAS INDICATING VERY HOT, ABOUT 70% TO 80% THROUGH THE GAUGE ON THE HOT SIDE, BUT THE TEMP IN THE COCKPIT WAS NORMAL AND RESPONDING NORMALLY ON THE L SIDE, WHICH WAS IN AUTO. THE TEMP CTL VALVE INDICATOR ON THE R WAS INDICATING NORMALLY AND MOVING IN PROPORTION TO THE SELECTED MANUAL INPUTS. I NOTICED NOTHING ABNORMAL ABOUT THE FLOW ON EITHER SIDE. IN CRUISE FLT, AT FL310, WE GOT A FLOW LIGHT. WE NOTED THAT THE CABIN VSI WAS PEGGED AT A 1500 FPM CLB. MY EARS WERE POPPING, I HAD THE SENSATION OF AIR BEING DRAWN FROM MY LUNGS, WE DONNED OUR MASKS, AND THE CAPT TOOK THE AIRPLANE AND INITIATED AN EMER DSCNT. I DROPPED THE PAX OXYGEN MASKS AS PER THE MEMORY ITEM ON THE CHKLIST AND ADVISED ATC OF OUR SIT. CTR ADVISED US THAT BCE WAS RIGHT OFF TO THE R AND LAS WAS 120 MI OR SO AWAY. THE CAPT ELECTED TO GO TO LAS. I NOTED THEN THAT THE R CABIN SUPPLY TEMP WAS AT 150 DEGS, THE TOP OF THE GAUGE. I TRIED TO LOWER THE TEMP, BUT IT WOULD NOT RESPOND IN EITHER MANUAL OR AUTO MODE. I POINTED THE HIGH TEMP TO THE CAPT. AT ABOUT THAT POINT FLT ATTENDANT #1 INFORMED US THAT THERE WAS SMOKE IN THE CABIN. I ASKED ATC THE LENGTH AND ELEVATION OF BCE AND WE LEARNED THAT IT WAS 7500 FT LONG AND 7500 FT IN ELEVATION. THE CAPT ELECTED TO GO TO BCE, WHICH I BELIEVED TO BE THE RIGHT DECISION. WITH THE EMER CHKLIST COMPLETE, I DID THE DSCNT CHKLIST AND WE DID THE MECHANICAL BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST AS THE CAPT FLEW THE AIRPLANE. I ALSO BROADCAST ON THE CTAF FOR BCE OUR INTENTIONS TO LAND. WE FLEW R TFC AND, WITH MAX BRAKING SELECTED, LANDED TO THE S AT BCE. WE PARKED ABOUT 1000 FT SHORT OF THE RWY. AFTER ASSESSING THE SIT WE DEPLANED THE PAX DOWN THE AFT AIRSTAIRS. THERE WAS AN ODOR LIKE HOT PLASTIC IN THE AIRPLANE. I WON'T GO INTO DETAIL ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED ON THE GND WITH THE PAX, ETC. ONE MORE ITEM OF NOTE IS THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO START THE ENGS LATER. THE APU WAS PROVING NORMAL ELECTRICAL PWR, BUT THERE WAS ZERO PNEUMATIC PRESSURE. BEFORE WE ALLOWED THE PAX TO EXIT DOWN THE AFT STAIRWAY, THE CAPT HAD ME EXAMINE THE AREA. I NOTED THAT THE GLYCOL WAS STREAMING FROM THE TAILCONE AT A SURPRISING RATE. IT WAS A CONSTANT STREAM, WHICH SEEMED UNUSUAL AFTER AN HR OF FLYING. 2 HRS LATER THE GLYCOL WAS NO LONGER STREAMING, BUT STILL DRIPPING FROM THE TAILCONE. I SAW THIS AS UNUSUAL, BUT NO REASON TO NOT ALLOW THE PAX TO USE THE STAIRS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE FO STATED THAT AFTER THE POSTFLT INSPECTION THE COMPANY FAILED TO REVEAL ANY EQUIP PROBS TO THE CREW. THE FO SUSPECTS THAT THE DEICING FLUID WAS TRAPPED BECAUSE OF THE AIR CONDITION/PRESSURIZING EQUIP CONFIGN. THE FLUID SOMEHOW ENTERED THE INTAKES OF THE SYS AND WAS TRAPPED IN THE AFT CONE AREA. THE READINGS ON THE L GAUGE WERE LATER TO BE DETERMINED AS FALSE READING FROM A BAD GAUGE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 487955: INITIAL LNDG PLANNED AT LAS, 100 NM W, BUT MEA WAS ONLY 15000 FT. AN EMER WAS DECLARED AND MEN AND EQUIP ON REQUEST. FLT ATTENDANTS DID A SUPERB JOB DURING THE WHOLE EVENT. ENTIRE CREW STAYED ON SCENE TO REMOVE ACFT FROM RWY, CARE FOR PAX TRANSPORT NEEDS, AND TO HELP SUPERVISE AS NO COMPANY PERSON OR MAINT WERE HANDY. TOW WAS NEEDED TO PARK ACFT AS NO APU PNEUMATIC AVAILABLE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.