Narrative:

En route to phl from sdf we were asked to enter the published holding pattern at terri intersection off of the dupont VOR on the dupont arrival into phl. Our flaps up holding speed was 220 KIAS at the weight we were operating at. We entered the holding pattern and, using the autoplt in the heading mode to maneuver the aircraft. Use of the autoplt in the heading mode usually banks the aircraft in a 20-25 degree angle of bank. (We had approximately 30+ KTS of wind at 14000 ft.) after completing the majority of the first turn in the holding pattern we were advised by ATC that we had exceeded the limits of the pattern and 'are we having any problems?' we advised ATC that we were not having any problems and would attempt to fly the pattern with more precision. At that point I noticed a notation on the arrival plate that indicated a maximum permitted holding speed of 210 KIAS. We configured the aircraft to 'flaps 1 degree' which reduced our holding speed to less than 210 KIAS and used the manual 'turn knob' to control the heading of the aircraft which gave us a 30 degree angle of bank. During the next circuit of the pattern the reduced airspeed and increased angle of bank helped to keep us within the confines of the holding pattern. Contributing factors were: 1) the crew and I not reading the arrival plate close enough to see the 210 KIAS holding speed limit. 2) relying on the autoplt in the 'heading' mode to produce required angle of bank. 3) the increased airspeed, limited angle of bank and relatively strong winds all contributed to allow us to exceed the limits of the holding pattern. Corrective actions: 1) configuring the aircraft to 'flaps 1 degree' to reduce the IAS. 2) using the 'turn knob' of the autoplt to increase the angle of bank to 30 degrees. 3) making precise wind corrections. Human performance considerations: neither of the crew members had a good night's sleep. Crew and maintenance worked through a relatively complex mechanical problem prior to departure. I believe fatigue may have played a part in us not being as sharp as we should have been. A very valuable lesson was learned by the crew.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B747 CARGO FLT EXCEEDS ITS HOLDING PATTERN LIMITS DURING SLOW TURN RATES IN A CLEAN CONFIGN NEAR TERRI INTXN, ZDC.

Narrative: ENRTE TO PHL FROM SDF WE WERE ASKED TO ENTER THE PUBLISHED HOLDING PATTERN AT TERRI INTXN OFF OF THE DUPONT VOR ON THE DUPONT ARR INTO PHL. OUR FLAPS UP HOLDING SPD WAS 220 KIAS AT THE WT WE WERE OPERATING AT. WE ENTERED THE HOLDING PATTERN AND, USING THE AUTOPLT IN THE HDG MODE TO MANEUVER THE ACFT. USE OF THE AUTOPLT IN THE HDG MODE USUALLY BANKS THE ACFT IN A 20-25 DEG ANGLE OF BANK. (WE HAD APPROX 30+ KTS OF WIND AT 14000 FT.) AFTER COMPLETING THE MAJORITY OF THE FIRST TURN IN THE HOLDING PATTERN WE WERE ADVISED BY ATC THAT WE HAD EXCEEDED THE LIMITS OF THE PATTERN AND 'ARE WE HAVING ANY PROBS?' WE ADVISED ATC THAT WE WERE NOT HAVING ANY PROBS AND WOULD ATTEMPT TO FLY THE PATTERN WITH MORE PRECISION. AT THAT POINT I NOTICED A NOTATION ON THE ARR PLATE THAT INDICATED A MAX PERMITTED HOLDING SPD OF 210 KIAS. WE CONFIGURED THE ACFT TO 'FLAPS 1 DEG' WHICH REDUCED OUR HOLDING SPD TO LESS THAN 210 KIAS AND USED THE MANUAL 'TURN KNOB' TO CTL THE HDG OF THE ACFT WHICH GAVE US A 30 DEG ANGLE OF BANK. DURING THE NEXT CIRCUIT OF THE PATTERN THE REDUCED AIRSPD AND INCREASED ANGLE OF BANK HELPED TO KEEP US WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THE HOLDING PATTERN. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE: 1) THE CREW AND I NOT READING THE ARR PLATE CLOSE ENOUGH TO SEE THE 210 KIAS HOLDING SPD LIMIT. 2) RELYING ON THE AUTOPLT IN THE 'HDG' MODE TO PRODUCE REQUIRED ANGLE OF BANK. 3) THE INCREASED AIRSPD, LIMITED ANGLE OF BANK AND RELATIVELY STRONG WINDS ALL CONTRIBUTED TO ALLOW US TO EXCEED THE LIMITS OF THE HOLDING PATTERN. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: 1) CONFIGURING THE ACFT TO 'FLAPS 1 DEG' TO REDUCE THE IAS. 2) USING THE 'TURN KNOB' OF THE AUTOPLT TO INCREASE THE ANGLE OF BANK TO 30 DEGS. 3) MAKING PRECISE WIND CORRECTIONS. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: NEITHER OF THE CREW MEMBERS HAD A GOOD NIGHT'S SLEEP. CREW AND MAINT WORKED THROUGH A RELATIVELY COMPLEX MECHANICAL PROB PRIOR TO DEP. I BELIEVE FATIGUE MAY HAVE PLAYED A PART IN US NOT BEING AS SHARP AS WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN. A VERY VALUABLE LESSON WAS LEARNED BY THE CREW.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.