Narrative:

I was the captain and PNF on scheduled flight to sbn from cvg. My first officer was the PF. We were cleared to 'position and hold' on runway 27 following a B727 on takeoff roll. Traffic was landing runway 36L (intersecting 27). Prior to the B727 liftoff, tower cleared us to take off 'no delay, traffic on 2 1/2 mi final.' we completed our line-up checklist and rolled immediately. My first officer commented that the B727 was not off the ground yet. I said he's rotating and we continued our takeoff roll. During our ground run, we practiced standard company callouts. Normal liftoff and departure ensued. Tower directed the traffic landing runway 36L to go around mid way through our roll. Shortly after departure, the tower controller sent us over to departure control, but also commented 'I guess you didn't hear me cancel your takeoff clearance.' I replied that we certainly had not. Departures and arrs were numerous during this time. I believe we should not have been cleared to go until after the conflicting traffic had landed. Immediately after takeoff clearance is issued, intracockpit communication is extensive and important. Pilots are concentrating primarily on meeting takeoff criteria safety. If it was critical to have us discontinue takeoff, the controller should have repeatedly issued his instruction to cancel clearance or possibly call for an abort. I believe it was incumbent on the controller to make sure we heard his call.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MDT CREW WAS CLRED FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF BEFORE THE B727 AHEAD OF THEM WAS AIRBORNE.

Narrative: I WAS THE CAPT AND PNF ON SCHEDULED FLT TO SBN FROM CVG. MY FO WAS THE PF. WE WERE CLRED TO 'POS AND HOLD' ON RWY 27 FOLLOWING A B727 ON TKOF ROLL. TFC WAS LNDG RWY 36L (INTERSECTING 27). PRIOR TO THE B727 LIFTOFF, TWR CLRED US TO TAKE OFF 'NO DELAY, TFC ON 2 1/2 MI FINAL.' WE COMPLETED OUR LINE-UP CHKLIST AND ROLLED IMMEDIATELY. MY FO COMMENTED THAT THE B727 WAS NOT OFF THE GND YET. I SAID HE'S ROTATING AND WE CONTINUED OUR TKOF ROLL. DURING OUR GND RUN, WE PRACTICED STANDARD COMPANY CALLOUTS. NORMAL LIFTOFF AND DEP ENSUED. TWR DIRECTED THE TFC LNDG RWY 36L TO GO AROUND MID WAY THROUGH OUR ROLL. SHORTLY AFTER DEP, THE TWR CTLR SENT US OVER TO DEP CTL, BUT ALSO COMMENTED 'I GUESS YOU DIDN'T HEAR ME CANCEL YOUR TKOF CLRNC.' I REPLIED THAT WE CERTAINLY HAD NOT. DEPS AND ARRS WERE NUMEROUS DURING THIS TIME. I BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CLRED TO GO UNTIL AFTER THE CONFLICTING TFC HAD LANDED. IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF CLRNC IS ISSUED, INTRACOCKPIT COM IS EXTENSIVE AND IMPORTANT. PLTS ARE CONCENTRATING PRIMARILY ON MEETING TKOF CRITERIA SAFETY. IF IT WAS CRITICAL TO HAVE US DISCONTINUE TKOF, THE CTLR SHOULD HAVE REPEATEDLY ISSUED HIS INSTRUCTION TO CANCEL CLRNC OR POSSIBLY CALL FOR AN ABORT. I BELIEVE IT WAS INCUMBENT ON THE CTLR TO MAKE SURE WE HEARD HIS CALL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.