Narrative:

Ramp control assigned us to entry point taxiway H4. Flight, up to clearing the runway, was routine through the visual approach to runway 35. We exited the runway at the high speed taxiway H5 and intended to taxi taxiway H5, taxiway G, taxiway H4 to the ramp (shortest route). Just after passing taxiway H, I saw debris on the centerline of taxiway G just in front of the nose of the aircraft, so I stopped the airplane. It looked like wires or cargo banding material. We were unable to contact ground control, primarily since a single controller was working approach, tower, ground, and clearance delivery. At the time of our landing rollout, he was reading someone a clearance. After a min or so, we called and advised of debris and asked that someone remove it so we could continue to the gate. Ground called the airport truck, and the driver indicated with hand signals that the debris could not be removed, rather we had to taxi sbound on taxiway G. We inquired with ground control and were advised that 'oh, by the way, taxiway G is closed.' ground and the airport truck worked out that they would marshall us past the debris to taxi sbound on taxiway G to taxiway east to proceed to the gate. We made the turn onto taxiway G (just clearing the debris with our nose gear and engine) and proceeded to the gate without further incident. There was no mention of the closure of taxiway G on ATIS, the flight plan NOTAM section contained no NOTAM information, and there was no specific mention of the closure by the controllers. As the debris was directly in line with a high speed turnoff from the runway, we could easily have driven right over the debris and damaged the airplane or FOD the engine had we not been more vigilant. This kind of thing happens because of communications breakdown. The trap set for us was enhanced by the controller's quadruple responsibility (approach, tower, ground, and clearance). He simply couldn't simultaneously manage all 4 areas (could anyone?) when the airport authority/authorized closed the taxiway. It should have been on the ATIS. We should have been told during our approach and landing clearance that the high speed was unavailable, or it should have been notamed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757-200 FLC IS FORCED TO USE AN ALTERNATE TAXI RTE WHEN ENCOUNTERING DEBRIS ON THE PLANNED TXWY AT MCO, FL.

Narrative: RAMP CTL ASSIGNED US TO ENTRY POINT TXWY H4. FLT, UP TO CLRING THE RWY, WAS ROUTINE THROUGH THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 35. WE EXITED THE RWY AT THE HIGH SPD TXWY H5 AND INTENDED TO TAXI TXWY H5, TXWY G, TXWY H4 TO THE RAMP (SHORTEST RTE). JUST AFTER PASSING TXWY H, I SAW DEBRIS ON THE CTRLINE OF TXWY G JUST IN FRONT OF THE NOSE OF THE ACFT, SO I STOPPED THE AIRPLANE. IT LOOKED LIKE WIRES OR CARGO BANDING MATERIAL. WE WERE UNABLE TO CONTACT GND CTL, PRIMARILY SINCE A SINGLE CTLR WAS WORKING APCH, TWR, GND, AND CLRNC DELIVERY. AT THE TIME OF OUR LNDG ROLLOUT, HE WAS READING SOMEONE A CLRNC. AFTER A MIN OR SO, WE CALLED AND ADVISED OF DEBRIS AND ASKED THAT SOMEONE REMOVE IT SO WE COULD CONTINUE TO THE GATE. GND CALLED THE ARPT TRUCK, AND THE DRIVER INDICATED WITH HAND SIGNALS THAT THE DEBRIS COULD NOT BE REMOVED, RATHER WE HAD TO TAXI SBOUND ON TXWY G. WE INQUIRED WITH GND CTL AND WERE ADVISED THAT 'OH, BY THE WAY, TXWY G IS CLOSED.' GND AND THE ARPT TRUCK WORKED OUT THAT THEY WOULD MARSHALL US PAST THE DEBRIS TO TAXI SBOUND ON TXWY G TO TXWY E TO PROCEED TO THE GATE. WE MADE THE TURN ONTO TXWY G (JUST CLRING THE DEBRIS WITH OUR NOSE GEAR AND ENG) AND PROCEEDED TO THE GATE WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. THERE WAS NO MENTION OF THE CLOSURE OF TXWY G ON ATIS, THE FLT PLAN NOTAM SECTION CONTAINED NO NOTAM INFO, AND THERE WAS NO SPECIFIC MENTION OF THE CLOSURE BY THE CTLRS. AS THE DEBRIS WAS DIRECTLY IN LINE WITH A HIGH SPD TURNOFF FROM THE RWY, WE COULD EASILY HAVE DRIVEN RIGHT OVER THE DEBRIS AND DAMAGED THE AIRPLANE OR FOD THE ENG HAD WE NOT BEEN MORE VIGILANT. THIS KIND OF THING HAPPENS BECAUSE OF COMS BREAKDOWN. THE TRAP SET FOR US WAS ENHANCED BY THE CTLR'S QUADRUPLE RESPONSIBILITY (APCH, TWR, GND, AND CLRNC). HE SIMPLY COULDN'T SIMULTANEOUSLY MANAGE ALL 4 AREAS (COULD ANYONE?) WHEN THE ARPT AUTH CLOSED THE TXWY. IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ON THE ATIS. WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN TOLD DURING OUR APCH AND LNDG CLRNC THAT THE HIGH SPD WAS UNAVAILABLE, OR IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN NOTAMED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.