Narrative:

We were performing parachuting operations in accordance with far part 105. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed all day long and since we were operating within approximately a 6 mi radius of the airport, no flight plan was filed. It was XA01, and before takeoff checks were accomplished and we proceeded to take off from runway 12 at opn. After takeoff and takeoff checks were accomplished, I initiated contact with ZTL at XA04. I informed the controller we had just departed thomaston and were presently at 2500 ft MSL and climbing to 14500 ft MSL with jumpers at thomaston. At XA05 the controller came back and gave us a transponder code of XXXX. The climb to altitude was uneventful, however, the winds were shifting all day long making it difficult for us to give the jumpers a good 'spot.' the definition of a 'good spot' is an advantageous exit point from the aircraft to let the jumpers drift (due to prevailing winds) during free-fall, so that they may open their parachutes slightly upwind and land at the designated landing zone. PIC commented that in order to make the altitude and jump run coincide he would perform a 360 degree turn with about 10-15 degrees of bank. Once the maneuver was completed, we proceeded on course for jump run parallel with the runway direction of 300 degrees with an offset to the right of approximately .25-.30 NM. As we approached the jump run, PIC told me, 'make your 2 min warning calls to ZTL and thomaston traffic.' this is standard operating procedure. I transmitted to center '2 mins before jumpers away, aircraft X.' ZTL acknowledges the transmission with 'roger, aircraft X.' then PIC gave the command to lower and level the tailgate of the airplane, I performed the action and informed PIC the tailgate was level. Then PIC commanded for flaps at 40 degrees, again I performed the action and informed him that 'flaps tracking' and then 'flaps set, hydraulics off.' PIC mumbled to himself about the difficulty of this jump run because the winds were unpredictable. This was idented by a higher than usual ground speed from the IFR GPS that is onboard the aircraft. PIC then decided, I assume, to modify the direction of the jump run. It seemed like the right thing to do considering the ground speed we encountered. We never at any time turned a green light on in the aircraft. This is a very significant and important factor, because the aircraft is placarded at the tailgate that the green light is the only time jumpers may exit the aircraft. At wings level I received a call from the same controller from ZTL, asking us if we were still on jump run, I noted the urgency in her voice. PIC directed me to inform center that we were still in progress of jump run. She quickly informed us we had an air carrier jet at our 1 O'clock position, at the same altitude and closing, however, I don't recall any distance from the jet being given. At first I could not see the air carrier jet, and informed the controller that we were negative for finding the air carrier aircraft. I scanned intensely for the aircraft then I visually idented the plane, and quickly called back to center, 'I got it, I got it.' the air carrier jet appeared to be on a 60 degree intercept course with us and the air carrier jet was less than 2.0 mi and closing quickly. Simultaneously during this exchange with center, I informed PIC, that we had traffic at our 1 O'clock position, same altitude and closing quickly. PIC could not see the air carrier jet, and when I visually idented the air carrier jet and called center, PIC asked me which way to turn because he could not see the plane. I suspect PIC could not see the plane because the metal frames that encased our plane's cockpit windows may have blocked his view due to the angle from the left seat. We needed to take immediate action to turn away from the oncoming air carrier jet. When PIC asked me which way to turn in addition to not being able to see the plane, I knew that he could not judge the maneuver without being able to see the air carrier jet. Without hesitation I then banked the airplane 25 degrees right and turned to the right 180 degrees. PIC saw the air carrier jet as we turned out of the way. During this time, the red light was on inside our airplane, this means to standby. It is clearly placarded in the plane what the 2 different lights indicate. When I turned the airplane, we informed center that we had not released any jumpers from aircraft X. The air carrier crew, understandably, replied with great concern that jumpers, in fact, were exiting from our aircraft. PIC and I could not see from the cockpit if people were indeed exiting the tailgate because there were 30 jumpers blocking the view of the tailgate. I witnessed the last group which was a tandem master and passenger with a cameraman, I yelled as loud as I possibly could at them to not jump, they looked at me and dropped off the tailgate into blue skies. By this time the air carrier crew asked the controller for our tail number, she complied with them. Aircraft X radioed to the air carrier crew and apologized for the course of events. PIC and I were beyond astonishment in witnessing the selfish acts of the jumpers and blatant disregard to the PIC of the aircraft. I wanted to close the tailgate during the episode but I knew that the jumpers had positioned themselves on the tailgate during red standby light. It would have been dangerous to attempt closing the door with people standing on the tailgate. Someone could have been injured due to door closing unbeknownst to them. Since so many jumpers were blocking the view of the tailgate it wasn't worth risking more lives while trying to avoid another plane. The light went from red (standby) to the off position which means 'do not jump.' callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: this is an operation that uses a load organizer (jump master) for control and briefing of the jumpers. This day there were between 28 and 32 jumpers aboard. Postflt briefing was held to debrief jumpers and load organizers as to what had occurred. The jump light system is the only communication available between the cockpit and the jump master or jumpers. The reporter was unaware that TA's were required of ARTCC only on a time permitted basis since they were not on an IFR flight plan.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SKYDIVERS LEAVE ACFT WITHOUT COMMAND. ACR TFC CONFLICT WITH JUMPERS AND JUMP ACFT WHILE BOTH ACFT UNDER ARTCC CTL OR ADVISORY STATUS.

Narrative: WE WERE PERFORMING PARACHUTING OPS IN ACCORDANCE WITH FAR PART 105. VISUAL METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS PREVAILED ALL DAY LONG AND SINCE WE WERE OPERATING WITHIN APPROX A 6 MI RADIUS OF THE ARPT, NO FLT PLAN WAS FILED. IT WAS XA01, AND BEFORE TKOF CHKS WERE ACCOMPLISHED AND WE PROCEEDED TO TAKE OFF FROM RWY 12 AT OPN. AFTER TKOF AND TKOF CHKS WERE ACCOMPLISHED, I INITIATED CONTACT WITH ZTL AT XA04. I INFORMED THE CTLR WE HAD JUST DEPARTED THOMASTON AND WERE PRESENTLY AT 2500 FT MSL AND CLBING TO 14500 FT MSL WITH JUMPERS AT THOMASTON. AT XA05 THE CTLR CAME BACK AND GAVE US A XPONDER CODE OF XXXX. THE CLB TO ALT WAS UNEVENTFUL, HOWEVER, THE WINDS WERE SHIFTING ALL DAY LONG MAKING IT DIFFICULT FOR US TO GIVE THE JUMPERS A GOOD 'SPOT.' THE DEFINITION OF A 'GOOD SPOT' IS AN ADVANTAGEOUS EXIT POINT FROM THE ACFT TO LET THE JUMPERS DRIFT (DUE TO PREVAILING WINDS) DURING FREE-FALL, SO THAT THEY MAY OPEN THEIR PARACHUTES SLIGHTLY UPWIND AND LAND AT THE DESIGNATED LNDG ZONE. PIC COMMENTED THAT IN ORDER TO MAKE THE ALT AND JUMP RUN COINCIDE HE WOULD PERFORM A 360 DEG TURN WITH ABOUT 10-15 DEGS OF BANK. ONCE THE MANEUVER WAS COMPLETED, WE PROCEEDED ON COURSE FOR JUMP RUN PARALLEL WITH THE RWY DIRECTION OF 300 DEGS WITH AN OFFSET TO THE R OF APPROX .25-.30 NM. AS WE APCHED THE JUMP RUN, PIC TOLD ME, 'MAKE YOUR 2 MIN WARNING CALLS TO ZTL AND THOMASTON TFC.' THIS IS STANDARD OPERATING PROC. I XMITTED TO CTR '2 MINS BEFORE JUMPERS AWAY, ACFT X.' ZTL ACKNOWLEDGES THE XMISSION WITH 'ROGER, ACFT X.' THEN PIC GAVE THE COMMAND TO LOWER AND LEVEL THE TAILGATE OF THE AIRPLANE, I PERFORMED THE ACTION AND INFORMED PIC THE TAILGATE WAS LEVEL. THEN PIC COMMANDED FOR FLAPS AT 40 DEGS, AGAIN I PERFORMED THE ACTION AND INFORMED HIM THAT 'FLAPS TRACKING' AND THEN 'FLAPS SET, HYDS OFF.' PIC MUMBLED TO HIMSELF ABOUT THE DIFFICULTY OF THIS JUMP RUN BECAUSE THE WINDS WERE UNPREDICTABLE. THIS WAS IDENTED BY A HIGHER THAN USUAL GND SPD FROM THE IFR GPS THAT IS ONBOARD THE ACFT. PIC THEN DECIDED, I ASSUME, TO MODIFY THE DIRECTION OF THE JUMP RUN. IT SEEMED LIKE THE RIGHT THING TO DO CONSIDERING THE GND SPD WE ENCOUNTERED. WE NEVER AT ANY TIME TURNED A GREEN LIGHT ON IN THE ACFT. THIS IS A VERY SIGNIFICANT AND IMPORTANT FACTOR, BECAUSE THE ACFT IS PLACARDED AT THE TAILGATE THAT THE GREEN LIGHT IS THE ONLY TIME JUMPERS MAY EXIT THE ACFT. AT WINGS LEVEL I RECEIVED A CALL FROM THE SAME CTLR FROM ZTL, ASKING US IF WE WERE STILL ON JUMP RUN, I NOTED THE URGENCY IN HER VOICE. PIC DIRECTED ME TO INFORM CTR THAT WE WERE STILL IN PROGRESS OF JUMP RUN. SHE QUICKLY INFORMED US WE HAD AN ACR JET AT OUR 1 O'CLOCK POS, AT THE SAME ALT AND CLOSING, HOWEVER, I DON'T RECALL ANY DISTANCE FROM THE JET BEING GIVEN. AT FIRST I COULD NOT SEE THE ACR JET, AND INFORMED THE CTLR THAT WE WERE NEGATIVE FOR FINDING THE ACR ACFT. I SCANNED INTENSELY FOR THE ACFT THEN I VISUALLY IDENTED THE PLANE, AND QUICKLY CALLED BACK TO CTR, 'I GOT IT, I GOT IT.' THE ACR JET APPEARED TO BE ON A 60 DEG INTERCEPT COURSE WITH US AND THE ACR JET WAS LESS THAN 2.0 MI AND CLOSING QUICKLY. SIMULTANEOUSLY DURING THIS EXCHANGE WITH CTR, I INFORMED PIC, THAT WE HAD TFC AT OUR 1 O'CLOCK POS, SAME ALT AND CLOSING QUICKLY. PIC COULD NOT SEE THE ACR JET, AND WHEN I VISUALLY IDENTED THE ACR JET AND CALLED CTR, PIC ASKED ME WHICH WAY TO TURN BECAUSE HE COULD NOT SEE THE PLANE. I SUSPECT PIC COULD NOT SEE THE PLANE BECAUSE THE METAL FRAMES THAT ENCASED OUR PLANE'S COCKPIT WINDOWS MAY HAVE BLOCKED HIS VIEW DUE TO THE ANGLE FROM THE L SEAT. WE NEEDED TO TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO TURN AWAY FROM THE ONCOMING ACR JET. WHEN PIC ASKED ME WHICH WAY TO TURN IN ADDITION TO NOT BEING ABLE TO SEE THE PLANE, I KNEW THAT HE COULD NOT JUDGE THE MANEUVER WITHOUT BEING ABLE TO SEE THE ACR JET. WITHOUT HESITATION I THEN BANKED THE AIRPLANE 25 DEGS R AND TURNED TO THE R 180 DEGS. PIC SAW THE ACR JET AS WE TURNED OUT OF THE WAY. DURING THIS TIME, THE RED LIGHT WAS ON INSIDE OUR AIRPLANE, THIS MEANS TO STANDBY. IT IS CLRLY PLACARDED IN THE PLANE WHAT THE 2 DIFFERENT LIGHTS INDICATE. WHEN I TURNED THE AIRPLANE, WE INFORMED CTR THAT WE HAD NOT RELEASED ANY JUMPERS FROM ACFT X. THE ACR CREW, UNDERSTANDABLY, REPLIED WITH GREAT CONCERN THAT JUMPERS, IN FACT, WERE EXITING FROM OUR ACFT. PIC AND I COULD NOT SEE FROM THE COCKPIT IF PEOPLE WERE INDEED EXITING THE TAILGATE BECAUSE THERE WERE 30 JUMPERS BLOCKING THE VIEW OF THE TAILGATE. I WITNESSED THE LAST GROUP WHICH WAS A TANDEM MASTER AND PAX WITH A CAMERAMAN, I YELLED AS LOUD AS I POSSIBLY COULD AT THEM TO NOT JUMP, THEY LOOKED AT ME AND DROPPED OFF THE TAILGATE INTO BLUE SKIES. BY THIS TIME THE ACR CREW ASKED THE CTLR FOR OUR TAIL NUMBER, SHE COMPLIED WITH THEM. ACFT X RADIOED TO THE ACR CREW AND APOLOGIZED FOR THE COURSE OF EVENTS. PIC AND I WERE BEYOND ASTONISHMENT IN WITNESSING THE SELFISH ACTS OF THE JUMPERS AND BLATANT DISREGARD TO THE PIC OF THE ACFT. I WANTED TO CLOSE THE TAILGATE DURING THE EPISODE BUT I KNEW THAT THE JUMPERS HAD POSITIONED THEMSELVES ON THE TAILGATE DURING RED STANDBY LIGHT. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN DANGEROUS TO ATTEMPT CLOSING THE DOOR WITH PEOPLE STANDING ON THE TAILGATE. SOMEONE COULD HAVE BEEN INJURED DUE TO DOOR CLOSING UNBEKNOWNST TO THEM. SINCE SO MANY JUMPERS WERE BLOCKING THE VIEW OF THE TAILGATE IT WASN'T WORTH RISKING MORE LIVES WHILE TRYING TO AVOID ANOTHER PLANE. THE LIGHT WENT FROM RED (STANDBY) TO THE OFF POS WHICH MEANS 'DO NOT JUMP.' CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THIS IS AN OP THAT USES A LOAD ORGANIZER (JUMP MASTER) FOR CTL AND BRIEFING OF THE JUMPERS. THIS DAY THERE WERE BTWN 28 AND 32 JUMPERS ABOARD. POSTFLT BRIEFING WAS HELD TO DEBRIEF JUMPERS AND LOAD ORGANIZERS AS TO WHAT HAD OCCURRED. THE JUMP LIGHT SYS IS THE ONLY COM AVAILABLE BTWN THE COCKPIT AND THE JUMP MASTER OR JUMPERS. THE RPTR WAS UNAWARE THAT TA'S WERE REQUIRED OF ARTCC ONLY ON A TIME PERMITTED BASIS SINCE THEY WERE NOT ON AN IFR FLT PLAN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.