Narrative:

We were assigned aircraft xyz. The captain had flown the aircraft the night before from det to ZZZ. We were scheduled to fly the plane from ZZZ to YYY where the plane could enter maintenance. The captain was perturbed at the fact that none of the MEL's had been cleared. I'll try and remember them all for continuity sake: captain's radar indicator inoperative (first officer's worked) autothrottles inoperative, 1 channel of the elevator feel system inoperative, #1 pack inoperative, and anti-ice disagreement light inoperative. At show time, the captain took our release stated that we weren't going to fly such a 'piece of crap' airplane and went to visit the flight safety department. He came back with our director of flight operations and they discussed why the plane needed to be in YYY and how infrequent we flew without autothrottles. After exhausting all other options, the captain asked me and the flight engineer if we would be willing to fly the airplane. There was nothing listed that downed the plane, so we said that we would. As we left to wait, the captain explained to the director of operations that if anything else went wrong, he wouldn't take the plane. During preflight, 2 lights on the warning/caution panel (overhead) were discovered to be inoperative. The light bulbs were changed and sockets were checked. 4 mechanics were working on the system, while the flight engineer and I finished our preflight duties. When we were ready to go, the captain turned to the mechanic and instructed him to MEL it so that we could leave. The mechanic informed him that it could not be MEL'ed. The captain then said 'it's not in the book, so we'll write it up airborne.' when I expressed my displeasure, I was told 'don't worry about it, situation down and read the checklist.' the lights were not crucial (bright/dim and press-to-test), but there's a reason they are not listed in the MEL. I feel the captain felt pressure from the company and more regulation is required to prevent this 'pilot pushing.' a good dose of CRM wouldn't hurt. Next time I'll just walk off the plane with the mechanic.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DC10 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH A KNOWN MASTER CAUTION FAULT NOT DEFERRABLE BUT NOT ENTERED IN THE LOGBOOK.

Narrative: WE WERE ASSIGNED ACFT XYZ. THE CAPT HAD FLOWN THE ACFT THE NIGHT BEFORE FROM DET TO ZZZ. WE WERE SCHEDULED TO FLY THE PLANE FROM ZZZ TO YYY WHERE THE PLANE COULD ENTER MAINT. THE CAPT WAS PERTURBED AT THE FACT THAT NONE OF THE MEL'S HAD BEEN CLRED. I'LL TRY AND REMEMBER THEM ALL FOR CONTINUITY SAKE: CAPT'S RADAR INDICATOR INOP (FO'S WORKED) AUTOTHROTTLES INOP, 1 CHANNEL OF THE ELEVATOR FEEL SYS INOP, #1 PACK INOP, AND ANTI-ICE DISAGREEMENT LIGHT INOP. AT SHOW TIME, THE CAPT TOOK OUR RELEASE STATED THAT WE WEREN'T GOING TO FLY SUCH A 'PIECE OF CRAP' AIRPLANE AND WENT TO VISIT THE FLT SAFETY DEPT. HE CAME BACK WITH OUR DIRECTOR OF FLT OPS AND THEY DISCUSSED WHY THE PLANE NEEDED TO BE IN YYY AND HOW INFREQUENT WE FLEW WITHOUT AUTOTHROTTLES. AFTER EXHAUSTING ALL OTHER OPTIONS, THE CAPT ASKED ME AND THE FE IF WE WOULD BE WILLING TO FLY THE AIRPLANE. THERE WAS NOTHING LISTED THAT DOWNED THE PLANE, SO WE SAID THAT WE WOULD. AS WE LEFT TO WAIT, THE CAPT EXPLAINED TO THE DIRECTOR OF OPS THAT IF ANYTHING ELSE WENT WRONG, HE WOULDN'T TAKE THE PLANE. DURING PREFLT, 2 LIGHTS ON THE WARNING/CAUTION PANEL (OVERHEAD) WERE DISCOVERED TO BE INOP. THE LIGHT BULBS WERE CHANGED AND SOCKETS WERE CHKED. 4 MECHS WERE WORKING ON THE SYS, WHILE THE FE AND I FINISHED OUR PREFLT DUTIES. WHEN WE WERE READY TO GO, THE CAPT TURNED TO THE MECH AND INSTRUCTED HIM TO MEL IT SO THAT WE COULD LEAVE. THE MECH INFORMED HIM THAT IT COULD NOT BE MEL'ED. THE CAPT THEN SAID 'IT'S NOT IN THE BOOK, SO WE'LL WRITE IT UP AIRBORNE.' WHEN I EXPRESSED MY DISPLEASURE, I WAS TOLD 'DON'T WORRY ABOUT IT, SIT DOWN AND READ THE CHKLIST.' THE LIGHTS WERE NOT CRUCIAL (BRIGHT/DIM AND PRESS-TO-TEST), BUT THERE'S A REASON THEY ARE NOT LISTED IN THE MEL. I FEEL THE CAPT FELT PRESSURE FROM THE COMPANY AND MORE REG IS REQUIRED TO PREVENT THIS 'PLT PUSHING.' A GOOD DOSE OF CRM WOULDN'T HURT. NEXT TIME I'LL JUST WALK OFF THE PLANE WITH THE MECH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.