Narrative:

Night VMC arrival into lax. Asked by socal if we could accept visual approach to runway 24R. Captain reported yes with runway in sight. First officer and so did not have runway 24R in sight. Proper localizer frequency was set in both captain/first officer navaids as a backup. On an intercept heading from the north, received a red flashing instrument warning on the first officer's annunciator. As so referenced cockpit operations manual for guidance, first officer was given a frequency change to tower. After incorrectly setting tower frequency, first officer again looked down to set proper frequency. Captain also looked inside to reference first officer's instruments for any malfunctions due to previous instrument warning. As all 3 pilot's attention returned outside, the assumption was that the captain still had the runway in sight. The aircraft had actually passed through the runway 24R localizer and neared runway 25R. Received TCASII TA. Captain realized alignment error and executed hard turn to right to realign on runway 24R. Shortly thereafter were given immediate turn to right by tower. Eventually executed a go around for resequencing and uneventful landing on runway 24R. Captain was overconfident in accepting visual and thought he knew ground references. First officer distraction by incorrect setting of tower frequency. So distraction by referencing cockpit manual. Scattered deck/marine layer that unknowingly dimmed approach lighting to runway 24R. First officer/so overreliant on captain to navigation to runway 24R, should have insisted on ILS approach instead of visual.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B747 CREW HAD TRACK DEV ON APCH AT LAX.

Narrative: NIGHT VMC ARR INTO LAX. ASKED BY SOCAL IF WE COULD ACCEPT VISUAL APCH TO RWY 24R. CAPT RPTED YES WITH RWY IN SIGHT. FO AND SO DID NOT HAVE RWY 24R IN SIGHT. PROPER LOC FREQ WAS SET IN BOTH CAPT/FO NAVAIDS AS A BACKUP. ON AN INTERCEPT HDG FROM THE N, RECEIVED A RED FLASHING INST WARNING ON THE FO'S ANNUNCIATOR. AS SO REFED COCKPIT OPS MANUAL FOR GUIDANCE, FO WAS GIVEN A FREQ CHANGE TO TWR. AFTER INCORRECTLY SETTING TWR FREQ, FO AGAIN LOOKED DOWN TO SET PROPER FREQ. CAPT ALSO LOOKED INSIDE TO REF FO'S INSTS FOR ANY MALFUNCTIONS DUE TO PREVIOUS INST WARNING. AS ALL 3 PLT'S ATTN RETURNED OUTSIDE, THE ASSUMPTION WAS THAT THE CAPT STILL HAD THE RWY IN SIGHT. THE ACFT HAD ACTUALLY PASSED THROUGH THE RWY 24R LOC AND NEARED RWY 25R. RECEIVED TCASII TA. CAPT REALIZED ALIGNMENT ERROR AND EXECUTED HARD TURN TO R TO REALIGN ON RWY 24R. SHORTLY THEREAFTER WERE GIVEN IMMEDIATE TURN TO R BY TWR. EVENTUALLY EXECUTED A GAR FOR RESEQUENCING AND UNEVENTFUL LNDG ON RWY 24R. CAPT WAS OVERCONFIDENT IN ACCEPTING VISUAL AND THOUGHT HE KNEW GND REFS. FO DISTR BY INCORRECT SETTING OF TWR FREQ. SO DISTR BY REFING COCKPIT MANUAL. SCATTERED DECK/MARINE LAYER THAT UNKNOWINGLY DIMMED APCH LIGHTING TO RWY 24R. FO/SO OVERRELIANT ON CAPT TO NAV TO RWY 24R, SHOULD HAVE INSISTED ON ILS APCH INSTEAD OF VISUAL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.