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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 493765 |
Time | |
Date | 200011 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : lga.airport |
State Reference | NY |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 2600 msl bound upper : 3000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : pit.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | other vortac |
Flight Phase | descent : vacating altitude |
Route In Use | approach : instrument non precision arrival : on vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : n90.tracon |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | other vortac |
Flight Phase | descent : intermediate altitude |
Route In Use | approach : instrument non precision arrival : on vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : cfi pilot : atp pilot : multi engine |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 240 flight time total : 5050 flight time type : 1350 |
ASRS Report | 493765 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : airborne less severe non adherence : published procedure non adherence : required legal separation other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment : tcas other controllera other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued alert controller : separated traffic controller : issued new clearance |
Consequence | Other |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 18000 vertical : 600 |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance FAA Company Airspace Structure ATC Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Airspace Structure |
Air Traffic Incident | Operational Error |
Narrative:
While being vectored for a localizer 31 approach to lga, we were with final controller on 134.9. Our flight number was cgcg, and we also heard our company flight number cgca on frequency. The busy controller clearly stated 'air carrier cgcg, turn right heading 180, maintain 2000 ft.' the clearance was read back by us, and the controller added 'good rate down to 2000 ft please.' in the turning descent, I noticed traffic below us at about 2000 ft MSL, roughly the opposite direction. The TCAS ii then gave a TA. The captain stopped his descent and I pointed out the traffic. The controller then frantically told us to turn and maintain 3000 ft. After an abrupt climbing turn the conflict was cleared. I discussed this with the captain and also with the crew of cgca, who landed just before us. The crew of cgca was certain that the clearance was for us. There was no attempt by them to read back the clearance and they did not hear any xmissions 'blocked.' both crews were convinced beyond the shadow of doubt that the instruction was for cgcg and we were also convinced that the controller intended it for flight cgca. The continued traffic saturation at lga will continue to decrease safety. Both the airlines and the FAA are to blame. The FAA is guilty of turning lga into a parking lot by lifting slot restrs and the airlines are guilty of adding to the problem by increasing flts at the airport. Traffic saturation at lga was the cause of this incident and there will be many more like it until reasonable restrs are in place. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: first officer reporter stated that in the last six months his company has increased their flight schedules into and out of lga by approximately 20 percent. The airport is so competitive that even late or delayed flts are going nearly full. Controllers are 'over burdened with the traffic levels...' he cited an associated problem that entails similar sounding a/north or call signs. The airlines may schedule those flts with similar call signs at different hours, but at times, with one flight delay after another, these closely sounding flight numbers do tend to 'mingle,' thus exacerbating the problem of controllers mentally (and thus physically) keeping these flight numbers and flts apart from each other. He is fearful that this will be an ongoing threat to safety at lga. Reporter said that lga appears to have more problems of this nature than any other airport he flies into... Neither the union, nor the FAA have been copied in on this event. The company is getting a copy shortly.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: N90 APCH CTLR ISSUES A CLRNC TO ACR FLT X WHICH WAS INTENDED FOR SAME ACR FLT Y. FLT X HAS POTENTIAL CONFLICT WITH UNIDENTIFIED ACFT Z DURING TURN AND DSCNT 10 MI E OF LGA, NY.
Narrative: WHILE BEING VECTORED FOR A LOC 31 APCH TO LGA, WE WERE WITH FINAL CTLR ON 134.9. OUR FLT NUMBER WAS CGCG, AND WE ALSO HEARD OUR COMPANY FLT NUMBER CGCA ON FREQ. THE BUSY CTLR CLEARLY STATED 'ACR CGCG, TURN R HDG 180, MAINTAIN 2000 FT.' THE CLRNC WAS READ BACK BY US, AND THE CTLR ADDED 'GOOD RATE DOWN TO 2000 FT PLEASE.' IN THE TURNING DSCNT, I NOTICED TFC BELOW US AT ABOUT 2000 FT MSL, ROUGHLY THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION. THE TCAS II THEN GAVE A TA. THE CAPT STOPPED HIS DSCNT AND I POINTED OUT THE TFC. THE CTLR THEN FRANTICALLY TOLD US TO TURN AND MAINTAIN 3000 FT. AFTER AN ABRUPT CLBING TURN THE CONFLICT WAS CLRED. I DISCUSSED THIS WITH THE CAPT AND ALSO WITH THE CREW OF CGCA, WHO LANDED JUST BEFORE US. THE CREW OF CGCA WAS CERTAIN THAT THE CLRNC WAS FOR US. THERE WAS NO ATTEMPT BY THEM TO READ BACK THE CLRNC AND THEY DID NOT HEAR ANY XMISSIONS 'BLOCKED.' BOTH CREWS WERE CONVINCED BEYOND THE SHADOW OF DOUBT THAT THE INSTRUCTION WAS FOR CGCG AND WE WERE ALSO CONVINCED THAT THE CTLR INTENDED IT FOR FLT CGCA. THE CONTINUED TFC SATURATION AT LGA WILL CONTINUE TO DECREASE SAFETY. BOTH THE AIRLINES AND THE FAA ARE TO BLAME. THE FAA IS GUILTY OF TURNING LGA INTO A PARKING LOT BY LIFTING SLOT RESTRS AND THE AIRLINES ARE GUILTY OF ADDING TO THE PROB BY INCREASING FLTS AT THE ARPT. TFC SATURATION AT LGA WAS THE CAUSE OF THIS INCIDENT AND THERE WILL BE MANY MORE LIKE IT UNTIL REASONABLE RESTRS ARE IN PLACE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: FO RPTR STATED THAT IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS HIS COMPANY HAS INCREASED THEIR FLT SCHEDULES INTO AND OUT OF LGA BY APPROX 20 PERCENT. THE ARPT IS SO COMPETITIVE THAT EVEN LATE OR DELAYED FLTS ARE GOING NEARLY FULL. CTLRS ARE 'OVER BURDENED WITH THE TFC LEVELS...' HE CITED AN ASSOCIATED PROB THAT ENTAILS SIMILAR SOUNDING A/N OR CALL SIGNS. THE AIRLINES MAY SCHEDULE THOSE FLTS WITH SIMILAR CALL SIGNS AT DIFFERENT HRS, BUT AT TIMES, WITH ONE FLT DELAY AFTER ANOTHER, THESE CLOSELY SOUNDING FLT NUMBERS DO TEND TO 'MINGLE,' THUS EXACERBATING THE PROB OF CTLRS MENTALLY (AND THUS PHYSICALLY) KEEPING THESE FLT NUMBERS AND FLTS APART FROM EACH OTHER. HE IS FEARFUL THAT THIS WILL BE AN ONGOING THREAT TO SAFETY AT LGA. RPTR SAID THAT LGA APPEARS TO HAVE MORE PROBS OF THIS NATURE THAN ANY OTHER ARPT HE FLIES INTO... NEITHER THE UNION, NOR THE FAA HAVE BEEN COPIED IN ON THIS EVENT. THE COMPANY IS GETTING A COPY SHORTLY.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.