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Attributes | |
ACN | 494302 |
Time | |
Date | 200012 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : cvg.airport |
State Reference | KY |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Regional Jet CL65, Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | other Other |
Flight Phase | ground : parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : instrument pilot : cfi pilot : multi engine |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 240 flight time total : 1600 flight time type : 240 |
ASRS Report | 494302 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : cabin pressure indicator other other : 3 |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other other other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Cabin Crew Human Performance Aircraft Chart Or Publication |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Narrative:
Shortly after takeoff (less than 30 seconds) a 'door latch' warning followed by 'passenger door' warning appeared on the EICAS primary page. Cvg approach was notified of our problem. I was the PF and the captain ran the QRH procedure and checklists. We entered a 'box pattern' until we were ready for the approach. The QRH procedure called for manual control of the pressurization system. The captain called maintenance and inquired about the airplane's pressurization, due to concerns about the airplane's internal pressure. I wanted the captain to check with maintenance if we could activate the emergency depressurization. From what I could understand, the maintenance contact reassured the captain that it was acceptable for us to land with the indicated pressure of -200. As we opened the cockpit door at the gate, the flight attendant was standing by the passenger door, and said 'I can't get the door open.' before I could say anything (it was a 'red flag' to me, and I was about to tell her no) the next moment, a loud noise coupled with a rapid ejection of the passenger door and the flight attendant. She was not injured, but visibly shaken by the experience. She held on to the door as it opened and went out with it, and landed head down on the door. Considerations: this could have been prevented in several ways. First, if the QRH procedure had called for the emergency depressurization to be activated, at least after landing in case the manual mode did not function properly or was not operated properly, which would be a training issue. Either way, it would eliminate future pressurization problems on the ground and prevent crew injury upon opening the passenger door. Secondly, the disturbing incident which the flight attendant experienced could have been avoided if she had received instructions to stay seated, until advised it would be safe to open the passenger door. Such instructions should be standard any time pressurization problems have been encountered.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CABIN ATTENDANT EJECTED OUT WITH THE MAIN CABIN DOOR WHEN OPENING THE DOOR AT THE GATE AFTER RETURNING DUE TO A PRESSURIZATION PROB.
Narrative: SHORTLY AFTER TKOF (LESS THAN 30 SECONDS) A 'DOOR LATCH' WARNING FOLLOWED BY 'PAX DOOR' WARNING APPEARED ON THE EICAS PRIMARY PAGE. CVG APCH WAS NOTIFIED OF OUR PROB. I WAS THE PF AND THE CAPT RAN THE QRH PROC AND CHKLISTS. WE ENTERED A 'BOX PATTERN' UNTIL WE WERE READY FOR THE APCH. THE QRH PROC CALLED FOR MANUAL CTL OF THE PRESSURIZATION SYS. THE CAPT CALLED MAINT AND INQUIRED ABOUT THE AIRPLANE'S PRESSURIZATION, DUE TO CONCERNS ABOUT THE AIRPLANE'S INTERNAL PRESSURE. I WANTED THE CAPT TO CHK WITH MAINT IF WE COULD ACTIVATE THE EMER DEPRESSURIZATION. FROM WHAT I COULD UNDERSTAND, THE MAINT CONTACT REASSURED THE CAPT THAT IT WAS ACCEPTABLE FOR US TO LAND WITH THE INDICATED PRESSURE OF -200. AS WE OPENED THE COCKPIT DOOR AT THE GATE, THE FLT ATTENDANT WAS STANDING BY THE PAX DOOR, AND SAID 'I CAN'T GET THE DOOR OPEN.' BEFORE I COULD SAY ANYTHING (IT WAS A 'RED FLAG' TO ME, AND I WAS ABOUT TO TELL HER NO) THE NEXT MOMENT, A LOUD NOISE COUPLED WITH A RAPID EJECTION OF THE PAX DOOR AND THE FLT ATTENDANT. SHE WAS NOT INJURED, BUT VISIBLY SHAKEN BY THE EXPERIENCE. SHE HELD ON TO THE DOOR AS IT OPENED AND WENT OUT WITH IT, AND LANDED HEAD DOWN ON THE DOOR. CONSIDERATIONS: THIS COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED IN SEVERAL WAYS. FIRST, IF THE QRH PROC HAD CALLED FOR THE EMER DEPRESSURIZATION TO BE ACTIVATED, AT LEAST AFTER LNDG IN CASE THE MANUAL MODE DID NOT FUNCTION PROPERLY OR WAS NOT OPERATED PROPERLY, WHICH WOULD BE A TRAINING ISSUE. EITHER WAY, IT WOULD ELIMINATE FUTURE PRESSURIZATION PROBS ON THE GND AND PREVENT CREW INJURY UPON OPENING THE PAX DOOR. SECONDLY, THE DISTURBING INCIDENT WHICH THE FLT ATTENDANT EXPERIENCED COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF SHE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO STAY SEATED, UNTIL ADVISED IT WOULD BE SAFE TO OPEN THE PAX DOOR. SUCH INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD BE STANDARD ANY TIME PRESSURIZATION PROBS HAVE BEEN ENCOUNTERED.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.