Narrative:

During normal flight planning, I was discussing the fuel load for our flight with the first officer and the load planner. Our flight had been dispatched at maximum landing weight (structural) and if the payload was dropping off, I wanted to add additional fuel. The WX en route and at both destination and the alter had chance of rain showers. It was decided that an additional 1200 pounds of fuel could be boarded -- bringing the desired load to 23000 pounds from the original released fuel load of 21800 pounds. Prior to closing the door, I was informed by load planning that our current weight was 800 pounds under maximum takeoff weight based on our original release fuel of 21800 pounds. I informed load planning to use the original release of 21800 pounds for the weight manifest and to load the last 4 passenger which totaled approximately 800 pounds. The additional 1200 pounds of fuel would be considered part of my burn. The original 'burn' fuel in the predep paperwork did not reflect en route WX deviations which were present along our flight. Additionally, since we were now running behind schedule, I plugged in a lower altitude and higher airspeed into the FMC. We then derived at a new 'burn' fuel which showed us below our maximum landing weight. Furthermore, the runway in use was opposite of the runway used to generate our weight sheet, thus further increasing our fuel burn. I was informed by the chief pilot after the door had closed that we were overweight. I told him our numbers checked out and that we were ok to go. I was then informed to burn the extra fuel en route and to proceed. After completing the sequence of flts, I spoke to our chief pilot and explained the day's activities. He believed that what we had done may have violated FARS and further discussion would be necessary. Our actions in the cockpit were openly discussed and using our FMC to generate new fuel burn numbers seemed appropriate. However, a proper plan would have been go contact our dispatch and have new numbers generated rather than relying on our own calculations. Several chain of events were created that added to our dilemma: 1) inaccurate payload calculation during the preparation of paperwork. 2) load planner using the original release numbers for our fuel (21800 pounds) and saying that we were 800 pounds under maximum takeoff weight when in reality we were facing a 400 pound overweight scenario. 3) relying on our automation in the airplane to generate fuel burn and estimated landing weights prior to gate departure. 4) similar anxiety of get homeitis -- maximize -- payloaditis. The desire to generate maximum revenue and passenger convenience.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR CREW CHANGES FUEL LOAD AND PLANNED LNDG FUEL WITHOUT COORD WITH DISPATCH. SUPERVISORY PLT QUESTIONS OP AFTER THE FACT.

Narrative: DURING NORMAL FLT PLANNING, I WAS DISCUSSING THE FUEL LOAD FOR OUR FLT WITH THE FO AND THE LOAD PLANNER. OUR FLT HAD BEEN DISPATCHED AT MAX LNDG WT (STRUCTURAL) AND IF THE PAYLOAD WAS DROPPING OFF, I WANTED TO ADD ADDITIONAL FUEL. THE WX ENRTE AND AT BOTH DEST AND THE ALTER HAD CHANCE OF RAIN SHOWERS. IT WAS DECIDED THAT AN ADDITIONAL 1200 LBS OF FUEL COULD BE BOARDED -- BRINGING THE DESIRED LOAD TO 23000 LBS FROM THE ORIGINAL RELEASED FUEL LOAD OF 21800 LBS. PRIOR TO CLOSING THE DOOR, I WAS INFORMED BY LOAD PLANNING THAT OUR CURRENT WT WAS 800 LBS UNDER MAX TKOF WT BASED ON OUR ORIGINAL RELEASE FUEL OF 21800 LBS. I INFORMED LOAD PLANNING TO USE THE ORIGINAL RELEASE OF 21800 LBS FOR THE WT MANIFEST AND TO LOAD THE LAST 4 PAX WHICH TOTALED APPROX 800 LBS. THE ADDITIONAL 1200 LBS OF FUEL WOULD BE CONSIDERED PART OF MY BURN. THE ORIGINAL 'BURN' FUEL IN THE PREDEP PAPERWORK DID NOT REFLECT ENRTE WX DEVS WHICH WERE PRESENT ALONG OUR FLT. ADDITIONALLY, SINCE WE WERE NOW RUNNING BEHIND SCHEDULE, I PLUGGED IN A LOWER ALT AND HIGHER AIRSPD INTO THE FMC. WE THEN DERIVED AT A NEW 'BURN' FUEL WHICH SHOWED US BELOW OUR MAX LNDG WT. FURTHERMORE, THE RWY IN USE WAS OPPOSITE OF THE RWY USED TO GENERATE OUR WT SHEET, THUS FURTHER INCREASING OUR FUEL BURN. I WAS INFORMED BY THE CHIEF PLT AFTER THE DOOR HAD CLOSED THAT WE WERE OVERWT. I TOLD HIM OUR NUMBERS CHKED OUT AND THAT WE WERE OK TO GO. I WAS THEN INFORMED TO BURN THE EXTRA FUEL ENRTE AND TO PROCEED. AFTER COMPLETING THE SEQUENCE OF FLTS, I SPOKE TO OUR CHIEF PLT AND EXPLAINED THE DAY'S ACTIVITIES. HE BELIEVED THAT WHAT WE HAD DONE MAY HAVE VIOLATED FARS AND FURTHER DISCUSSION WOULD BE NECESSARY. OUR ACTIONS IN THE COCKPIT WERE OPENLY DISCUSSED AND USING OUR FMC TO GENERATE NEW FUEL BURN NUMBERS SEEMED APPROPRIATE. HOWEVER, A PROPER PLAN WOULD HAVE BEEN GO CONTACT OUR DISPATCH AND HAVE NEW NUMBERS GENERATED RATHER THAN RELYING ON OUR OWN CALCULATIONS. SEVERAL CHAIN OF EVENTS WERE CREATED THAT ADDED TO OUR DILEMMA: 1) INACCURATE PAYLOAD CALCULATION DURING THE PREPARATION OF PAPERWORK. 2) LOAD PLANNER USING THE ORIGINAL RELEASE NUMBERS FOR OUR FUEL (21800 LBS) AND SAYING THAT WE WERE 800 LBS UNDER MAX TKOF WT WHEN IN REALITY WE WERE FACING A 400 LB OVERWT SCENARIO. 3) RELYING ON OUR AUTOMATION IN THE AIRPLANE TO GENERATE FUEL BURN AND ESTIMATED LNDG WTS PRIOR TO GATE DEP. 4) SIMILAR ANXIETY OF GET HOMEITIS -- MAXIMIZE -- PAYLOADITIS. THE DESIRE TO GENERATE MAX REVENUE AND PAX CONVENIENCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.