Narrative:

First officer performed normal preflight in accordance with airplane flight manual. Ramp crew had preflted/deiced aircraft before crew arrived. Overnight/deice equipment had appeared to be fully removed. During preflight, first officer recalls locking in left engine intake for damage in accordance with afm. Upon reaching right engine, first officer noticed engine intake overnight pad installed. First officer removed pad and installed it in the appropriate container. Upon left engine start, engine climbed toward redline for start. After 2 successive attempts, postflt was performed before contacting maintenance. It was at this time that the first officer observed a small whisp of smoke rising from the intake. The captain reached into the inlet and pulled out approximately 90% of the intake deice pad. 4 people recall the appearance of the left inlet being clear. Contributing to accident: improper installation of inlet covers. Inlet cover not complete with warning flag. Inlet too high for normal inspection of entire inlet area. Corrective actions: airline needs to supply proper inlet cover equipped with warning flags. Proper installation of inlet cover must take place. Inventory of overnight equipment should have taken place. Supplemental information from acn 495878: I did not notice any obstruction in the l-hand intake. Upon l-hand engine start, the engine tried to hot start 3 times. I aborted each time well before limits were exceeded. After deplaning, first officer and I noticed a smoke trail out of l-hand inlet. Upon further investigation, found engine inlet foam plug next to impeller blades. The aircraft winter kit was removed by ground personnel before deice procedures. The person responsible for this told us after the fact that he did not see inlet plug. First officer on preflight did not see plug, and I did not see the plug before attempted start. The plug did not have a streamer installed on it and since the inlet is 6 ft 8 inches above ground, it is impossible to view down inside it for a normal sized person.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: 3 HOT STARTS ON A JETSTREAM 3200 AS A RESULT OF THE ENG INLET PLUG NOT BEING REMOVED BEFORE ENG START.

Narrative: FO PERFORMED NORMAL PREFLT IN ACCORDANCE WITH AIRPLANE FLT MANUAL. RAMP CREW HAD PREFLTED/DEICED ACFT BEFORE CREW ARRIVED. OVERNIGHT/DEICE EQUIP HAD APPEARED TO BE FULLY REMOVED. DURING PREFLT, FO RECALLS LOCKING IN L ENG INTAKE FOR DAMAGE IN ACCORDANCE WITH AFM. UPON REACHING R ENG, FO NOTICED ENG INTAKE OVERNIGHT PAD INSTALLED. FO REMOVED PAD AND INSTALLED IT IN THE APPROPRIATE CONTAINER. UPON L ENG START, ENG CLBED TOWARD REDLINE FOR START. AFTER 2 SUCCESSIVE ATTEMPTS, POSTFLT WAS PERFORMED BEFORE CONTACTING MAINT. IT WAS AT THIS TIME THAT THE FO OBSERVED A SMALL WHISP OF SMOKE RISING FROM THE INTAKE. THE CAPT REACHED INTO THE INLET AND PULLED OUT APPROX 90% OF THE INTAKE DEICE PAD. 4 PEOPLE RECALL THE APPEARANCE OF THE L INLET BEING CLR. CONTRIBUTING TO ACCIDENT: IMPROPER INSTALLATION OF INLET COVERS. INLET COVER NOT COMPLETE WITH WARNING FLAG. INLET TOO HIGH FOR NORMAL INSPECTION OF ENTIRE INLET AREA. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: AIRLINE NEEDS TO SUPPLY PROPER INLET COVER EQUIPPED WITH WARNING FLAGS. PROPER INSTALLATION OF INLET COVER MUST TAKE PLACE. INVENTORY OF OVERNIGHT EQUIP SHOULD HAVE TAKEN PLACE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 495878: I DID NOT NOTICE ANY OBSTRUCTION IN THE L-HAND INTAKE. UPON L-HAND ENG START, THE ENG TRIED TO HOT START 3 TIMES. I ABORTED EACH TIME WELL BEFORE LIMITS WERE EXCEEDED. AFTER DEPLANING, FO AND I NOTICED A SMOKE TRAIL OUT OF L-HAND INLET. UPON FURTHER INVESTIGATION, FOUND ENG INLET FOAM PLUG NEXT TO IMPELLER BLADES. THE ACFT WINTER KIT WAS REMOVED BY GND PERSONNEL BEFORE DEICE PROCS. THE PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS TOLD US AFTER THE FACT THAT HE DID NOT SEE INLET PLUG. FO ON PREFLT DID NOT SEE PLUG, AND I DID NOT SEE THE PLUG BEFORE ATTEMPTED START. THE PLUG DID NOT HAVE A STREAMER INSTALLED ON IT AND SINCE THE INLET IS 6 FT 8 INCHES ABOVE GND, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO VIEW DOWN INSIDE IT FOR A NORMAL SIZED PERSON.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.