Narrative:

On jan/xa/01, while on an IFR flight from kansas city to santa barbara, ca, we had been cleared from FL200 to 13000 ft with further clearance to 9000 ft, assigned heading 250 degrees by sba approach control. Since we were closing in on sba, I initiated a steeper descent, approximately 3500 FPM. Sba approach was working an outbound flight climbing out on vectors. After our clearance to 9000 ft, we received a TA passing through approximately 14000 ft. Somewhere around 13000 ft we received a climb RA. I immediately applied climb power and began to pull the nose up toward the TCASII command bars, stopping our descent and beginning a shallow climb. We next heard the clear of conflict announcement, then proceeded with our descent again. At no time did approach control alert us to the other aircraft. While we had the aircraft on TCASII, we never acquired visual contact. WX at the time was cavu. We believe that due to our high rate of descent and the rate of climb from the other aircraft, our TCASII RA gave us ample warning and proper instructions to avoid a truly close call. Also, approach control questioned the 'Y' flight as to what his heading was. We are not sure that he did not turn the wrong way when given one of his vectors. ZLA had held up our descent, which seems to be the usual procedure for flts into the santa barbara area. This results in being high and close, requiring delaying vectors to lose altitude. At one point after the conflict, we were passing through 11000 ft slowing through 250 KTS, 10 mi from the runway, when approach asked if we could turn base and make it from there. We declined to accept the visual approach at that time, continuing on past the airport and making a 180 degree turn to the downwind leg before being cleared for the visual approach for landing on runway 25. While we possibly could have made it from the earlier point, we were carrying passenger and it would have been an uncomfortably steep descent for them. We understand that there are times due to traffic that timely dscnts are not possible, but it seems that when coming over the los angeles basin inbound to sba we are always kept high. Someday (or night) some crew may feel pressured into making a kamikaze descent into this airport with tragic results.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CL60 CREW, DURING DSCNT, RESPONDED TO A TCASII CLB RA.

Narrative: ON JAN/XA/01, WHILE ON AN IFR FLT FROM KANSAS CITY TO SANTA BARBARA, CA, WE HAD BEEN CLRED FROM FL200 TO 13000 FT WITH FURTHER CLRNC TO 9000 FT, ASSIGNED HDG 250 DEGS BY SBA APCH CTL. SINCE WE WERE CLOSING IN ON SBA, I INITIATED A STEEPER DSCNT, APPROX 3500 FPM. SBA APCH WAS WORKING AN OUTBOUND FLT CLBING OUT ON VECTORS. AFTER OUR CLRNC TO 9000 FT, WE RECEIVED A TA PASSING THROUGH APPROX 14000 FT. SOMEWHERE AROUND 13000 FT WE RECEIVED A CLB RA. I IMMEDIATELY APPLIED CLB PWR AND BEGAN TO PULL THE NOSE UP TOWARD THE TCASII COMMAND BARS, STOPPING OUR DSCNT AND BEGINNING A SHALLOW CLB. WE NEXT HEARD THE CLR OF CONFLICT ANNOUNCEMENT, THEN PROCEEDED WITH OUR DSCNT AGAIN. AT NO TIME DID APCH CTL ALERT US TO THE OTHER ACFT. WHILE WE HAD THE ACFT ON TCASII, WE NEVER ACQUIRED VISUAL CONTACT. WX AT THE TIME WAS CAVU. WE BELIEVE THAT DUE TO OUR HIGH RATE OF DSCNT AND THE RATE OF CLB FROM THE OTHER ACFT, OUR TCASII RA GAVE US AMPLE WARNING AND PROPER INSTRUCTIONS TO AVOID A TRULY CLOSE CALL. ALSO, APCH CTL QUESTIONED THE 'Y' FLT AS TO WHAT HIS HDG WAS. WE ARE NOT SURE THAT HE DID NOT TURN THE WRONG WAY WHEN GIVEN ONE OF HIS VECTORS. ZLA HAD HELD UP OUR DSCNT, WHICH SEEMS TO BE THE USUAL PROC FOR FLTS INTO THE SANTA BARBARA AREA. THIS RESULTS IN BEING HIGH AND CLOSE, REQUIRING DELAYING VECTORS TO LOSE ALT. AT ONE POINT AFTER THE CONFLICT, WE WERE PASSING THROUGH 11000 FT SLOWING THROUGH 250 KTS, 10 MI FROM THE RWY, WHEN APCH ASKED IF WE COULD TURN BASE AND MAKE IT FROM THERE. WE DECLINED TO ACCEPT THE VISUAL APCH AT THAT TIME, CONTINUING ON PAST THE ARPT AND MAKING A 180 DEG TURN TO THE DOWNWIND LEG BEFORE BEING CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH FOR LNDG ON RWY 25. WHILE WE POSSIBLY COULD HAVE MADE IT FROM THE EARLIER POINT, WE WERE CARRYING PAX AND IT WOULD HAVE BEEN AN UNCOMFORTABLY STEEP DSCNT FOR THEM. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THERE ARE TIMES DUE TO TFC THAT TIMELY DSCNTS ARE NOT POSSIBLE, BUT IT SEEMS THAT WHEN COMING OVER THE LOS ANGELES BASIN INBOUND TO SBA WE ARE ALWAYS KEPT HIGH. SOMEDAY (OR NIGHT) SOME CREW MAY FEEL PRESSURED INTO MAKING A KAMIKAZE DSCNT INTO THIS ARPT WITH TRAGIC RESULTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.