Narrative:

We were at 2500 ft MSL and cleared for the visual approach. We elected to follow the localizer and were about to intercept the GS when flaps 45 degrees were selected. About the same time the aircraft rolled right, approximately 15-20 degrees. I applied left aileron to correct the roll. Shortly thereafter, we received a 'flight spoiler deployed' caution message on the EICAS. The flight control synoptic page showed everything normal except the right flight spoiler box was yellow and zero displacement was indicated. I applied power and discontinued the approach. We informed the tower we were breaking off the approach and declared an emergency. The tower xferred us back to approach control who asked us to maintain 3000 ft MSL because that was the MSA for the airspace. We later climbed to 5000 ft to remain clear of the icing layer. We ran the checklist for the flight spoiler deployed caution message and verified that the handle was stowed. We orbited making l-hand turns while we tried to identify the problem and attempted to contact air carrier maintenance control for assistance. After consulting with maintenance and flight operations personnel, and conducting a visual inspection, we determined that we had some sort of failure of the right flight spoiler. We then ran the checklist for a flight spoiler failure without satisfactory results. By this time we had only 2000 pounds of fuel remaining and we elected to land using the corrected airspds per the handbook. The approach and landing were uneventful with normal ground lift dump deployment indicated on touchdown. A postflt inspection revealed the right flight spoiler was fully deployed, probably from ground lift dump on landing, and the left spoiler lug had fractured and separated from its respective actuator. Whether the lug failure was the primary failure or a secondary failure is unknown at this time. One of the inherent weaknesses of the CL65 EICAS system is that it relies on actuator displacement to determine the position of the flight controls. This has the undesirable consequence of generating erroneous or misleading information with some actuator failure modes or when the actuator becomes separated from its control surface. In our event, the primary EICAS message was 'flight spoilers deploy' caution message instead of the 'flight spoiler left(right)' caution message. We were forced to spend time reviewing the contents of the other checklists to see which one would be most applicable to our situation. In this case, both the flight spoiler and flaps twist checklists could have been applicable. We were forced to conduct a visual inspection to eliminate the possibility of a flap failure. Furthermore, when we extended the flight spoilers per the checklist the 'F/ctrl' page indicated a symmetrical deployment of the flight spoilers, even though this was not the case. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the spoiler float was caused by the flight spoiler actuator cylinder rod end breaking at the spoiler end. The reporter said an airworthiness directive exists on the spoiler system requiring the spoiler actuators to be inspected every 7000 hours. The reporter said this time limit is much too long as this airplane has low time. The reporter stated the airplane was ctlable but considerable time was wasted determining what the problem was. The reporter said the EICAS system warning messages were at best erroneous and attempting to match the handbook to the messages was misleading. The reporter stated a visual inspection was required to determine the problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CANADAIR CL65 ON APCH AT 2500 FT DECLARED AN EMER AND EXECUTED A GAR DUE TO ACFT ROLLING R 15-20 DEGS CAUSED BY A SPOILER ACTUATOR ROD END FAILURE.

Narrative: WE WERE AT 2500 FT MSL AND CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH. WE ELECTED TO FOLLOW THE LOC AND WERE ABOUT TO INTERCEPT THE GS WHEN FLAPS 45 DEGS WERE SELECTED. ABOUT THE SAME TIME THE ACFT ROLLED R, APPROX 15-20 DEGS. I APPLIED L AILERON TO CORRECT THE ROLL. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, WE RECEIVED A 'FLT SPOILER DEPLOYED' CAUTION MESSAGE ON THE EICAS. THE FLT CTL SYNOPTIC PAGE SHOWED EVERYTHING NORMAL EXCEPT THE R FLT SPOILER BOX WAS YELLOW AND ZERO DISPLACEMENT WAS INDICATED. I APPLIED PWR AND DISCONTINUED THE APCH. WE INFORMED THE TWR WE WERE BREAKING OFF THE APCH AND DECLARED AN EMER. THE TWR XFERRED US BACK TO APCH CTL WHO ASKED US TO MAINTAIN 3000 FT MSL BECAUSE THAT WAS THE MSA FOR THE AIRSPACE. WE LATER CLBED TO 5000 FT TO REMAIN CLR OF THE ICING LAYER. WE RAN THE CHKLIST FOR THE FLT SPOILER DEPLOYED CAUTION MESSAGE AND VERIFIED THAT THE HANDLE WAS STOWED. WE ORBITED MAKING L-HAND TURNS WHILE WE TRIED TO IDENT THE PROB AND ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT ACR MAINT CTL FOR ASSISTANCE. AFTER CONSULTING WITH MAINT AND FLT OPS PERSONNEL, AND CONDUCTING A VISUAL INSPECTION, WE DETERMINED THAT WE HAD SOME SORT OF FAILURE OF THE R FLT SPOILER. WE THEN RAN THE CHKLIST FOR A FLT SPOILER FAILURE WITHOUT SATISFACTORY RESULTS. BY THIS TIME WE HAD ONLY 2000 LBS OF FUEL REMAINING AND WE ELECTED TO LAND USING THE CORRECTED AIRSPDS PER THE HANDBOOK. THE APCH AND LNDG WERE UNEVENTFUL WITH NORMAL GND LIFT DUMP DEPLOYMENT INDICATED ON TOUCHDOWN. A POSTFLT INSPECTION REVEALED THE R FLT SPOILER WAS FULLY DEPLOYED, PROBABLY FROM GND LIFT DUMP ON LNDG, AND THE L SPOILER LUG HAD FRACTURED AND SEPARATED FROM ITS RESPECTIVE ACTUATOR. WHETHER THE LUG FAILURE WAS THE PRIMARY FAILURE OR A SECONDARY FAILURE IS UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME. ONE OF THE INHERENT WEAKNESSES OF THE CL65 EICAS SYS IS THAT IT RELIES ON ACTUATOR DISPLACEMENT TO DETERMINE THE POS OF THE FLT CTLS. THIS HAS THE UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCE OF GENERATING ERRONEOUS OR MISLEADING INFO WITH SOME ACTUATOR FAILURE MODES OR WHEN THE ACTUATOR BECOMES SEPARATED FROM ITS CTL SURFACE. IN OUR EVENT, THE PRIMARY EICAS MESSAGE WAS 'FLT SPOILERS DEPLOY' CAUTION MESSAGE INSTEAD OF THE 'FLT SPOILER L(R)' CAUTION MESSAGE. WE WERE FORCED TO SPEND TIME REVIEWING THE CONTENTS OF THE OTHER CHKLISTS TO SEE WHICH ONE WOULD BE MOST APPLICABLE TO OUR SIT. IN THIS CASE, BOTH THE FLT SPOILER AND FLAPS TWIST CHKLISTS COULD HAVE BEEN APPLICABLE. WE WERE FORCED TO CONDUCT A VISUAL INSPECTION TO ELIMINATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A FLAP FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, WHEN WE EXTENDED THE FLT SPOILERS PER THE CHKLIST THE 'F/CTRL' PAGE INDICATED A SYMMETRICAL DEPLOYMENT OF THE FLT SPOILERS, EVEN THOUGH THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE SPOILER FLOAT WAS CAUSED BY THE FLT SPOILER ACTUATOR CYLINDER ROD END BREAKING AT THE SPOILER END. THE RPTR SAID AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE EXISTS ON THE SPOILER SYS REQUIRING THE SPOILER ACTUATORS TO BE INSPECTED EVERY 7000 HRS. THE RPTR SAID THIS TIME LIMIT IS MUCH TOO LONG AS THIS AIRPLANE HAS LOW TIME. THE RPTR STATED THE AIRPLANE WAS CTLABLE BUT CONSIDERABLE TIME WAS WASTED DETERMINING WHAT THE PROB WAS. THE RPTR SAID THE EICAS SYS WARNING MESSAGES WERE AT BEST ERRONEOUS AND ATTEMPTING TO MATCH THE HANDBOOK TO THE MESSAGES WAS MISLEADING. THE RPTR STATED A VISUAL INSPECTION WAS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE THE PROB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.