Narrative:

On feb/xa/01 we were operating from grr to mke. On the takeoff roll we got a rwp light and master warning (takeoff confign) at approximately 90 KTS. I was the PF at the time. The first officer called 'abort, abort.' I conducted the memory items for a takeoff confign warning -- airplane -- stop. We cleared the active runway 26L and advised ATC of the situation. We found that the trim indicator to be out of the green band, which set off the takeoff confign warning. It appears that on takeoff roll, I inadvertently activated the trim switch on the yoke, which would have caused the takeoff confign warning. We again completed an after landing checklist as well as a taxi checklist. We were again cleared for takeoff on runway 26L. At that time another before takeoff checklist was completed and a normal takeoff was done. Inaction on our part was the failure to contact our dispatch to advise them of the rejected takeoff. I feel the factors that contributed to this incident were that it was our 6TH day on duty with 3 stand-up overnights taking place earlier in the week (fatigue). A training bulletin should be written of the adverse effects of using elevator trim on the takeoff phase of flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: D328 CREW HAD TKOF ABORT CAUSED BY THE CAPT'S INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF THE STABILIZER TRIM.

Narrative: ON FEB/XA/01 WE WERE OPERATING FROM GRR TO MKE. ON THE TKOF ROLL WE GOT A RWP LIGHT AND MASTER WARNING (TKOF CONFIGN) AT APPROX 90 KTS. I WAS THE PF AT THE TIME. THE FO CALLED 'ABORT, ABORT.' I CONDUCTED THE MEMORY ITEMS FOR A TKOF CONFIGN WARNING -- AIRPLANE -- STOP. WE CLRED THE ACTIVE RWY 26L AND ADVISED ATC OF THE SIT. WE FOUND THAT THE TRIM INDICATOR TO BE OUT OF THE GREEN BAND, WHICH SET OFF THE TKOF CONFIGN WARNING. IT APPEARS THAT ON TKOF ROLL, I INADVERTENTLY ACTIVATED THE TRIM SWITCH ON THE YOKE, WHICH WOULD HAVE CAUSED THE TKOF CONFIGN WARNING. WE AGAIN COMPLETED AN AFTER LNDG CHKLIST AS WELL AS A TAXI CHKLIST. WE WERE AGAIN CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 26L. AT THAT TIME ANOTHER BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED AND A NORMAL TKOF WAS DONE. INACTION ON OUR PART WAS THE FAILURE TO CONTACT OUR DISPATCH TO ADVISE THEM OF THE REJECTED TKOF. I FEEL THE FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT WERE THAT IT WAS OUR 6TH DAY ON DUTY WITH 3 STAND-UP OVERNIGHTS TAKING PLACE EARLIER IN THE WK (FATIGUE). A TRAINING BULLETIN SHOULD BE WRITTEN OF THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF USING ELEVATOR TRIM ON THE TKOF PHASE OF FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.