Narrative:

Approach sequence began at 7000 ft MSL, abeam atl airport with radar vectors (at 250 KTS) by atl approach control. Shortly after passing this abeam point, approach issued a descent clearance. He also told us to expedite descent (as atl approach often issues a 'slam dunk approach' for this approach). While descending at maximum rate (throttles idle, speed brakes full, etc) through 6000 ft, approach issued base leg and asked if we had the airport. (We did not visually acquire the airport until after the event was over.) we said we didn't have the airport. Approach then asked if we had parallel traffic on runway 27L. Again we said we didn't have traffic. Approach then issued a 230 degree heading to intercept runway 26R. We still did not have the airport or the other airplane in sight. (Keep in mind that we were still descending maximum rate, lowering the landing gear, trying to run the 'final descent checklist' and slowing the aircraft down.) as we intercepted the localizer for runway 26R, approach asked if we saw our parallel traffic. Right at that moment, we received a TCASII traffic alert. We responded to approach by saying 'we do not have traffic in sight and we just received a TA.' as I was responding to approach (I was the PNF), I noticed our traffic on the screen 600 ft below and less than 1 mi horizontal. In addition, I noticed the 'wind arrow' indicating a 30 KT (right) direct crosswind to the runway 26R localizer. Following my response, approach immediately issued a climb and 30 degree right turn. Shortly after our 'breakout maneuver,' we saw the airport and reported so. Atl approach then reclred us for the ILS runway 26R. Summary: I suspect (after reviewing both the runway 26R and runway 27L approachs and recalling the events stated above) the following: 1) atl approach was 'slam dunking' us for runway 26R. 2) atl approach was unaware or forgot about the 30 KT north wind which added 30 KTS on the tail on base. 3) we were unable to see airport/airplane due to haze and task saturation. 4) other aircraft was descending from his intermediate altitude to his GS intercept altitude via the GS, as opposed to an idle power descent stepdown. 5) ATC should be more careful when issuing the 'slam dunk' approachs. This capacity enhancement tool is pushing the safety envelope. Supplemental information from acn 502194: the first officer and I agreed we couldn't have done anything better and that approach didn't realize the strength of the wind from the north and that the B737 for runway 26L probably slowed his descent to capture the GS are the 2 things that made us get close.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR BROKE OFF ATL RWY 26 FINAL DUE TO PROX OF ANOTHER ACFT BEING CROSSED UNDER TO ANOTHER RWY. ARPT AND TFC NOT IN SIGHT DURING EVENT UNTIL LAST MOMENT.

Narrative: APCH SEQUENCE BEGAN AT 7000 FT MSL, ABEAM ATL ARPT WITH RADAR VECTORS (AT 250 KTS) BY ATL APCH CTL. SHORTLY AFTER PASSING THIS ABEAM POINT, APCH ISSUED A DSCNT CLRNC. HE ALSO TOLD US TO EXPEDITE DSCNT (AS ATL APCH OFTEN ISSUES A 'SLAM DUNK APCH' FOR THIS APCH). WHILE DSNDING AT MAX RATE (THROTTLES IDLE, SPD BRAKES FULL, ETC) THROUGH 6000 FT, APCH ISSUED BASE LEG AND ASKED IF WE HAD THE ARPT. (WE DID NOT VISUALLY ACQUIRE THE ARPT UNTIL AFTER THE EVENT WAS OVER.) WE SAID WE DIDN'T HAVE THE ARPT. APCH THEN ASKED IF WE HAD PARALLEL TFC ON RWY 27L. AGAIN WE SAID WE DIDN'T HAVE TFC. APCH THEN ISSUED A 230 DEG HDG TO INTERCEPT RWY 26R. WE STILL DID NOT HAVE THE ARPT OR THE OTHER AIRPLANE IN SIGHT. (KEEP IN MIND THAT WE WERE STILL DSNDING MAX RATE, LOWERING THE LNDG GEAR, TRYING TO RUN THE 'FINAL DSCNT CHKLIST' AND SLOWING THE ACFT DOWN.) AS WE INTERCEPTED THE LOC FOR RWY 26R, APCH ASKED IF WE SAW OUR PARALLEL TFC. RIGHT AT THAT MOMENT, WE RECEIVED A TCASII TFC ALERT. WE RESPONDED TO APCH BY SAYING 'WE DO NOT HAVE TFC IN SIGHT AND WE JUST RECEIVED A TA.' AS I WAS RESPONDING TO APCH (I WAS THE PNF), I NOTICED OUR TFC ON THE SCREEN 600 FT BELOW AND LESS THAN 1 MI HORIZ. IN ADDITION, I NOTICED THE 'WIND ARROW' INDICATING A 30 KT (R) DIRECT XWIND TO THE RWY 26R LOC. FOLLOWING MY RESPONSE, APCH IMMEDIATELY ISSUED A CLB AND 30 DEG R TURN. SHORTLY AFTER OUR 'BREAKOUT MANEUVER,' WE SAW THE ARPT AND RPTED SO. ATL APCH THEN RECLRED US FOR THE ILS RWY 26R. SUMMARY: I SUSPECT (AFTER REVIEWING BOTH THE RWY 26R AND RWY 27L APCHS AND RECALLING THE EVENTS STATED ABOVE) THE FOLLOWING: 1) ATL APCH WAS 'SLAM DUNKING' US FOR RWY 26R. 2) ATL APCH WAS UNAWARE OR FORGOT ABOUT THE 30 KT N WIND WHICH ADDED 30 KTS ON THE TAIL ON BASE. 3) WE WERE UNABLE TO SEE ARPT/AIRPLANE DUE TO HAZE AND TASK SATURATION. 4) OTHER ACFT WAS DSNDING FROM HIS INTERMEDIATE ALT TO HIS GS INTERCEPT ALT VIA THE GS, AS OPPOSED TO AN IDLE PWR DSCNT STEPDOWN. 5) ATC SHOULD BE MORE CAREFUL WHEN ISSUING THE 'SLAM DUNK' APCHS. THIS CAPACITY ENHANCEMENT TOOL IS PUSHING THE SAFETY ENVELOPE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 502194: THE FO AND I AGREED WE COULDN'T HAVE DONE ANYTHING BETTER AND THAT APCH DIDN'T REALIZE THE STRENGTH OF THE WIND FROM THE N AND THAT THE B737 FOR RWY 26L PROBABLY SLOWED HIS DSCNT TO CAPTURE THE GS ARE THE 2 THINGS THAT MADE US GET CLOSE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.