Narrative:

It was the captain's leg. We briefed a visual to runway 22 after getting the ATIS. Nothing appeared unusual except a right quartering gusty headwind at the airport. I did the performance calculations and after entering a notamed displaced threshold for runway 22, commented that either runway 22 or 26 was within limits. Nothing in the data was bracketed or flashing and brake cooling was not a factor. Vref was 128 KTS and target was 144 KTS. We broke out of clouds about 12000 ft and picked up elp visually as we crossed over the mountains. We were a bit steep and the captain decided runway 26 might give us a better shot at getting down. He leveled off briefly and we configured to flaps 30 degrees and then resumed our descent. It became apparent we would get down in time to be on glide path for runway 22 in plenty of time so we requested to land on runway 22. Tower cleared us to land on runway 22 and gave the winds. This was the first indication we might have a problem since they were now 20-30 KTS variable and shifting to more of a crosswind. We were stabilized on the visual glide path, (the ILS GS was out due to the displaced threshold). The captain then flew a visual approach using the hgs in VMC mode. When we were about 1500 ft the tower gave winds for 2 areas. The first one was still a strong gusty quartering headwind. The northeast boundary winds were now a quartering tailwind 20 KTS gusting to 30 KTS. I computed this would be out of our landing limits for a 500 (10 maximum). Meanwhile the visibility decreased somewhat but we never lost sight of the runway or airport. This later turned out to be a developing dust storm. The captain reported he was seeing 33 KTS of tailwind in hgs. In my mind this was a rapidly developing unsafe situation. I announced the winds were out of limits for landing. Soon thereafter the tower announced a windshear alert. I mentioned we were out of limits to land and the captain asked for another wind check. The tower gave winds about the same as before. As I remember the northeast winds were 340 degrees at 23 KTS. We made the 1000 ft call and I really became uncomfortable with the conditions, the possibility of landing with excessive tailwind and the possibility of windshear. I announced 2 or 3 times we should go around and each time the captain calmly said we would continue and to get an update on the winds. I don't think I made another callout until after touchdown in the ensuing confusion. About 200 ft I made my last go around input but by then it was apparent he had made his decision to land. I considered taking the aircraft but worried we might start fighting over the controls. Soon after touchdown I noted 155 KTS of ground speed. He gently began braking and went into reverse soon after touchdown. I called '135 KTS' ground speed at 5000 ft remaining. We then decelerated more rapidly to taxi speed and turned off at what I think was taxiway G. On the way to the gate the cockpit air was electric. The captain proceeded to tell me why he chose to land under those conditions. I mentioned CRM had failed in the last 3 mins. I almost asked to be replaced in elp but after cooling off in the jetway went back and asked if we could put the issue aside for the last leg back. He said we could and we flew uneventfully to dallas. The captain and I discussed this in depth after the event. He realizes we should have gone around and was essentially solo the last 5 mi or so. He sincerely has expressed remorse and for that reason I do not want to report this. We both would like this to provide a learning tool for all our pilots to see how fast sits can develop that challenge our judgement. Here are some areas where we had problems. The captain thought I was using FMC winds for my computations while I was using tower winds. I think he was hoping the winds would die down to within limits by touchdown on the heads up guidance system. I have stressed tower winds determine if winds meet flight manual limits. We have discussed training issues as well. We both feel the windshear scenarios for landing we use during training in the simulators can insidiously allow us to press the runway when we start tofeel uncomfortable in a situation such as ours. In the simulators we are told continue when we see large airspeed and flight path excursions because we have to be trained on recovering from an actual 'windshear, windshear, windshear' warning when in reality we should have gone around long before then. Finally, I would like to know why there is sometimes a stigma attached to a go around. As I explained, 'do the manly thing and go around.' then you can objectively evaluate the conditions and take more prudent and safe action with the captain and first officer working as a team.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-500 CAPT LANDED ON A RWY THAT PERFORMANCE CALCULATIONS SHOWED ILLEGAL. IN ADDITION THERE WAS RPTED WINDSHEAR AND 20-30 KT TAILWINDS.

Narrative: IT WAS THE CAPT'S LEG. WE BRIEFED A VISUAL TO RWY 22 AFTER GETTING THE ATIS. NOTHING APPEARED UNUSUAL EXCEPT A R QUARTERING GUSTY HEADWIND AT THE ARPT. I DID THE PERFORMANCE CALCULATIONS AND AFTER ENTERING A NOTAMED DISPLACED THRESHOLD FOR RWY 22, COMMENTED THAT EITHER RWY 22 OR 26 WAS WITHIN LIMITS. NOTHING IN THE DATA WAS BRACKETED OR FLASHING AND BRAKE COOLING WAS NOT A FACTOR. VREF WAS 128 KTS AND TARGET WAS 144 KTS. WE BROKE OUT OF CLOUDS ABOUT 12000 FT AND PICKED UP ELP VISUALLY AS WE CROSSED OVER THE MOUNTAINS. WE WERE A BIT STEEP AND THE CAPT DECIDED RWY 26 MIGHT GIVE US A BETTER SHOT AT GETTING DOWN. HE LEVELED OFF BRIEFLY AND WE CONFIGURED TO FLAPS 30 DEGS AND THEN RESUMED OUR DSCNT. IT BECAME APPARENT WE WOULD GET DOWN IN TIME TO BE ON GLIDE PATH FOR RWY 22 IN PLENTY OF TIME SO WE REQUESTED TO LAND ON RWY 22. TWR CLRED US TO LAND ON RWY 22 AND GAVE THE WINDS. THIS WAS THE FIRST INDICATION WE MIGHT HAVE A PROB SINCE THEY WERE NOW 20-30 KTS VARIABLE AND SHIFTING TO MORE OF A XWIND. WE WERE STABILIZED ON THE VISUAL GLIDE PATH, (THE ILS GS WAS OUT DUE TO THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD). THE CAPT THEN FLEW A VISUAL APCH USING THE HGS IN VMC MODE. WHEN WE WERE ABOUT 1500 FT THE TWR GAVE WINDS FOR 2 AREAS. THE FIRST ONE WAS STILL A STRONG GUSTY QUARTERING HEADWIND. THE NE BOUNDARY WINDS WERE NOW A QUARTERING TAILWIND 20 KTS GUSTING TO 30 KTS. I COMPUTED THIS WOULD BE OUT OF OUR LNDG LIMITS FOR A 500 (10 MAX). MEANWHILE THE VISIBILITY DECREASED SOMEWHAT BUT WE NEVER LOST SIGHT OF THE RWY OR ARPT. THIS LATER TURNED OUT TO BE A DEVELOPING DUST STORM. THE CAPT RPTED HE WAS SEEING 33 KTS OF TAILWIND IN HGS. IN MY MIND THIS WAS A RAPIDLY DEVELOPING UNSAFE SIT. I ANNOUNCED THE WINDS WERE OUT OF LIMITS FOR LNDG. SOON THEREAFTER THE TWR ANNOUNCED A WINDSHEAR ALERT. I MENTIONED WE WERE OUT OF LIMITS TO LAND AND THE CAPT ASKED FOR ANOTHER WIND CHK. THE TWR GAVE WINDS ABOUT THE SAME AS BEFORE. AS I REMEMBER THE NE WINDS WERE 340 DEGS AT 23 KTS. WE MADE THE 1000 FT CALL AND I REALLY BECAME UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE CONDITIONS, THE POSSIBILITY OF LNDG WITH EXCESSIVE TAILWIND AND THE POSSIBILITY OF WINDSHEAR. I ANNOUNCED 2 OR 3 TIMES WE SHOULD GO AROUND AND EACH TIME THE CAPT CALMLY SAID WE WOULD CONTINUE AND TO GET AN UPDATE ON THE WINDS. I DON'T THINK I MADE ANOTHER CALLOUT UNTIL AFTER TOUCHDOWN IN THE ENSUING CONFUSION. ABOUT 200 FT I MADE MY LAST GAR INPUT BUT BY THEN IT WAS APPARENT HE HAD MADE HIS DECISION TO LAND. I CONSIDERED TAKING THE ACFT BUT WORRIED WE MIGHT START FIGHTING OVER THE CTLS. SOON AFTER TOUCHDOWN I NOTED 155 KTS OF GND SPD. HE GENTLY BEGAN BRAKING AND WENT INTO REVERSE SOON AFTER TOUCHDOWN. I CALLED '135 KTS' GND SPD AT 5000 FT REMAINING. WE THEN DECELERATED MORE RAPIDLY TO TAXI SPD AND TURNED OFF AT WHAT I THINK WAS TXWY G. ON THE WAY TO THE GATE THE COCKPIT AIR WAS ELECTRIC. THE CAPT PROCEEDED TO TELL ME WHY HE CHOSE TO LAND UNDER THOSE CONDITIONS. I MENTIONED CRM HAD FAILED IN THE LAST 3 MINS. I ALMOST ASKED TO BE REPLACED IN ELP BUT AFTER COOLING OFF IN THE JETWAY WENT BACK AND ASKED IF WE COULD PUT THE ISSUE ASIDE FOR THE LAST LEG BACK. HE SAID WE COULD AND WE FLEW UNEVENTFULLY TO DALLAS. THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED THIS IN DEPTH AFTER THE EVENT. HE REALIZES WE SHOULD HAVE GONE AROUND AND WAS ESSENTIALLY SOLO THE LAST 5 MI OR SO. HE SINCERELY HAS EXPRESSED REMORSE AND FOR THAT REASON I DO NOT WANT TO RPT THIS. WE BOTH WOULD LIKE THIS TO PROVIDE A LEARNING TOOL FOR ALL OUR PLTS TO SEE HOW FAST SITS CAN DEVELOP THAT CHALLENGE OUR JUDGEMENT. HERE ARE SOME AREAS WHERE WE HAD PROBS. THE CAPT THOUGHT I WAS USING FMC WINDS FOR MY COMPUTATIONS WHILE I WAS USING TWR WINDS. I THINK HE WAS HOPING THE WINDS WOULD DIE DOWN TO WITHIN LIMITS BY TOUCHDOWN ON THE HEADS UP GUIDANCE SYS. I HAVE STRESSED TWR WINDS DETERMINE IF WINDS MEET FLT MANUAL LIMITS. WE HAVE DISCUSSED TRAINING ISSUES AS WELL. WE BOTH FEEL THE WINDSHEAR SCENARIOS FOR LNDG WE USE DURING TRAINING IN THE SIMULATORS CAN INSIDIOUSLY ALLOW US TO PRESS THE RWY WHEN WE START TOFEEL UNCOMFORTABLE IN A SIT SUCH AS OURS. IN THE SIMULATORS WE ARE TOLD CONTINUE WHEN WE SEE LARGE AIRSPD AND FLT PATH EXCURSIONS BECAUSE WE HAVE TO BE TRAINED ON RECOVERING FROM AN ACTUAL 'WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR' WARNING WHEN IN REALITY WE SHOULD HAVE GONE AROUND LONG BEFORE THEN. FINALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHY THERE IS SOMETIMES A STIGMA ATTACHED TO A GAR. AS I EXPLAINED, 'DO THE MANLY THING AND GO AROUND.' THEN YOU CAN OBJECTIVELY EVALUATE THE CONDITIONS AND TAKE MORE PRUDENT AND SAFE ACTION WITH THE CAPT AND FO WORKING AS A TEAM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.