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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 506643 |
Time | |
Date | 200103 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : lga.airport |
State Reference | NY |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Weather Elements | Fog Rain |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | DC-9 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : lga.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B727 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : position and hold |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 170 flight time total : 12200 flight time type : 3000 |
ASRS Report | 506643 |
Person 2 | |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : commercial |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 180 flight time total : 4520 flight time type : 800 |
ASRS Report | 506386 |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : ground less severe incursion : runway non adherence : clearance |
Independent Detector | other controllera other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued alert flight crew : exited adverse environment none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 2000 vertical : 0 |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | ATC Human Performance Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Situations | |
ATC Facility | procedure or policy : lga.tower |
Narrative:
We flew ILS runway 04 lga. During landing rollout we were given taxi instructions during high workload phase of flight. This set of instructions was given to us as we were making callouts related to reversing, airspeed and whether we could make a specific turnoff relative to our ground speed and wet runway conditions and transfer of aircraft control and braking from first officer to captain. Prior to approach the first officer briefed a possible turnoff taxiway P from runway 04 lga. We also discussed that our proposed weight and runway conditions (wet) might preclude that from happening and that we may cross runway 13/31 and have to taxi back across active runway 13. The landing and rollout was uneventful, we missed taxiway P and the first officer backed off on the braking somewhat to get through runway 13/04 intersection. During this time we were busy with cockpit duties, radio xmissions directed to us, and making a determination if we could turn off at taxiway 'U' from runway 04, and transfer of aircraft from first officer to captain. We did not make taxiway U as we determined, given wet runway, we were just a little too fast so we exited runway 04 at taxiway right. First officer switched radio to ground as we exited runway 04 at taxiway 'right' stating aircraft X on right. Response from controller was taxi 'right-B-gate.' I stated to the first officer this sounded odd, to please confirm that. As we continued southwest bound on taxiway right, we confirmed our taxi routing. Controller said ...B short of north. Now we were approaching taxiway U on right. There was an aircraft on landing roll and an aircraft in position runway 13 with its lights on. In my mind this was all going to work out. I was going to cross runway 13 on taxiway right, within seconds of landing roll aircraft on runway 04, who turned off either taxiway U or romeo (this aircraft also crossed runway 13 on landing roll). Now the first officer made one more radio call to confirm us to cross runway 22. He mis spoke -- he meant runway 13. At this time controller directed us to stop, but I estimated us to be 20-30 ft extended across runway so I added power to get across vs stopping on runway centerline. We continued as previously cleared and taxied to the gate. How problems arose: controllers who spend 8 hours a day at a given airport, due to high traffic loads, have a lot of information to get out to crews, so they can move traffic. Giving us taxi instructions (crews go to and are responsible for, hundreds of airports) while we are 'still flying' on runway and slowing down is not a good time to pass us this information. We are at a fairly high workload on landing roll, at lga, at night, wet runway, speed, reverser callouts, braking, turn offs and aircraft transfer control. Contributing factor: first officer switched radio to ground control prior to crossing runway 13 on taxiway right. Above factor did not sink into my brain. Ground controller gave us a clearance to taxi 'right-B-gate' prior to us reaching taxiway r-rwy 13 intersection. This in my mind was a legal clearance. We checked it a second time. We were again cleared taxi B short north. We were on wrong frequency -- I did not catch it. Did ground controller verify our position on airport when he gave us r-b, gate? Discovered as ground controller directed us to stop prior to runway 13. Too late. Corrective action: I will not acknowledge any radio transmissions until I am ready and able to think it through no matter who or how long it holds up traffic. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter had nothing to add to his report.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: DC9 ON TXWY R AT LGA IS TOLD BY ATC TO STOP WHILE IN THE MIDDLE OF RWY 13, BUT ELECTS TO CONTINUE ACROSS WITH A B727 ABOUT TO TAKE OFF FROM THE RWY.
Narrative: WE FLEW ILS RWY 04 LGA. DURING LNDG ROLLOUT WE WERE GIVEN TAXI INSTRUCTIONS DURING HIGH WORKLOAD PHASE OF FLIGHT. THIS SET OF INSTRUCTIONS WAS GIVEN TO US AS WE WERE MAKING CALLOUTS RELATED TO REVERSING, AIRSPEED AND WHETHER WE COULD MAKE A SPECIFIC TURNOFF RELATIVE TO OUR GND SPEED AND WET RWY CONDITIONS AND TRANSFER OF ACFT CONTROL AND BRAKING FROM FO TO CAPT. PRIOR TO APCH THE FO BRIEFED A POSSIBLE TURNOFF TXWY P FROM RWY 04 LGA. WE ALSO DISCUSSED THAT OUR PROPOSED WEIGHT AND RWY CONDITIONS (WET) MIGHT PRECLUDE THAT FROM HAPPENING AND THAT WE MAY CROSS RWY 13/31 AND HAVE TO TAXI BACK ACROSS ACTIVE RWY 13. THE LNDG AND ROLLOUT WAS UNEVENTFUL, WE MISSED TXWY P AND THE FO BACKED OFF ON THE BRAKING SOMEWHAT TO GET THROUGH RWY 13/04 INTERSECTION. DURING THIS TIME WE WERE BUSY WITH COCKPIT DUTIES, RADIO XMISSIONS DIRECTED TO US, AND MAKING A DETERMINATION IF WE COULD TURN OFF AT TXWY 'U' FROM RWY 04, AND TRANSFER OF ACFT FROM FO TO CAPT. WE DID NOT MAKE TXWY U AS WE DETERMINED, GIVEN WET RWY, WE WERE JUST A LITTLE TOO FAST SO WE EXITED RWY 04 AT TXWY R. FO SWITCHED RADIO TO GND AS WE EXITED RWY 04 AT TXWY 'R' STATING ACFT X ON R. RESPONSE FROM CTLR WAS TAXI 'R-B-GATE.' I STATED TO THE FO THIS SOUNDED ODD, TO PLEASE CONFIRM THAT. AS WE CONTINUED SW BOUND ON TXWY R, WE CONFIRMED OUR TAXI ROUTING. CTLR SAID ...B SHORT OF N. NOW WE WERE APCHING TXWY U ON R. THERE WAS AN ACFT ON LNDG ROLL AND AN ACFT IN POS RWY 13 WITH ITS LIGHTS ON. IN MY MIND THIS WAS ALL GOING TO WORK OUT. I WAS GOING TO CROSS RWY 13 ON TXWY R, WITHIN SECONDS OF LNDG ROLL ACFT ON RWY 04, WHO TURNED OFF EITHER TXWY U OR ROMEO (THIS ACFT ALSO CROSSED RWY 13 ON LNDG ROLL). NOW THE FO MADE ONE MORE RADIO CALL TO CONFIRM US TO CROSS RWY 22. HE MIS SPOKE -- HE MEANT RWY 13. AT THIS TIME CTLR DIRECTED US TO STOP, BUT I ESTIMATED US TO BE 20-30 FT EXTENDED ACROSS RWY SO I ADDED POWER TO GET ACROSS VS STOPPING ON RWY CTRLINE. WE CONTINUED AS PREVIOUSLY CLRED AND TAXIED TO THE GATE. HOW PROBLEMS AROSE: CTLRS WHO SPEND 8 HRS A DAY AT A GIVEN ARPT, DUE TO HIGH TFC LOADS, HAVE A LOT OF INFO TO GET OUT TO CREWS, SO THEY CAN MOVE TFC. GIVING US TAXI INSTRUCTIONS (CREWS GO TO AND ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR, HUNDREDS OF ARPTS) WHILE WE ARE 'STILL FLYING' ON RWY AND SLOWING DOWN IS NOT A GOOD TIME TO PASS US THIS INFO. WE ARE AT A FAIRLY HIGH WORKLOAD ON LNDG ROLL, AT LGA, AT NIGHT, WET RWY, SPEED, REVERSER CALLOUTS, BRAKING, TURN OFFS AND ACFT TRANSFER CONTROL. CONTRIBUTING FACTOR: FO SWITCHED RADIO TO GROUND CTL PRIOR TO CROSSING RWY 13 ON TXWY R. ABOVE FACTOR DID NOT SINK INTO MY BRAIN. GND CTLR GAVE US A CLRNC TO TAXI 'R-B-GATE' PRIOR TO US REACHING TXWY R-RWY 13 INTERSECTION. THIS IN MY MIND WAS A LEGAL CLRNC. WE CHECKED IT A SECOND TIME. WE WERE AGAIN CLRED TAXI B SHORT N. WE WERE ON WRONG FREQ -- I DID NOT CATCH IT. DID GND CTLR VERIFY OUR POS ON ARPT WHEN HE GAVE US R-B, GATE? DISCOVERED AS GND CTLR DIRECTED US TO STOP PRIOR TO RWY 13. TOO LATE. CORRECTIVE ACTION: I WILL NOT ACKNOWLEDGE ANY RADIO TRANSMISSIONS UNTIL I AM READY AND ABLE TO THINK IT THROUGH NO MATTER WHO OR HOW LONG IT HOLDS UP TFC. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR HAD NOTHING TO ADD TO HIS RPT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.