Narrative:

This report addresses a commuter airline flight on march xa to shreveport la. I was the first officer and the non-flying pilot. Shv ATIS 'T' reported 7 mi visibility with drizzle. 500 ft broken, 1800 ft broken, 3700 ft overcast, wind 360 degree at 5 knots. Using ILS 14. My captain and I agreed that 32 would be the better runway considering the wind, so I requested it and ATC approved. The landing was fine. I even complimented my captain about it. As we were performing the ground roll, including deceleration, I scanned not only outside the airplane, but also the clock a few times to get the landing time in my memory and the airspeed indicator a few times to note and announce 60 knots, so my captain would say, 'min rpms', and I would pull the condition levers back to the stops. Also I anticipated that tower would soon assign me to call or monitor ground control, so I looked to get the frequency. I missed the 60 knot callout, but my captain said, 'min rpms', anyway. I then said, 'whoops, sorry, 60 knots, min rpms', and pulled back the levers. He said that it was okay. As we were getting in the vicinity of our turnoff at the far end (the departure end) of runway 32 I looked off to the right a bit, anticipating our turn. Just as I wondered why we weren't beginning to turn, my captain urgently asked, 'is that the end of the runway?' then I looked straight ahead of us and saw many lights that immediately confused me and I didn't know how to answer. I think I said, 'uh, is that extended runway for overrun?' he urgently said, 'it is the end of the runway', and applied heavy brake pressure and we skidded the nose a few ft off of the wet runway. He called tower and they asked if we needed help, but we thought we could successfully perform a u-turn. We hadn't realized it, but the main gear were both still on the runway, so when my captain applied power, we moved forward and the mains went off the pavement and immediately sunk about 6 inches in mushy grass covered ground. Then we were stuck, so we did have to get assistance. The runway excursion was not violent, it was very smooth. Our flight attendant couldn't even tell that anything went wrong until a passenger who saw out a window informed her. We were taxiing slowly, just not slowly enough to stop when my captain realized his error. After we stopped I realized that the confusing lights that my captain and I saw were the approach lights (alsf 2) for the opposite runway 14. We, of course, saw them from behind the direction they aim. It was totally unfamiliar sight that I have never seen before. They caused an illusion of extended runway and caused the four (left and right) red runway end lights to be unnoticeable. I wonder if this is normal for ATC to keep opposite approach lights on. I never thought about it before, but now I'm wary of it and I wish that ATC would turn off approach lights opposite the runway (of the moment) in use. When it is dark beyond the end of a runway there is no uncertainty where the end of the runway is. It is obvious that is the end of the runway. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter advised the runway was wet and was not monitoring the PIC's immediate actions, looking for the anticipated taxiway, when the PIC apparently became disoriented. It was after they realized that the nose gear was off the runway end, having called local control for assistance, that the runway 14 approach light system reflectivity caused concern. The first officer admitted that the flight crew was not completely 'on top of the situation'. The first officer advised company provided additional training.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: E120 FLC EXPERIENCE SHV RWY 32 EXCURSION WITH NOSE WHEEL OFF PAVEMENT. FLC CONCERNED WITH RWY 14 APCH LIGHT REFLECTIVE ILLUSION OF NOT SEEING RWY 32 REIL (RWY END IDENTIFIER LIGHTS).

Narrative: THIS RPT ADDRESSES A COMMUTER AIRLINE FLT ON MARCH XA TO SHREVEPORT LA. I WAS THE FO AND THE NON-FLYING PLT. SHV ATIS 'T' RPTED 7 MI VISIBILITY WITH DRIZZLE. 500 FT BROKEN, 1800 FT BROKEN, 3700 FT OVERCAST, WIND 360 DEG AT 5 KNOTS. USING ILS 14. MY CAPT AND I AGREED THAT 32 WOULD BE THE BETTER RWY CONSIDERING THE WIND, SO I REQUESTED IT AND ATC APPROVED. THE LNDG WAS FINE. I EVEN COMPLIMENTED MY CAPT ABOUT IT. AS WE WERE PERFORMING THE GND ROLL, INCLUDING DECELERATION, I SCANNED NOT ONLY OUTSIDE THE AIRPLANE, BUT ALSO THE CLOCK A FEW TIMES TO GET THE LNDG TIME IN MY MEMORY AND THE AIRSPEED INDICATOR A FEW TIMES TO NOTE AND ANNOUNCE 60 KNOTS, SO MY CAPT WOULD SAY, 'MIN RPMS', AND I WOULD PULL THE CONDITION LEVERS BACK TO THE STOPS. ALSO I ANTICIPATED THAT TWR WOULD SOON ASSIGN ME TO CALL OR MONITOR GND CTL, SO I LOOKED TO GET THE FREQ. I MISSED THE 60 KNOT CALLOUT, BUT MY CAPT SAID, 'MIN RPMS', ANYWAY. I THEN SAID, 'WHOOPS, SORRY, 60 KNOTS, MIN RPMS', AND PULLED BACK THE LEVERS. HE SAID THAT IT WAS OKAY. AS WE WERE GETTING IN THE VICINITY OF OUR TURNOFF AT THE FAR END (THE DEP END) OF RWY 32 I LOOKED OFF TO THE RIGHT A BIT, ANTICIPATING OUR TURN. JUST AS I WONDERED WHY WE WEREN'T BEGINNING TO TURN, MY CAPT URGENTLY ASKED, 'IS THAT THE END OF THE RWY?' THEN I LOOKED STRAIGHT AHEAD OF US AND SAW MANY LIGHTS THAT IMMEDIATELY CONFUSED ME AND I DIDN'T KNOW HOW TO ANSWER. I THINK I SAID, 'UH, IS THAT EXTENDED RWY FOR OVERRUN?' HE URGENTLY SAID, 'IT IS THE END OF THE RWY', AND APPLIED HEAVY BRAKE PRESSURE AND WE SKIDDED THE NOSE A FEW FT OFF OF THE WET RWY. HE CALLED TWR AND THEY ASKED IF WE NEEDED HELP, BUT WE THOUGHT WE COULD SUCCESSFULLY PERFORM A U-TURN. WE HADN'T REALIZED IT, BUT THE MAIN GEAR WERE BOTH STILL ON THE RWY, SO WHEN MY CAPT APPLIED POWER, WE MOVED FORWARD AND THE MAINS WENT OFF THE PAVEMENT AND IMMEDIATELY SUNK ABOUT 6 INCHES IN MUSHY GRASS COVERED GND. THEN WE WERE STUCK, SO WE DID HAVE TO GET ASSISTANCE. THE RWY EXCURSION WAS NOT VIOLENT, IT WAS VERY SMOOTH. OUR FA COULDN'T EVEN TELL THAT ANYTHING WENT WRONG UNTIL A PAX WHO SAW OUT A WINDOW INFORMED HER. WE WERE TAXIING SLOWLY, JUST NOT SLOWLY ENOUGH TO STOP WHEN MY CAPT REALIZED HIS ERROR. AFTER WE STOPPED I REALIZED THAT THE CONFUSING LIGHTS THAT MY CAPT AND I SAW WERE THE APCH LIGHTS (ALSF 2) FOR THE OPPOSITE RWY 14. WE, OF COURSE, SAW THEM FROM BEHIND THE DIRECTION THEY AIM. IT WAS TOTALLY UNFAMILIAR SIGHT THAT I HAVE NEVER SEEN BEFORE. THEY CAUSED AN ILLUSION OF EXTENDED RWY AND CAUSED THE FOUR (L AND R) RED RWY END LIGHTS TO BE UNNOTICEABLE. I WONDER IF THIS IS NORMAL FOR ATC TO KEEP OPPOSITE APCH LIGHTS ON. I NEVER THOUGHT ABOUT IT BEFORE, BUT NOW I'M WARY OF IT AND I WISH THAT ATC WOULD TURN OFF APCH LIGHTS OPPOSITE THE RWY (OF THE MOMENT) IN USE. WHEN IT IS DARK BEYOND THE END OF A RWY THERE IS NO UNCERTAINTY WHERE THE END OF THE RWY IS. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT IS THE END OF THE RWY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR ADVISED THE RWY WAS WET AND WAS NOT MONITORING THE PIC'S IMMEDIATE ACTIONS, LOOKING FOR THE ANTICIPATED TXWY, WHEN THE PIC APPARENTLY BECAME DISORIENTED. IT WAS AFTER THEY REALIZED THAT THE NOSE GEAR WAS OFF THE RWY END, HAVING CALLED LC FOR ASSISTANCE, THAT THE RWY 14 APCH LIGHT SYS REFLECTIVITY CAUSED CONCERN. THE FO ADMITTED THAT THE FLC WAS NOT COMPLETELY 'ON TOP OF THE SIT'. THE FO ADVISED COMPANY PROVIDED ADDITIONAL TRAINING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.