Narrative:

It was apr/sun/01 and we were taking off out of charleston, sc at XA37. I was the captain and the PF. Just after takeoff, we retracted the flaps like normal, but it appeared the flaps did not retract. We placed the flap selector in the flaps up position, but the flap indicator still indicated the flaps were at 9 degrees. We received no other cockpit indication, aural or visual, that the flaps were in a position contrary to the flap selector. I had my first officer run our QRH and try to locate the correct procedure for this scenario while having my flight attendant visually verify that the flap position 'appeared to be at 9 degrees.' we discovered that there is no procedure outlined in our reference book for flaps failing to retract. At this point, I called my company dispatch and had my first officer visually confirm that the flaps were at the 9 degree position. Dispatch informed me that this very same plane had the very same problem with the previous crew who brought it to me in charleston, sc. They further reported that I had more than enough fuel to return to washington, dulles (approximately 1 hour 20 mins of fuel remaining when I landed in dulles). They gave me new en route performance data and also reported that the only limitation on the aircraft was a 200 KT flap speed restr. This wasn't going to be a problem since the aircraft's vne is 250 KTS anyway and that the previous crew didn't have any problems flying it to charleston, sc, this way. After reviewing the manufacturer's operating handbooks and finding no further structural limitations on the aircraft for flying at flaps 9 degrees, I concurred with our dispatch, maintenance control and chief pilot's office decisions to return to dulles. While en route to dulles, I had our dispatch run some new landing data for a flaps 9 degree landing. I did not want to extend the flaps any further in the event I needed to execute a go around. The flaps were stuck at 9 degrees, which is the go around flap setting in our aircraft anyway. Dispatch informed me that they were unable to figure any numbers for a flaps 9 degree landing. I had my dispatcher call the chief pilot on duty and confer with maintenance as to which data they preferred I use. At the direction of the chief pilot's office, I elected to use the next fastest set of approach speeds which were flaps 0 degree speeds for the landing. Once I entered dulles' airspace, I elected to declare an emergency and have the emergency vehicles standing by, just to be safe. I figured, since I didn't have the correct landing data and I didn't know how the aircraft was going to perform during the landing, the only safe thing to do was to have vehicles available. Dispatch agreed with my decision. While on downwind for the approach, we received an ACARS message to call dispatch. Thinking they might have some crucial information for us for the landing, I instructed my first officer to call them on the #2 communication. He said that dispatch was instructed by the chief pilot's office to demand that I not declare an emergency. I told my first officer to tell dispatch that it was too late, the emergency had already been declared and that we would call them on the ground. We placed the flap selector in the flaps 9 degree position so the selector would agree with the indication for the landing. We landed in washington, dulles, safely and without incident. Once safely on the ground, I was instructed by dispatch to call the chief pilot on duty. The chief pilot informed me that I should not have declared an emergency. He went on to say that there are certain times to declare an emergency and certain times not to. I told him that I executed my PIC authority/authorized and that I know that I did the right thing by having the trucks available. He went on to say that he is going to look into writing a new chapter to our operations procedures clearly defining when it is and is not ok to declare an emergency. I find it despicable that my company is taking a stand to completely undermine the PIC's decision making process and question my judgement in a case where I clearly erred on the side of safety. I find it disturbing that a PIC faces and solves many problems in the cockpit and then must face the company as their judgement is scrutinized. It seems to me the problem isn't that I declared the emergency, but that I have in the company's eyes waived a red flag alerting the FAA of our very troubled maintenance department.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A JETSTREAM 4100 PIC RPT ON MAINT PROBS WITHIN THE COMPANY WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH HIS FLAP RETRACTION PROB, NECESSITATING AN EMER LNDG AT IAD, VA.

Narrative: IT WAS APR/SUN/01 AND WE WERE TAKING OFF OUT OF CHARLESTON, SC AT XA37. I WAS THE CAPT AND THE PF. JUST AFTER TKOF, WE RETRACTED THE FLAPS LIKE NORMAL, BUT IT APPEARED THE FLAPS DID NOT RETRACT. WE PLACED THE FLAP SELECTOR IN THE FLAPS UP POS, BUT THE FLAP INDICATOR STILL INDICATED THE FLAPS WERE AT 9 DEGS. WE RECEIVED NO OTHER COCKPIT INDICATION, AURAL OR VISUAL, THAT THE FLAPS WERE IN A POS CONTRARY TO THE FLAP SELECTOR. I HAD MY FO RUN OUR QRH AND TRY TO LOCATE THE CORRECT PROC FOR THIS SCENARIO WHILE HAVING MY FLT ATTENDANT VISUALLY VERIFY THAT THE FLAP POS 'APPEARED TO BE AT 9 DEGS.' WE DISCOVERED THAT THERE IS NO PROC OUTLINED IN OUR REF BOOK FOR FLAPS FAILING TO RETRACT. AT THIS POINT, I CALLED MY COMPANY DISPATCH AND HAD MY FO VISUALLY CONFIRM THAT THE FLAPS WERE AT THE 9 DEG POS. DISPATCH INFORMED ME THAT THIS VERY SAME PLANE HAD THE VERY SAME PROB WITH THE PREVIOUS CREW WHO BROUGHT IT TO ME IN CHARLESTON, SC. THEY FURTHER RPTED THAT I HAD MORE THAN ENOUGH FUEL TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON, DULLES (APPROX 1 HR 20 MINS OF FUEL REMAINING WHEN I LANDED IN DULLES). THEY GAVE ME NEW ENRTE PERFORMANCE DATA AND ALSO RPTED THAT THE ONLY LIMITATION ON THE ACFT WAS A 200 KT FLAP SPD RESTR. THIS WASN'T GOING TO BE A PROB SINCE THE ACFT'S VNE IS 250 KTS ANYWAY AND THAT THE PREVIOUS CREW DIDN'T HAVE ANY PROBS FLYING IT TO CHARLESTON, SC, THIS WAY. AFTER REVIEWING THE MANUFACTURER'S OPERATING HANDBOOKS AND FINDING NO FURTHER STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS ON THE ACFT FOR FLYING AT FLAPS 9 DEGS, I CONCURRED WITH OUR DISPATCH, MAINT CTL AND CHIEF PLT'S OFFICE DECISIONS TO RETURN TO DULLES. WHILE ENRTE TO DULLES, I HAD OUR DISPATCH RUN SOME NEW LNDG DATA FOR A FLAPS 9 DEG LNDG. I DID NOT WANT TO EXTEND THE FLAPS ANY FURTHER IN THE EVENT I NEEDED TO EXECUTE A GAR. THE FLAPS WERE STUCK AT 9 DEGS, WHICH IS THE GAR FLAP SETTING IN OUR ACFT ANYWAY. DISPATCH INFORMED ME THAT THEY WERE UNABLE TO FIGURE ANY NUMBERS FOR A FLAPS 9 DEG LNDG. I HAD MY DISPATCHER CALL THE CHIEF PLT ON DUTY AND CONFER WITH MAINT AS TO WHICH DATA THEY PREFERRED I USE. AT THE DIRECTION OF THE CHIEF PLT'S OFFICE, I ELECTED TO USE THE NEXT FASTEST SET OF APCH SPDS WHICH WERE FLAPS 0 DEG SPDS FOR THE LNDG. ONCE I ENTERED DULLES' AIRSPACE, I ELECTED TO DECLARE AN EMER AND HAVE THE EMER VEHICLES STANDING BY, JUST TO BE SAFE. I FIGURED, SINCE I DIDN'T HAVE THE CORRECT LNDG DATA AND I DIDN'T KNOW HOW THE ACFT WAS GOING TO PERFORM DURING THE LNDG, THE ONLY SAFE THING TO DO WAS TO HAVE VEHICLES AVAILABLE. DISPATCH AGREED WITH MY DECISION. WHILE ON DOWNWIND FOR THE APCH, WE RECEIVED AN ACARS MESSAGE TO CALL DISPATCH. THINKING THEY MIGHT HAVE SOME CRUCIAL INFO FOR US FOR THE LNDG, I INSTRUCTED MY FO TO CALL THEM ON THE #2 COM. HE SAID THAT DISPATCH WAS INSTRUCTED BY THE CHIEF PLT'S OFFICE TO DEMAND THAT I NOT DECLARE AN EMER. I TOLD MY FO TO TELL DISPATCH THAT IT WAS TOO LATE, THE EMER HAD ALREADY BEEN DECLARED AND THAT WE WOULD CALL THEM ON THE GND. WE PLACED THE FLAP SELECTOR IN THE FLAPS 9 DEG POS SO THE SELECTOR WOULD AGREE WITH THE INDICATION FOR THE LNDG. WE LANDED IN WASHINGTON, DULLES, SAFELY AND WITHOUT INCIDENT. ONCE SAFELY ON THE GND, I WAS INSTRUCTED BY DISPATCH TO CALL THE CHIEF PLT ON DUTY. THE CHIEF PLT INFORMED ME THAT I SHOULD NOT HAVE DECLARED AN EMER. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THERE ARE CERTAIN TIMES TO DECLARE AN EMER AND CERTAIN TIMES NOT TO. I TOLD HIM THAT I EXECUTED MY PIC AUTH AND THAT I KNOW THAT I DID THE RIGHT THING BY HAVING THE TRUCKS AVAILABLE. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE IS GOING TO LOOK INTO WRITING A NEW CHAPTER TO OUR OPS PROCS CLRLY DEFINING WHEN IT IS AND IS NOT OK TO DECLARE AN EMER. I FIND IT DESPICABLE THAT MY COMPANY IS TAKING A STAND TO COMPLETELY UNDERMINE THE PIC'S DECISION MAKING PROCESS AND QUESTION MY JUDGEMENT IN A CASE WHERE I CLRLY ERRED ON THE SIDE OF SAFETY. I FIND IT DISTURBING THAT A PIC FACES AND SOLVES MANY PROBS IN THE COCKPIT AND THEN MUST FACE THE COMPANY AS THEIR JUDGEMENT IS SCRUTINIZED. IT SEEMS TO ME THE PROB ISN'T THAT I DECLARED THE EMER, BUT THAT I HAVE IN THE COMPANY'S EYES WAIVED A RED FLAG ALERTING THE FAA OF OUR VERY TROUBLED MAINT DEPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.