Narrative:

Gulfstream 2 (aircraft X) cleared visual approach by dfw TRACON. Never cleared to love tower frequency change. Changed to tower on our own 4 NM from touchdown. Following a learjet (aircraft Y) who was touching down just after a B757 cleared the runway. Between our first contact with local controller and the learjet's leaving the runway, local controller put a tbm (aircraft Z, single turboprop) in position ahead of us. Then he told us to be prepared for a possible go around. We got to 500 ft AGL, the tbm had just lifted off and we were told to go around, when the tbm was clearly airborne. We initiated a go around, but if we went straight ahead, we 1) would have overflown that aircraft, and 2) lost sight of him. After beginning evasive maneuver to the right, the controller cleared us for an option landing. This was clearly impossible and way too late. We paralleled the tbm, passed between the tower and that aircraft and then passed him. It sounded like controller training was in progress by the backgnd voices we heard over the radio. There were only 2 aircraft waiting for departure and absolutely no reason to be squeezing departures that closely. I could not afford to lose sight of the aircraft in front of us. We had a 100 KT overtake, and I felt sure his departure instructions were to turn left after takeoff, or maintain runway heading. If he had turned to a southerly heading we would have been 'sol.' approach to runway 13L at love field, daylight, clear WX, very little winds. In the last 3 yrs we've had to make 5 gars -- 3 at houston-hobby, 2 at dallas-love. All controllers squeezing aircraft into too little airspace, with controller training in progress. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter felt he had to take the initiative on the go around because, in his judgement, he would overtake aircraft Z immediately. Situation discussed with company, but expected no further action.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GLF2 FLC INITIATE GAR AS DAL TWR ISSUES GAR, THEN LNDG CLRNC, AS TMB7 BEGINS TKOF ROLL.

Narrative: GULFSTREAM 2 (ACFT X) CLRED VISUAL APCH BY DFW TRACON. NEVER CLRED TO LOVE TWR FREQ CHANGE. CHANGED TO TWR ON OUR OWN 4 NM FROM TOUCHDOWN. FOLLOWING A LEARJET (ACFT Y) WHO WAS TOUCHING DOWN JUST AFTER A B757 CLRED THE RWY. BTWN OUR FIRST CONTACT WITH LCL CTLR AND THE LEARJET'S LEAVING THE RWY, LCL CTLR PUT A TBM (ACFT Z, SINGLE TURBOPROP) IN POS AHEAD OF US. THEN HE TOLD US TO BE PREPARED FOR A POSSIBLE GAR. WE GOT TO 500 FT AGL, THE TBM HAD JUST LIFTED OFF AND WE WERE TOLD TO GO AROUND, WHEN THE TBM WAS CLRLY AIRBORNE. WE INITIATED A GAR, BUT IF WE WENT STRAIGHT AHEAD, WE 1) WOULD HAVE OVERFLOWN THAT ACFT, AND 2) LOST SIGHT OF HIM. AFTER BEGINNING EVASIVE MANEUVER TO THE R, THE CTLR CLRED US FOR AN OPTION LNDG. THIS WAS CLRLY IMPOSSIBLE AND WAY TOO LATE. WE PARALLELED THE TBM, PASSED BTWN THE TWR AND THAT ACFT AND THEN PASSED HIM. IT SOUNDED LIKE CTLR TRAINING WAS IN PROGRESS BY THE BACKGND VOICES WE HEARD OVER THE RADIO. THERE WERE ONLY 2 ACFT WAITING FOR DEP AND ABSOLUTELY NO REASON TO BE SQUEEZING DEPS THAT CLOSELY. I COULD NOT AFFORD TO LOSE SIGHT OF THE ACFT IN FRONT OF US. WE HAD A 100 KT OVERTAKE, AND I FELT SURE HIS DEP INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO TURN L AFTER TKOF, OR MAINTAIN RWY HDG. IF HE HAD TURNED TO A SOUTHERLY HDG WE WOULD HAVE BEEN 'SOL.' APCH TO RWY 13L AT LOVE FIELD, DAYLIGHT, CLR WX, VERY LITTLE WINDS. IN THE LAST 3 YRS WE'VE HAD TO MAKE 5 GARS -- 3 AT HOUSTON-HOBBY, 2 AT DALLAS-LOVE. ALL CTLRS SQUEEZING ACFT INTO TOO LITTLE AIRSPACE, WITH CTLR TRAINING IN PROGRESS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR FELT HE HAD TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE ON THE GAR BECAUSE, IN HIS JUDGEMENT, HE WOULD OVERTAKE ACFT Z IMMEDIATELY. SIT DISCUSSED WITH COMPANY, BUT EXPECTED NO FURTHER ACTION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.