Narrative:

The pilot had made considerable preparations for the homebuilt aircraft's first flight, including a review of the operating limitations. In addition, the pilot called the tower by telephone to alert the tower personnel, and to coordinate the flight for maximum safety for all parties. The relevant sections of the operating limitations pertain to the use of runways at sba during the aircraft's first 10 hours of flight. The limitations are stated as follows: '...departure from sba airport to be on runway 25 with a 45 degree turn to the southwest or on runways 15L/right with a southern departure. All departures must avoid ucsb college. Landing at sba airport to be left traffic runway 25 or runway 33L/right.' in the telephone conversation with sba tower, the pilot advised the tower this was the aircraft's first flight and of the plan to depart runway 25 and requested circling over the airport at 4000-5000 ft for airwork. The tower indicated they would prefer to use runway 7 and then climb the flight to work in an area northeast to northwest to avoid blanking out their radar. The WX at the time was clear skies, 50 mi visibility, and light winds (VRB004). The pilot agreed to the plan to depart runway 7 because it was ATC's request. The right turnout southeast after departure would be equivalent to the southwest turnout from runway 25, and would take the flight over similarly sparsely populated areas (perhaps even more so than the runway 25 departure). The flight departed without incident in accordance with the first flight checklist for this type aircraft. The gear was left extended, and a series of handling tests and stall tests were accomplished without incident. At the conclusion of the flight, the pilot obtained the current WX to discover the wind was now 130 degrees at 10 KTS. The first flight checklist for the airplane specifically addresses the matter of xwinds, and recommends 10 KTS as a maximum. In this case, there were runways (runway 15L/right) almost directly into the wind, so the pilot elected to land on runway 15R to minimize any potential problems with xwinds on the aircraft's first landing. The approach was flown high to avoid any possibility of landing short. The landing was uneventful, and the flight was an unqualified success. Later in the day, the designated airworthiness representative who had written the operating limitations confronted the pilot and pointed out that he had observed the aircraft being flown in a manner that was contrary to the operating limitations. After the pilot explained the choices for takeoff and landing runways (ie, ATC requests and safety of flight considerations, respectively) the designated airworthiness representative remained unsatisfied, stating the pilot had no discretion whatsoever in the matter. The problem that arose was a conflict between the safety intent of the operating limitations as expressly written, the safety interests of ATC, and the pilot's judgement pertaining to the safe operation of the flight. In this case the operating limitations did not cover enough reasonable possibilities (ie, a departure from runway 7), nor did they allow for any discretion on the part of the pilot. Since no emergency developed, the pilot was not free to deviate from the operating limitations, regardless of the circumstances of the moment (ie, the unanticipated wind shift). Options for ensuring the problem does not occur in the future include: 1) offering some latitude to the pilot regarding operating limitations to fit into the flow of ATC directed traffic. 2) ensuring operating limitations are written broadly enough to allow for unforeseen circumstances, while retaining their safety benefits. 3) having the pilot and author of the operating limitations discuss directly the limitations, including interpretation of potentially ambiguous points or reinforcing the gravity of others that might not get the attention they require. 4) having the pilot delay the flight until all possible conditions are met and are assured to not change during the course of the flight(south).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE PLT OF A HOME BUILT DEVIATED FROM THE ACFT'S OPERATING LIMITATIONS.

Narrative: THE PLT HAD MADE CONSIDERABLE PREPARATIONS FOR THE HOMEBUILT ACFT'S FIRST FLT, INCLUDING A REVIEW OF THE OPERATING LIMITATIONS. IN ADDITION, THE PLT CALLED THE TWR BY TELEPHONE TO ALERT THE TWR PERSONNEL, AND TO COORDINATE THE FLT FOR MAX SAFETY FOR ALL PARTIES. THE RELEVANT SECTIONS OF THE OPERATING LIMITATIONS PERTAIN TO THE USE OF RWYS AT SBA DURING THE ACFT'S FIRST 10 HRS OF FLT. THE LIMITATIONS ARE STATED AS FOLLOWS: '...DEP FROM SBA ARPT TO BE ON RWY 25 WITH A 45 DEG TURN TO THE SW OR ON RWYS 15L/R WITH A SOUTHERN DEP. ALL DEPS MUST AVOID UCSB COLLEGE. LNDG AT SBA ARPT TO BE L TFC RWY 25 OR RWY 33L/R.' IN THE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH SBA TWR, THE PLT ADVISED THE TWR THIS WAS THE ACFT'S FIRST FLT AND OF THE PLAN TO DEPART RWY 25 AND REQUESTED CIRCLING OVER THE ARPT AT 4000-5000 FT FOR AIRWORK. THE TWR INDICATED THEY WOULD PREFER TO USE RWY 7 AND THEN CLB THE FLT TO WORK IN AN AREA NE TO NW TO AVOID BLANKING OUT THEIR RADAR. THE WX AT THE TIME WAS CLR SKIES, 50 MI VISIBILITY, AND LIGHT WINDS (VRB004). THE PLT AGREED TO THE PLAN TO DEPART RWY 7 BECAUSE IT WAS ATC'S REQUEST. THE R TURNOUT SE AFTER DEP WOULD BE EQUIVALENT TO THE SW TURNOUT FROM RWY 25, AND WOULD TAKE THE FLT OVER SIMILARLY SPARSELY POPULATED AREAS (PERHAPS EVEN MORE SO THAN THE RWY 25 DEP). THE FLT DEPARTED WITHOUT INCIDENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FIRST FLT CHKLIST FOR THIS TYPE ACFT. THE GEAR WAS LEFT EXTENDED, AND A SERIES OF HANDLING TESTS AND STALL TESTS WERE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT INCIDENT. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE FLT, THE PLT OBTAINED THE CURRENT WX TO DISCOVER THE WIND WAS NOW 130 DEGS AT 10 KTS. THE FIRST FLT CHKLIST FOR THE AIRPLANE SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSES THE MATTER OF XWINDS, AND RECOMMENDS 10 KTS AS A MAX. IN THIS CASE, THERE WERE RWYS (RWY 15L/R) ALMOST DIRECTLY INTO THE WIND, SO THE PLT ELECTED TO LAND ON RWY 15R TO MINIMIZE ANY POTENTIAL PROBS WITH XWINDS ON THE ACFT'S FIRST LNDG. THE APCH WAS FLOWN HIGH TO AVOID ANY POSSIBILITY OF LNDG SHORT. THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL, AND THE FLT WAS AN UNQUALIFIED SUCCESS. LATER IN THE DAY, THE DESIGNATED AIRWORTHINESS REPRESENTATIVE WHO HAD WRITTEN THE OPERATING LIMITATIONS CONFRONTED THE PLT AND POINTED OUT THAT HE HAD OBSERVED THE ACFT BEING FLOWN IN A MANNER THAT WAS CONTRARY TO THE OPERATING LIMITATIONS. AFTER THE PLT EXPLAINED THE CHOICES FOR TKOF AND LNDG RWYS (IE, ATC REQUESTS AND SAFETY OF FLT CONSIDERATIONS, RESPECTIVELY) THE DESIGNATED AIRWORTHINESS REPRESENTATIVE REMAINED UNSATISFIED, STATING THE PLT HAD NO DISCRETION WHATSOEVER IN THE MATTER. THE PROB THAT AROSE WAS A CONFLICT BTWN THE SAFETY INTENT OF THE OPERATING LIMITATIONS AS EXPRESSLY WRITTEN, THE SAFETY INTERESTS OF ATC, AND THE PLT'S JUDGEMENT PERTAINING TO THE SAFE OP OF THE FLT. IN THIS CASE THE OPERATING LIMITATIONS DID NOT COVER ENOUGH REASONABLE POSSIBILITIES (IE, A DEP FROM RWY 7), NOR DID THEY ALLOW FOR ANY DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE PLT. SINCE NO EMER DEVELOPED, THE PLT WAS NOT FREE TO DEVIATE FROM THE OPERATING LIMITATIONS, REGARDLESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE MOMENT (IE, THE UNANTICIPATED WIND SHIFT). OPTIONS FOR ENSURING THE PROB DOES NOT OCCUR IN THE FUTURE INCLUDE: 1) OFFERING SOME LATITUDE TO THE PLT REGARDING OPERATING LIMITATIONS TO FIT INTO THE FLOW OF ATC DIRECTED TFC. 2) ENSURING OPERATING LIMITATIONS ARE WRITTEN BROADLY ENOUGH TO ALLOW FOR UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES, WHILE RETAINING THEIR SAFETY BENEFITS. 3) HAVING THE PLT AND AUTHOR OF THE OPERATING LIMITATIONS DISCUSS DIRECTLY THE LIMITATIONS, INCLUDING INTERP OF POTENTIALLY AMBIGUOUS POINTS OR REINFORCING THE GRAVITY OF OTHERS THAT MIGHT NOT GET THE ATTN THEY REQUIRE. 4) HAVING THE PLT DELAY THE FLT UNTIL ALL POSSIBLE CONDITIONS ARE MET AND ARE ASSURED TO NOT CHANGE DURING THE COURSE OF THE FLT(S).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.