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Attributes | |
ACN | 511454 |
Time | |
Date | 200105 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : mia.airport |
State Reference | FL |
Altitude | msl single value : 1500 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : mia.tracon |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B727-100 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | ils localizer only : 9r |
Flight Phase | descent : approach |
Route In Use | approach : instrument precision arrival : on vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : multi engine pilot : flight engineer pilot : commercial pilot : cfi pilot : instrument |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 50 flight time total : 1350 flight time type : 350 |
ASRS Report | 511454 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : airborne less severe non adherence : clearance non adherence : required legal separation non adherence : published procedure non adherence : company policies non adherence : far other spatial deviation |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : became reoriented flight crew : returned to original clearance |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
On may/fri/01, I was assigned to fly 4 flts between nassau and miami. This was part of a 4 day sequence involving the same flts every day. The captain flew the airplane on the first 2 flts, the third flight, from nassau to miami was my leg. On contacting mia approach, we were given vectors for the ILS runway 9R approach. The captain said 'I will tune the localizer on your side, and leave the VOR on my side.' I agreed to this. Final instructions from approach for intercepting the localizer were 'fly heading 060 degrees, maintain 1500 ft until established, cleared ILS runway 9R approach.' we had ground contact, but there was no visibility through the forward windshield. As I turned to the heading, the localizer started to come in, and I began my turn to intercept the localizer. The captain then said, 'what are you doing? You are supposed to fly the heading until established!' I replied 'I am established!' he said 'I have the airplane' and took control, turning back to the 060 degree heading. The captain continued to fly through the localizer, toward the runway 9L approach course. I looked down at the radios and saw that he still had the dolphin VOR, 113.9, tuned on navigation #1, although he had the localizer course, 092 degrees, on his HSI. Since the dolphin VOR is almost aligned with runway 9L, continuing on this course would have put us in conflict with the traffic to that runway. I was not sure what to say, although a potentially hazardous situation was developing, he had forcefully made it clear he regarded himself to be right and me wrong, and if I said anything he would silence me. After a brief period, he looked down at his radios, realized his mistake and tuned in the runway 9R localizer. He had full scale deflection at this point. He turned back to the right and intercepted the localizer. After parking he said to me 'don't yell at me in my cockpit -- don't ever yell at me in my cockpit.' I disagree with his description of my 'yelling' at him. I spoke in a loud, excited voice -- the same way he had spoken to me. I was forcefully stating the situation as I saw it. I do not believe the cockpit is a place for weak personalities. I explained that I was concerned because we were overshooting the approach plate to runway 9R and flying toward the approach path of runway 9R. He admitted that I was right and he was wrong, but for him that was not the issue. He told me I had used poor CRM by 'yelling' at him, and I should have informed him of his mistake in a calm, polite manner. The next leg was to be mine also, but he elected to fly it and instead of unintentionally making a serious error, he deliberately flew below minimums on approach. This incident is covered in a separate report. He did not let me fly either of the 2 legs we did the next day, and when I asked him about this he told me I would only be flying the airplane if I was 'nice' to him.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B727-100 FO RPT ON INADEQUATE LEVELS OF CRM WITHIN THE COCKPIT DURING A POORLY EXECUTED ILS APCH TO MIA, FL.
Narrative: ON MAY/FRI/01, I WAS ASSIGNED TO FLY 4 FLTS BTWN NASSAU AND MIAMI. THIS WAS PART OF A 4 DAY SEQUENCE INVOLVING THE SAME FLTS EVERY DAY. THE CAPT FLEW THE AIRPLANE ON THE FIRST 2 FLTS, THE THIRD FLT, FROM NASSAU TO MIAMI WAS MY LEG. ON CONTACTING MIA APCH, WE WERE GIVEN VECTORS FOR THE ILS RWY 9R APCH. THE CAPT SAID 'I WILL TUNE THE LOC ON YOUR SIDE, AND LEAVE THE VOR ON MY SIDE.' I AGREED TO THIS. FINAL INSTRUCTIONS FROM APCH FOR INTERCEPTING THE LOC WERE 'FLY HDG 060 DEGS, MAINTAIN 1500 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED, CLRED ILS RWY 9R APCH.' WE HAD GND CONTACT, BUT THERE WAS NO VISIBILITY THROUGH THE FORWARD WINDSHIELD. AS I TURNED TO THE HDG, THE LOC STARTED TO COME IN, AND I BEGAN MY TURN TO INTERCEPT THE LOC. THE CAPT THEN SAID, 'WHAT ARE YOU DOING? YOU ARE SUPPOSED TO FLY THE HDG UNTIL ESTABLISHED!' I REPLIED 'I AM ESTABLISHED!' HE SAID 'I HAVE THE AIRPLANE' AND TOOK CTL, TURNING BACK TO THE 060 DEG HDG. THE CAPT CONTINUED TO FLY THROUGH THE LOC, TOWARD THE RWY 9L APCH COURSE. I LOOKED DOWN AT THE RADIOS AND SAW THAT HE STILL HAD THE DOLPHIN VOR, 113.9, TUNED ON NAV #1, ALTHOUGH HE HAD THE LOC COURSE, 092 DEGS, ON HIS HSI. SINCE THE DOLPHIN VOR IS ALMOST ALIGNED WITH RWY 9L, CONTINUING ON THIS COURSE WOULD HAVE PUT US IN CONFLICT WITH THE TFC TO THAT RWY. I WAS NOT SURE WHAT TO SAY, ALTHOUGH A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS SIT WAS DEVELOPING, HE HAD FORCEFULLY MADE IT CLR HE REGARDED HIMSELF TO BE RIGHT AND ME WRONG, AND IF I SAID ANYTHING HE WOULD SILENCE ME. AFTER A BRIEF PERIOD, HE LOOKED DOWN AT HIS RADIOS, REALIZED HIS MISTAKE AND TUNED IN THE RWY 9R LOC. HE HAD FULL SCALE DEFLECTION AT THIS POINT. HE TURNED BACK TO THE R AND INTERCEPTED THE LOC. AFTER PARKING HE SAID TO ME 'DON'T YELL AT ME IN MY COCKPIT -- DON'T EVER YELL AT ME IN MY COCKPIT.' I DISAGREE WITH HIS DESCRIPTION OF MY 'YELLING' AT HIM. I SPOKE IN A LOUD, EXCITED VOICE -- THE SAME WAY HE HAD SPOKEN TO ME. I WAS FORCEFULLY STATING THE SIT AS I SAW IT. I DO NOT BELIEVE THE COCKPIT IS A PLACE FOR WEAK PERSONALITIES. I EXPLAINED THAT I WAS CONCERNED BECAUSE WE WERE OVERSHOOTING THE APCH PLATE TO RWY 9R AND FLYING TOWARD THE APCH PATH OF RWY 9R. HE ADMITTED THAT I WAS RIGHT AND HE WAS WRONG, BUT FOR HIM THAT WAS NOT THE ISSUE. HE TOLD ME I HAD USED POOR CRM BY 'YELLING' AT HIM, AND I SHOULD HAVE INFORMED HIM OF HIS MISTAKE IN A CALM, POLITE MANNER. THE NEXT LEG WAS TO BE MINE ALSO, BUT HE ELECTED TO FLY IT AND INSTEAD OF UNINTENTIONALLY MAKING A SERIOUS ERROR, HE DELIBERATELY FLEW BELOW MINIMUMS ON APCH. THIS INCIDENT IS COVERED IN A SEPARATE RPT. HE DID NOT LET ME FLY EITHER OF THE 2 LEGS WE DID THE NEXT DAY, AND WHEN I ASKED HIM ABOUT THIS HE TOLD ME I WOULD ONLY BE FLYING THE AIRPLANE IF I WAS 'NICE' TO HIM.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.