Narrative:

On may/xa/01, while on a southwest vector to intercept the atl runway 26R localizer, approach came on the radio and advised us that we were south of the localizer. I responded that we were on an assigned heading to intercept the localizer. I was the PNF and immediately checked the localizer frequency and saw that it was incorrectly set in both the captain's and first officer's navigation radios. I immediately set in the correct frequency in both navigation radios and advised the captain he needed to immediately turn northwest to intercept the atl runway 26R localizer as we had obviously flown through it. He turned immediately to the northwest and I advised ATC that we were flying back to the runway 26R localizer. We intercepted the localizer and GS and continued with the approach. This event happened between 15-18 DME out. Why is it that 2 pilots with many yrs of experience set in the incorrect frequency? The answer is simple. I am rated on and fly both the B737-200 and B737-300 which is no big deal. However, some of the B737-200 aircraft are different from the other B737-200 aircraft in the air carrier's fleet. Some of the differences are: no rejected takeoff on the autobrakes, no autothrottles, no altitude capture, only allowed CAT I, autoflt panel is completely foreign, audio and navigation selector panels are different, oxygen masks, no pre departure clearance computer, manual speed and EPR bugs, just to name a few. The lack of system, mainly no autothrottles and no altitude capture, are no big deal except for the fact that we are not used to them. Therefore, when we do fly these 2 aircraft, we are reaching for knobs that are not there at time critical periods, trying to remember all the exceptions, and making callouts that are not relevant. The result of flying these 2 aircraft: making mistakes on routine operational procedures while trying to compensate for all the differences of the aircraft. The differences are a big distraction! Additionally, it puts a greater workload on the PNF because you get tunnel-vision on making sure the PF levels off at his altitude, is staying on speed, etc. Again, flying the plane manually is not a big deal, it is spending too much time concentrating on operating nonstandard controls. Consequently to flying this different aircraft, part of the reason for our mishap was the PF and PNF being too busy to do the normal checks we would routinely do out of good airmanship -- like making sure the correct localizer frequency is set in, etc. This mishap also came after a 2.5 hour flight became a 3.5 hour flight with holding, multiple vectors, and watching fuel gauges due to WX delays. Also, on this same flight we exceeded a speed restr on the macey arrival. It was such an enjoyable flight!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-200 CREW HAD TRACK DEV AT ATL BECAUSE OF DIFFERENCES IN THE ACFT IN THE ACR B737 FLEET.

Narrative: ON MAY/XA/01, WHILE ON A SW VECTOR TO INTERCEPT THE ATL RWY 26R LOC, APCH CAME ON THE RADIO AND ADVISED US THAT WE WERE S OF THE LOC. I RESPONDED THAT WE WERE ON AN ASSIGNED HDG TO INTERCEPT THE LOC. I WAS THE PNF AND IMMEDIATELY CHKED THE LOC FREQ AND SAW THAT IT WAS INCORRECTLY SET IN BOTH THE CAPT'S AND FO'S NAV RADIOS. I IMMEDIATELY SET IN THE CORRECT FREQ IN BOTH NAV RADIOS AND ADVISED THE CAPT HE NEEDED TO IMMEDIATELY TURN NW TO INTERCEPT THE ATL RWY 26R LOC AS WE HAD OBVIOUSLY FLOWN THROUGH IT. HE TURNED IMMEDIATELY TO THE NW AND I ADVISED ATC THAT WE WERE FLYING BACK TO THE RWY 26R LOC. WE INTERCEPTED THE LOC AND GS AND CONTINUED WITH THE APCH. THIS EVENT HAPPENED BTWN 15-18 DME OUT. WHY IS IT THAT 2 PLTS WITH MANY YRS OF EXPERIENCE SET IN THE INCORRECT FREQ? THE ANSWER IS SIMPLE. I AM RATED ON AND FLY BOTH THE B737-200 AND B737-300 WHICH IS NO BIG DEAL. HOWEVER, SOME OF THE B737-200 ACFT ARE DIFFERENT FROM THE OTHER B737-200 ACFT IN THE ACR'S FLEET. SOME OF THE DIFFERENCES ARE: NO REJECTED TKOF ON THE AUTOBRAKES, NO AUTOTHROTTLES, NO ALT CAPTURE, ONLY ALLOWED CAT I, AUTOFLT PANEL IS COMPLETELY FOREIGN, AUDIO AND NAV SELECTOR PANELS ARE DIFFERENT, OXYGEN MASKS, NO PDC COMPUTER, MANUAL SPD AND EPR BUGS, JUST TO NAME A FEW. THE LACK OF SYS, MAINLY NO AUTOTHROTTLES AND NO ALT CAPTURE, ARE NO BIG DEAL EXCEPT FOR THE FACT THAT WE ARE NOT USED TO THEM. THEREFORE, WHEN WE DO FLY THESE 2 ACFT, WE ARE REACHING FOR KNOBS THAT ARE NOT THERE AT TIME CRITICAL PERIODS, TRYING TO REMEMBER ALL THE EXCEPTIONS, AND MAKING CALLOUTS THAT ARE NOT RELEVANT. THE RESULT OF FLYING THESE 2 ACFT: MAKING MISTAKES ON ROUTINE OPERATIONAL PROCS WHILE TRYING TO COMPENSATE FOR ALL THE DIFFERENCES OF THE ACFT. THE DIFFERENCES ARE A BIG DISTR! ADDITIONALLY, IT PUTS A GREATER WORKLOAD ON THE PNF BECAUSE YOU GET TUNNEL-VISION ON MAKING SURE THE PF LEVELS OFF AT HIS ALT, IS STAYING ON SPD, ETC. AGAIN, FLYING THE PLANE MANUALLY IS NOT A BIG DEAL, IT IS SPENDING TOO MUCH TIME CONCENTRATING ON OPERATING NONSTANDARD CTLS. CONSEQUENTLY TO FLYING THIS DIFFERENT ACFT, PART OF THE REASON FOR OUR MISHAP WAS THE PF AND PNF BEING TOO BUSY TO DO THE NORMAL CHKS WE WOULD ROUTINELY DO OUT OF GOOD AIRMANSHIP -- LIKE MAKING SURE THE CORRECT LOC FREQ IS SET IN, ETC. THIS MISHAP ALSO CAME AFTER A 2.5 HR FLT BECAME A 3.5 HR FLT WITH HOLDING, MULTIPLE VECTORS, AND WATCHING FUEL GAUGES DUE TO WX DELAYS. ALSO, ON THIS SAME FLT WE EXCEEDED A SPD RESTR ON THE MACEY ARR. IT WAS SUCH AN ENJOYABLE FLT!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.