Narrative:

We were 6 miles behind an A-300 on the ILS to 27R calm wind. I asked the first officer to fly up to a DOT high to avoid wake turbulence. At 3 miles from touchdown the tower informed us that controller was going to clear a 747 to takeoff before we landed. At 2 miles the controller told us to continue the approach and be ready for a go around. I mentioned that he had already cleared us to land. He responded by saying continue. He cleared us to land at 150 ft and the 747 had not yet left the ground. I considered a go around, but rejected the idea because of the collision potential with the 747 taking off. The 747 broke ground 5 seconds, as counted by another flight watching from midfield on the parallel taxiway. There was considerable jet blast turbulence in the flare. I called the tower supervisor and asked why the need to cut it so close. His response centered around 'that's the way we have to do business and the controller had the legal separation.' I disagree, controling in a way that prevents the landing aircraft from going around is not the way we should be doing business, not to mention what would have happened if the 747 had aborted. Mia was not busy at the time thus I can find no good reason for this to have happened. Please fwd to the mia tower for training purposes. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: during callback the reporter's concern centered around the fact that the tower controller was in the mode of compressing traffic as much as possible when the relatively low activity level at the airport did not seem to require it. The attitude of the supervisor that he talked to after the fact appeared to be that it was legal and separation was not compromised since the departing aircraft was in the air before the reporter's touch down. The reporter conferred with the observing crew after the fact and they said that it was such an interesting scenario that they took it upon themselves to note the time between the B747's lift off and the reporter's touch down. They reported 5 seconds as the elapsed time. The reporter also said that the flying pilot was required to use up to full control deflection during the flare because of turbulence created by the B747 engine blast in the touch down zone. The estimated separation between the aircraft was 5000 to 6000 ft since the approach was made slightly above the glide slope and the touch down was longer than normal and the departing aircraft appeared to be lifting off in the last 2000 ft of the runway. The reporter said that as he has reanalyzed the situation he would probably have elected to go around.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR PLT QUESTIONS THE NEED TO SPACE TFC SO CLOSELY THAT THE POTENTIAL FOR SAFE OP IS COMPROMISED.

Narrative: WE WERE 6 MILES BEHIND AN A-300 ON THE ILS TO 27R CALM WIND. I ASKED THE FO TO FLY UP TO A DOT HIGH TO AVOID WAKE TURBULENCE. AT 3 MILES FROM TOUCHDOWN THE TWR INFORMED US THAT CTLR WAS GOING TO CLEAR A 747 TO TKOF BEFORE WE LANDED. AT 2 MILES THE CTLR TOLD US TO CONTINUE THE APCH AND BE READY FOR A GAR. I MENTIONED THAT HE HAD ALREADY CLRED US TO LAND. HE RESPONDED BY SAYING CONTINUE. HE CLRED US TO LAND AT 150 FT AND THE 747 HAD NOT YET LEFT THE GND. I CONSIDERED A GAR, BUT REJECTED THE IDEA BECAUSE OF THE COLLISION POTENTIAL WITH THE 747 TAKING OFF. THE 747 BROKE GND 5 SECS, AS COUNTED BY ANOTHER FLT WATCHING FROM MIDFIELD ON THE PARALLEL TXWY. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE JET BLAST TURBULENCE IN THE FLARE. I CALLED THE TWR SUPVR AND ASKED WHY THE NEED TO CUT IT SO CLOSE. HIS RESPONSE CENTERED AROUND 'THAT'S THE WAY WE HAVE TO DO BUSINESS AND THE CTLR HAD THE LEGAL SEPARATION.' I DISAGREE, CTLING IN A WAY THAT PREVENTS THE LNDG ACFT FROM GOING AROUND IS NOT THE WAY WE SHOULD BE DOING BUSINESS, NOT TO MENTION WHAT WOULD HAVE HAPPENED IF THE 747 HAD ABORTED. MIA WAS NOT BUSY AT THE TIME THUS I CAN FIND NO GOOD REASON FOR THIS TO HAVE HAPPENED. PLEASE FWD TO THE MIA TWR FOR TRAINING PURPOSES. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: DURING CALLBACK THE RPTR'S CONCERN CENTERED AROUND THE FACT THAT THE TWR CTLR WAS IN THE MODE OF COMPRESSING TFC AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE WHEN THE RELATIVELY LOW ACTIVITY LEVEL AT THE ARPT DID NOT SEEM TO REQUIRE IT. THE ATTITUDE OF THE SUPVR THAT HE TALKED TO AFTER THE FACT APPEARED TO BE THAT IT WAS LEGAL AND SEPARATION WAS NOT COMPROMISED SINCE THE DEPARTING ACFT WAS IN THE AIR BEFORE THE RPTR'S TOUCH DOWN. THE RPTR CONFERRED WITH THE OBSERVING CREW AFTER THE FACT AND THEY SAID THAT IT WAS SUCH AN INTERESTING SCENARIO THAT THEY TOOK IT UPON THEMSELVES TO NOTE THE TIME BTWN THE B747'S LIFT OFF AND THE RPTR'S TOUCH DOWN. THEY RPTED 5 SECS AS THE ELAPSED TIME. THE RPTR ALSO SAID THAT THE FLYING PLT WAS REQUIRED TO USE UP TO FULL CTL DEFLECTION DURING THE FLARE BECAUSE OF TURBULENCE CREATED BY THE B747 ENGINE BLAST IN THE TOUCH DOWN ZONE. THE ESTIMATED SEPARATION BTWN THE ACFT WAS 5000 TO 6000 FT SINCE THE APCH WAS MADE SLIGHTLY ABOVE THE GLIDE SLOPE AND THE TOUCH DOWN WAS LONGER THAN NORMAL AND THE DEPARTING ACFT APPEARED TO BE LIFTING OFF IN THE LAST 2000 FT OF THE RWY. THE RPTR SAID THAT AS HE HAS REANALYZED THE SIT HE WOULD PROBABLY HAVE ELECTED TO GO AROUND.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.