Narrative:

Inbound to atl on lagrange 8 STAR. ATC advised us we may have to hold (no time/location). As we passed lgc VOR, ATC told us to 'hold at lgc, right turns, 15 mi legs, maintain 17000 ft.' I made a right turn back to lgc and held on my inbound course. No mention was made of holding 'as published' or which direction to turn to return to lgc. The captain programmed the FMS for the hold, and we executed. Prior to our efc, ATC reclred us to 'hold south on the lgc 195 degree radial, 15 DME fix, 15 mi legs, right turns,' due to encroaching thunderstorms (the reason for the original hold). The captain was attempting to reprogram the FMS for the new hold, but was having difficulty and was unable to get it to 'take' when they cleared us to descend to 14000 ft. In my attempts to assist the captain (with advice only, I did not physically touch the FMS) and involved with the descent, I inadvertently turned onto the reciprocal radial at lgc and started outbound. ATC called to advise us 'right turn for the hold' and I realized my error and turned to the correct outbound course. The captain was completely heads-down this entire time, unable to reprogram the FMS. We finally went 'raw data' and flew on VOR signal alone for the hold. We flew 2 patterns before diverting to csg. After landing/shutdown, I discovered the captain had been programming a hold at lga, not lgc. This explained the mileage differences we noted in the air, but at the time it didn't make sense. I believe the captain's preoccupation with the FMS, and my own attempts to help, distracted me enough to make a wrong turn at the second hold, despite the fact that I was making a conscious effort to monitor the aircraft. I believed I could assist him and fly the plane. Side note -- captain was typed in aircraft in early january, and as a reserve captain had not flown prior to this trip in 6 weeks. I had been averaging 30-40 hours on reserve per month, and neither one of us has overly-thorough knowledge of FMS. I felt like captain was programming it properly at the time and merely assumed that since it wasn't working right it must be because of something I didn't know of its operation. Instead it was a simple typo. I have since reviewed pertinent chapters in my FMS handbook.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CL65 FLC FAILS TO ABIDE BY THE MANDATES OF HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS AND SUFFER A HEADING TRACK DEV WHILE ATTEMPTING A HOLD AT LGC, GA.

Narrative: INBOUND TO ATL ON LAGRANGE 8 STAR. ATC ADVISED US WE MAY HAVE TO HOLD (NO TIME/LOCATION). AS WE PASSED LGC VOR, ATC TOLD US TO 'HOLD AT LGC, R TURNS, 15 MI LEGS, MAINTAIN 17000 FT.' I MADE A R TURN BACK TO LGC AND HELD ON MY INBOUND COURSE. NO MENTION WAS MADE OF HOLDING 'AS PUBLISHED' OR WHICH DIRECTION TO TURN TO RETURN TO LGC. THE CAPT PROGRAMMED THE FMS FOR THE HOLD, AND WE EXECUTED. PRIOR TO OUR EFC, ATC RECLRED US TO 'HOLD S ON THE LGC 195 DEG RADIAL, 15 DME FIX, 15 MI LEGS, R TURNS,' DUE TO ENCROACHING TSTMS (THE REASON FOR THE ORIGINAL HOLD). THE CAPT WAS ATTEMPTING TO REPROGRAM THE FMS FOR THE NEW HOLD, BUT WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY AND WAS UNABLE TO GET IT TO 'TAKE' WHEN THEY CLRED US TO DSND TO 14000 FT. IN MY ATTEMPTS TO ASSIST THE CAPT (WITH ADVICE ONLY, I DID NOT PHYSICALLY TOUCH THE FMS) AND INVOLVED WITH THE DSCNT, I INADVERTENTLY TURNED ONTO THE RECIPROCAL RADIAL AT LGC AND STARTED OUTBOUND. ATC CALLED TO ADVISE US 'R TURN FOR THE HOLD' AND I REALIZED MY ERROR AND TURNED TO THE CORRECT OUTBOUND COURSE. THE CAPT WAS COMPLETELY HEADS-DOWN THIS ENTIRE TIME, UNABLE TO REPROGRAM THE FMS. WE FINALLY WENT 'RAW DATA' AND FLEW ON VOR SIGNAL ALONE FOR THE HOLD. WE FLEW 2 PATTERNS BEFORE DIVERTING TO CSG. AFTER LNDG/SHUTDOWN, I DISCOVERED THE CAPT HAD BEEN PROGRAMMING A HOLD AT LGA, NOT LGC. THIS EXPLAINED THE MILEAGE DIFFERENCES WE NOTED IN THE AIR, BUT AT THE TIME IT DIDN'T MAKE SENSE. I BELIEVE THE CAPT'S PREOCCUPATION WITH THE FMS, AND MY OWN ATTEMPTS TO HELP, DISTRACTED ME ENOUGH TO MAKE A WRONG TURN AT THE SECOND HOLD, DESPITE THE FACT THAT I WAS MAKING A CONSCIOUS EFFORT TO MONITOR THE ACFT. I BELIEVED I COULD ASSIST HIM AND FLY THE PLANE. SIDE NOTE -- CAPT WAS TYPED IN ACFT IN EARLY JANUARY, AND AS A RESERVE CAPT HAD NOT FLOWN PRIOR TO THIS TRIP IN 6 WKS. I HAD BEEN AVERAGING 30-40 HRS ON RESERVE PER MONTH, AND NEITHER ONE OF US HAS OVERLY-THOROUGH KNOWLEDGE OF FMS. I FELT LIKE CAPT WAS PROGRAMMING IT PROPERLY AT THE TIME AND MERELY ASSUMED THAT SINCE IT WASN'T WORKING RIGHT IT MUST BE BECAUSE OF SOMETHING I DIDN'T KNOW OF ITS OP. INSTEAD IT WAS A SIMPLE TYPO. I HAVE SINCE REVIEWED PERTINENT CHAPTERS IN MY FMS HANDBOOK.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.