Narrative:

On published visual approach to runway 28R sfo, bay approach vectored a small jet in front of us to fly runway 28R approach. We had been instructed to maintain 180 KIAS till bridj. Then, approach changed this to 170 KIAS till bridj. Approaching bridj, the jet was slightly ahead and to our left and we were assigned a change to runway 28L. This meant we had to cross to our left across the runway 28R final. Approach said we could start our turn to runway 28L prior to bridj. (They must have recognized the potential conflict.) the captain had the aircraft visually (PNF) -- I did not (PF). When I did see the airplane, we crossed above and behind the jet. We had a much higher approach speed and had to maintain almost level flight to allow for safe separation. As we intercepted the runway 28L final and increased our descent to intercept the GS, we received an RA for the jet. This may have been due to the increased rate of descent. We adjusted our approach to the left and the RA ended. Landed uneventfully. Bay approach put a small jet in front of us, crossing our final approach path, and had us flying across his final to reach our final. The charted visual has us fly to bridj then turn left to intercept final. The jet had a significantly slower approach speed, and the vector on to final was close. This is not a good practice for approach, and I believe they created the conflict with no speed reduction below 170 KIAS till bridj. They need to be aware of the B767-400's higher approach speeds. If the jet had been assigned runway 28L and we runway 28R, it would have worked much better. I have no idea why bay would cross final traffic the way they did.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-400 FO RPTED THAT, DURING APCH TO SFO, NCT PROVIDED XING VECTORS FOR HIS ACFT AND A BIZJET, CAUSING AN RA AS THEY CROSSED IN FRONT OF EACH OTHER FOR THE OTHER RWY.

Narrative: ON PUBLISHED VISUAL APCH TO RWY 28R SFO, BAY APCH VECTORED A SMALL JET IN FRONT OF US TO FLY RWY 28R APCH. WE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAINTAIN 180 KIAS TILL BRIDJ. THEN, APCH CHANGED THIS TO 170 KIAS TILL BRIDJ. APCHING BRIDJ, THE JET WAS SLIGHTLY AHEAD AND TO OUR L AND WE WERE ASSIGNED A CHANGE TO RWY 28L. THIS MEANT WE HAD TO CROSS TO OUR L ACROSS THE RWY 28R FINAL. APCH SAID WE COULD START OUR TURN TO RWY 28L PRIOR TO BRIDJ. (THEY MUST HAVE RECOGNIZED THE POTENTIAL CONFLICT.) THE CAPT HAD THE ACFT VISUALLY (PNF) -- I DID NOT (PF). WHEN I DID SEE THE AIRPLANE, WE CROSSED ABOVE AND BEHIND THE JET. WE HAD A MUCH HIGHER APCH SPD AND HAD TO MAINTAIN ALMOST LEVEL FLT TO ALLOW FOR SAFE SEPARATION. AS WE INTERCEPTED THE RWY 28L FINAL AND INCREASED OUR DSCNT TO INTERCEPT THE GS, WE RECEIVED AN RA FOR THE JET. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN DUE TO THE INCREASED RATE OF DSCNT. WE ADJUSTED OUR APCH TO THE L AND THE RA ENDED. LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. BAY APCH PUT A SMALL JET IN FRONT OF US, XING OUR FINAL APCH PATH, AND HAD US FLYING ACROSS HIS FINAL TO REACH OUR FINAL. THE CHARTED VISUAL HAS US FLY TO BRIDJ THEN TURN L TO INTERCEPT FINAL. THE JET HAD A SIGNIFICANTLY SLOWER APCH SPD, AND THE VECTOR ON TO FINAL WAS CLOSE. THIS IS NOT A GOOD PRACTICE FOR APCH, AND I BELIEVE THEY CREATED THE CONFLICT WITH NO SPD REDUCTION BELOW 170 KIAS TILL BRIDJ. THEY NEED TO BE AWARE OF THE B767-400'S HIGHER APCH SPDS. IF THE JET HAD BEEN ASSIGNED RWY 28L AND WE RWY 28R, IT WOULD HAVE WORKED MUCH BETTER. I HAVE NO IDEA WHY BAY WOULD CROSS FINAL TFC THE WAY THEY DID.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.