Narrative:

Takeoff clearance from runway 22, turn left heading 360 degrees. At 500 ft, initiated 30 degree bank left turn to stay within 3 mi and avoid ellington in long way around turn. Called flaps 1 degree, accelerated. Tower called 'radar contact, altitude shows . . .' First officer couldn't hear or understand and asked 'contact departure?' tower said, 'no, stay with me, grumman traffic 1 O'clock position . . . Altitude . . . Tighten your turn.' first officer answered 'in sight.' I did not see the plane until afterwards, at about the same time as the TCASII said 'descend, descend.' when I saw it, it was in a climbing right turn at 12 O'clock position, 100 ft above us, about 1 - 1 1/2 mi. I reduced thrust, increased bank to 40 degrees, and pitched down. TCASII display was commanding 1700 FPM descent, heading was 180 degrees at initial sighting. At about 100 degree heading and 1000 ft, GPWS said 'don't sink.' we stopped descent, retracted flaps, re-established climb, and continued turn. The first officer reported 'descent for resolution' and was told to contact departure. I had an XA45 show on the first day of a 4 day. First 4 legs were with a senior first officer that I knew. Then I had 1 hour ground time, an aircraft change and a flight attendant and first officer change to an 8 month first officer on reserve whom I had never seen before. Maintenance on the turn to fix my seat cables and safety wire a switch. I was tired, sunburned, and personally stressed by current change in life status to live with significant other, move, just received financial estimate for home renovation, just finished hosting for the first time teenage son of significant other alone. I had little sleep the night before, my hotel has thin walls and I heard guests using the ice machine all night. The first officer has little experience in B737's. Headsets like mine are always weird in the B737 and I had problems with communications on the taxi. It was a short taxi from gate to runway 22. I heard a faint call for our call sign, at about the volume I'd normally listen to company. I told the first officer to say we weren't ready for the departure and checked with company -- they hadn't called. I wasn't sure if the first officer had accidentally reduced ATC volume when changing to tower frequency or my headset batteries were going dead (contrary to advertising, these headsets are not normal with no battery power, and there's no built-in warning of impending battery failure). I turned up my master volume full blast and told the first officer I was ready. We heard and accepted our takeoff clearance. So, I was tired, stressed, confused, had faulty tools, a fragile team, and the schedule and equipment utilization were sub-PAR. Also and mostly: hobby tower and approach are a general menace! I've complained repeatedly to management, who says 'we like the way they control traffic here.' most recently, I reported circumstances that almost led to a ground incident for me which did result in the predicted incident for someone else the following day. These folks are always in too much of a hurry (you can't copy ATIS without listening 4 times, they read so fast) and it seems their only goal is increasing numbers of operations and making all separation pilot based visual with minimum distance. We are asking for a catastrophic event by being nice guys, ever compliant, expeditious, unthoughtfully parroting readbacks, accepting minimum separation with no room for error, train controllers to think of us as pieces in a video game instead of lives at risk. This traffic was talking to tower (without the headset/volume problem, I might have known that from the 'party line'), and should have been pointed out earlier. The first officer was way too quick to call 'in sight' without confirming that I saw and could avoid it. Partly culture and pride led to too much 'in sight' and partly the first officer judged badly. He admitted later he thought at first traffic was 'no factor.' normally I wait until the first approach to explain that I don't want airports and/or traffic called in sight too hastily -- my takeoff briefing is extensive to begin with. We seem to forget that 'in sight' calls shift the burden of responsibility. Visual separation on takeoff in this jet is risky at best, given pitch attitudes that preclude adequate field of vision, high workload,and high potential for safety critical abnormals. Yet I can only assume that this controller's intent was to point us straight at one another assuming we would work it out -- a common practice everywhere now. The departure controllers, passenger and flight attendants all mentioned noticing that something very unusual in our departure profile, yet we did what was necessary and appropriate to avoid both collision and ground contact. Circumstances that requires this kind of evasive action are not consistent with air carrier operations or the air carrier's mission and philosophy of safety and passenger comfort.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-200 PIC RPT ON A POTENTIAL CONFLICT AND THE ATC PRACTICES IN AND AROUND THE AIRSPACE AND ARPT AT HOU, TX.

Narrative: TKOF CLRNC FROM RWY 22, TURN L HDG 360 DEGS. AT 500 FT, INITIATED 30 DEG BANK L TURN TO STAY WITHIN 3 MI AND AVOID ELLINGTON IN LONG WAY AROUND TURN. CALLED FLAPS 1 DEG, ACCELERATED. TWR CALLED 'RADAR CONTACT, ALT SHOWS . . .' FO COULDN'T HEAR OR UNDERSTAND AND ASKED 'CONTACT DEP?' TWR SAID, 'NO, STAY WITH ME, GRUMMAN TFC 1 O'CLOCK POS . . . ALT . . . TIGHTEN YOUR TURN.' FO ANSWERED 'IN SIGHT.' I DID NOT SEE THE PLANE UNTIL AFTERWARDS, AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME AS THE TCASII SAID 'DSND, DSND.' WHEN I SAW IT, IT WAS IN A CLBING R TURN AT 12 O'CLOCK POS, 100 FT ABOVE US, ABOUT 1 - 1 1/2 MI. I REDUCED THRUST, INCREASED BANK TO 40 DEGS, AND PITCHED DOWN. TCASII DISPLAY WAS COMMANDING 1700 FPM DSCNT, HDG WAS 180 DEGS AT INITIAL SIGHTING. AT ABOUT 100 DEG HDG AND 1000 FT, GPWS SAID 'DON'T SINK.' WE STOPPED DSCNT, RETRACTED FLAPS, RE-ESTABLISHED CLB, AND CONTINUED TURN. THE FO RPTED 'DSCNT FOR RESOLUTION' AND WAS TOLD TO CONTACT DEP. I HAD AN XA45 SHOW ON THE FIRST DAY OF A 4 DAY. FIRST 4 LEGS WERE WITH A SENIOR FO THAT I KNEW. THEN I HAD 1 HR GND TIME, AN ACFT CHANGE AND A FLT ATTENDANT AND FO CHANGE TO AN 8 MONTH FO ON RESERVE WHOM I HAD NEVER SEEN BEFORE. MAINT ON THE TURN TO FIX MY SEAT CABLES AND SAFETY WIRE A SWITCH. I WAS TIRED, SUNBURNED, AND PERSONALLY STRESSED BY CURRENT CHANGE IN LIFE STATUS TO LIVE WITH SIGNIFICANT OTHER, MOVE, JUST RECEIVED FINANCIAL ESTIMATE FOR HOME RENOVATION, JUST FINISHED HOSTING FOR THE FIRST TIME TEENAGE SON OF SIGNIFICANT OTHER ALONE. I HAD LITTLE SLEEP THE NIGHT BEFORE, MY HOTEL HAS THIN WALLS AND I HEARD GUESTS USING THE ICE MACHINE ALL NIGHT. THE FO HAS LITTLE EXPERIENCE IN B737'S. HEADSETS LIKE MINE ARE ALWAYS WEIRD IN THE B737 AND I HAD PROBS WITH COMS ON THE TAXI. IT WAS A SHORT TAXI FROM GATE TO RWY 22. I HEARD A FAINT CALL FOR OUR CALL SIGN, AT ABOUT THE VOLUME I'D NORMALLY LISTEN TO COMPANY. I TOLD THE FO TO SAY WE WEREN'T READY FOR THE DEP AND CHKED WITH COMPANY -- THEY HADN'T CALLED. I WASN'T SURE IF THE FO HAD ACCIDENTALLY REDUCED ATC VOLUME WHEN CHANGING TO TWR FREQ OR MY HEADSET BATTERIES WERE GOING DEAD (CONTRARY TO ADVERTISING, THESE HEADSETS ARE NOT NORMAL WITH NO BATTERY PWR, AND THERE'S NO BUILT-IN WARNING OF IMPENDING BATTERY FAILURE). I TURNED UP MY MASTER VOLUME FULL BLAST AND TOLD THE FO I WAS READY. WE HEARD AND ACCEPTED OUR TKOF CLRNC. SO, I WAS TIRED, STRESSED, CONFUSED, HAD FAULTY TOOLS, A FRAGILE TEAM, AND THE SCHEDULE AND EQUIP UTILIZATION WERE SUB-PAR. ALSO AND MOSTLY: HOBBY TWR AND APCH ARE A GENERAL MENACE! I'VE COMPLAINED REPEATEDLY TO MGMNT, WHO SAYS 'WE LIKE THE WAY THEY CTL TFC HERE.' MOST RECENTLY, I RPTED CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALMOST LED TO A GND INCIDENT FOR ME WHICH DID RESULT IN THE PREDICTED INCIDENT FOR SOMEONE ELSE THE FOLLOWING DAY. THESE FOLKS ARE ALWAYS IN TOO MUCH OF A HURRY (YOU CAN'T COPY ATIS WITHOUT LISTENING 4 TIMES, THEY READ SO FAST) AND IT SEEMS THEIR ONLY GOAL IS INCREASING NUMBERS OF OPS AND MAKING ALL SEPARATION PLT BASED VISUAL WITH MINIMUM DISTANCE. WE ARE ASKING FOR A CATASTROPHIC EVENT BY BEING NICE GUYS, EVER COMPLIANT, EXPEDITIOUS, UNTHOUGHTFULLY PARROTING READBACKS, ACCEPTING MINIMUM SEPARATION WITH NO ROOM FOR ERROR, TRAIN CTLRS TO THINK OF US AS PIECES IN A VIDEO GAME INSTEAD OF LIVES AT RISK. THIS TFC WAS TALKING TO TWR (WITHOUT THE HEADSET/VOLUME PROB, I MIGHT HAVE KNOWN THAT FROM THE 'PARTY LINE'), AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN POINTED OUT EARLIER. THE FO WAS WAY TOO QUICK TO CALL 'IN SIGHT' WITHOUT CONFIRMING THAT I SAW AND COULD AVOID IT. PARTLY CULTURE AND PRIDE LED TO TOO MUCH 'IN SIGHT' AND PARTLY THE FO JUDGED BADLY. HE ADMITTED LATER HE THOUGHT AT FIRST TFC WAS 'NO FACTOR.' NORMALLY I WAIT UNTIL THE FIRST APCH TO EXPLAIN THAT I DON'T WANT ARPTS AND/OR TFC CALLED IN SIGHT TOO HASTILY -- MY TKOF BRIEFING IS EXTENSIVE TO BEGIN WITH. WE SEEM TO FORGET THAT 'IN SIGHT' CALLS SHIFT THE BURDEN OF RESPONSIBILITY. VISUAL SEPARATION ON TKOF IN THIS JET IS RISKY AT BEST, GIVEN PITCH ATTITUDES THAT PRECLUDE ADEQUATE FIELD OF VISION, HIGH WORKLOAD,AND HIGH POTENTIAL FOR SAFETY CRITICAL ABNORMALS. YET I CAN ONLY ASSUME THAT THIS CTLR'S INTENT WAS TO POINT US STRAIGHT AT ONE ANOTHER ASSUMING WE WOULD WORK IT OUT -- A COMMON PRACTICE EVERYWHERE NOW. THE DEP CTLRS, PAX AND FLT ATTENDANTS ALL MENTIONED NOTICING THAT SOMETHING VERY UNUSUAL IN OUR DEP PROFILE, YET WE DID WHAT WAS NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE TO AVOID BOTH COLLISION AND GND CONTACT. CIRCUMSTANCES THAT REQUIRES THIS KIND OF EVASIVE ACTION ARE NOT CONSISTENT WITH ACR OPS OR THE ACR'S MISSION AND PHILOSOPHY OF SAFETY AND PAX COMFORT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.