Narrative:

On jul/sat/01, I was leading a flight of 2 TA-4 aircraft from ZZZ to phx. The aircraft are considered public aircraft under FAA rules, because of the exclusive united states government contract work they are used in. We stopped in keflavik, iceland (bikf) at the military base for fuel and were continuing to sondre stromfjord, greenland (bgsf). We landed in MVFR conditions, refueled, and filed a flight plan for continuing on our trip. While in base operations, I had the duty operations person call the tower personnel on the telephone. I proposed a plan for takeoff and formation flight join-up. I told the tower operator we would take off, turn left at 3 mi, and circle the field at that distance, remaining below the clouds, until the wingman had joined in formation. After safely in formation, we would then climb on course towards our destination. The tower personnel gave their verbal approval of the plan over the telephone. I contacted ground control on the radio at approximately XA30, and received my IFR flight clearance. I repeated the takeoff plan over the radio, in detail, to the personnel there. It was also approved by that facility. We taxied for takeoff on runway 20. We were held while 3 or 4 aircraft made lndgs in IFR conditions. The WX was reported 900 ft overcast with 5+ mi of visibility. During the wait, I reiterated the plan for our formation join-up to the tower personnel on the radio. Again, they approved the procedure. We were cleared onto the runway and told to expedite our takeoff, which we did. The clouds at the takeoff end of the runway were lower than the reported 900 ft, so I descended to stay clear of the clouds. The wingman joined quickly and we turned left onto the 3 mi circle around the field. We were approximately abeam the runway, in a wide downwind position, heading in a northerly direction, when the tower asked what our altitude was. I reported 800 ft. After I reported the altitude, they directed us to turn right to a heading of 140 degrees and contact departure control. I started a right turn and switched frequencys while remaining below the clouds, in an SVFR situation. When I contacted departure, the controller was extremely excited. He claimed we had an near midair collision with an airliner, and had not followed directions. He directed us to return to the field and land to face our consequences. We were carrying 3 drop tanks full of fuel, and were far too heavy to land safely. I informed him of the situation. He directed us to climb and he would issue holding instructions for us at gimli intersection to burn down and return. I informed him I had coordinated with the tower for the nonstandard departure, had their approval, and followed their directions. He claimed we had not. We were then instructed to climb on course to gimli on about a 310 degree heading. In a few mins, the same controller came back on the air and gave us a frequency change to iceland control. He was speaking in a normal voice and did not issue any further instructions pertaining to holding at gimli or returning to the base. In analysis, although the takeoff plan was discussed at 3 different levels, the coordination between the field facilities and departure control was not sufficient. To prevent further incidents, suggest a procedure be instituted for closer coordination between the tower, ground, and radar. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: pilots were flying a douglas A-4 skyhawk single seat fighter. The pilot faults the irrational departure controller attitude. The controller hollered and screamed over the radio and issued threats to the pilots over the incident. Pilot has not heard a thing since the incident took place.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A-4 DOUGLAS SKYHAWK PLT AND WINGMAN HAD LESS THAN LEGAL SPACING FROM AIRLINER AT BIKF.

Narrative: ON JUL/SAT/01, I WAS LEADING A FLT OF 2 TA-4 ACFT FROM ZZZ TO PHX. THE ACFT ARE CONSIDERED PUBLIC ACFT UNDER FAA RULES, BECAUSE OF THE EXCLUSIVE UNITED STATES GOV CONTRACT WORK THEY ARE USED IN. WE STOPPED IN KEFLAVIK, ICELAND (BIKF) AT THE MIL BASE FOR FUEL AND WERE CONTINUING TO SONDRE STROMFJORD, GREENLAND (BGSF). WE LANDED IN MVFR CONDITIONS, REFUELED, AND FILED A FLT PLAN FOR CONTINUING ON OUR TRIP. WHILE IN BASE OPS, I HAD THE DUTY OPS PERSON CALL THE TWR PERSONNEL ON THE TELEPHONE. I PROPOSED A PLAN FOR TKOF AND FORMATION FLT JOIN-UP. I TOLD THE TWR OPERATOR WE WOULD TAKE OFF, TURN L AT 3 MI, AND CIRCLE THE FIELD AT THAT DISTANCE, REMAINING BELOW THE CLOUDS, UNTIL THE WINGMAN HAD JOINED IN FORMATION. AFTER SAFELY IN FORMATION, WE WOULD THEN CLB ON COURSE TOWARDS OUR DEST. THE TWR PERSONNEL GAVE THEIR VERBAL APPROVAL OF THE PLAN OVER THE TELEPHONE. I CONTACTED GND CTL ON THE RADIO AT APPROX XA30, AND RECEIVED MY IFR FLT CLRNC. I REPEATED THE TKOF PLAN OVER THE RADIO, IN DETAIL, TO THE PERSONNEL THERE. IT WAS ALSO APPROVED BY THAT FACILITY. WE TAXIED FOR TKOF ON RWY 20. WE WERE HELD WHILE 3 OR 4 ACFT MADE LNDGS IN IFR CONDITIONS. THE WX WAS RPTED 900 FT OVCST WITH 5+ MI OF VISIBILITY. DURING THE WAIT, I REITERATED THE PLAN FOR OUR FORMATION JOIN-UP TO THE TWR PERSONNEL ON THE RADIO. AGAIN, THEY APPROVED THE PROC. WE WERE CLRED ONTO THE RWY AND TOLD TO EXPEDITE OUR TKOF, WHICH WE DID. THE CLOUDS AT THE TKOF END OF THE RWY WERE LOWER THAN THE RPTED 900 FT, SO I DSNDED TO STAY CLR OF THE CLOUDS. THE WINGMAN JOINED QUICKLY AND WE TURNED L ONTO THE 3 MI CIRCLE AROUND THE FIELD. WE WERE APPROX ABEAM THE RWY, IN A WIDE DOWNWIND POS, HDG IN A NORTHERLY DIRECTION, WHEN THE TWR ASKED WHAT OUR ALT WAS. I RPTED 800 FT. AFTER I RPTED THE ALT, THEY DIRECTED US TO TURN R TO A HDG OF 140 DEGS AND CONTACT DEP CTL. I STARTED A R TURN AND SWITCHED FREQS WHILE REMAINING BELOW THE CLOUDS, IN AN SVFR SIT. WHEN I CONTACTED DEP, THE CTLR WAS EXTREMELY EXCITED. HE CLAIMED WE HAD AN NMAC WITH AN AIRLINER, AND HAD NOT FOLLOWED DIRECTIONS. HE DIRECTED US TO RETURN TO THE FIELD AND LAND TO FACE OUR CONSEQUENCES. WE WERE CARRYING 3 DROP TANKS FULL OF FUEL, AND WERE FAR TOO HVY TO LAND SAFELY. I INFORMED HIM OF THE SIT. HE DIRECTED US TO CLB AND HE WOULD ISSUE HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS FOR US AT GIMLI INTXN TO BURN DOWN AND RETURN. I INFORMED HIM I HAD COORDINATED WITH THE TWR FOR THE NONSTANDARD DEP, HAD THEIR APPROVAL, AND FOLLOWED THEIR DIRECTIONS. HE CLAIMED WE HAD NOT. WE WERE THEN INSTRUCTED TO CLB ON COURSE TO GIMLI ON ABOUT A 310 DEG HDG. IN A FEW MINS, THE SAME CTLR CAME BACK ON THE AIR AND GAVE US A FREQ CHANGE TO ICELAND CTL. HE WAS SPEAKING IN A NORMAL VOICE AND DID NOT ISSUE ANY FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS PERTAINING TO HOLDING AT GIMLI OR RETURNING TO THE BASE. IN ANALYSIS, ALTHOUGH THE TKOF PLAN WAS DISCUSSED AT 3 DIFFERENT LEVELS, THE COORD BTWN THE FIELD FACILITIES AND DEP CTL WAS NOT SUFFICIENT. TO PREVENT FURTHER INCIDENTS, SUGGEST A PROC BE INSTITUTED FOR CLOSER COORD BTWN THE TWR, GND, AND RADAR. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: PLTS WERE FLYING A DOUGLAS A-4 SKYHAWK SINGLE SEAT FIGHTER. THE PLT FAULTS THE IRRATIONAL DEP CTLR ATTITUDE. THE CTLR HOLLERED AND SCREAMED OVER THE RADIO AND ISSUED THREATS TO THE PLTS OVER THE INCIDENT. PLT HAS NOT HEARD A THING SINCE THE INCIDENT TOOK PLACE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.