Narrative:

At approximately XA40 on jul/xa/01, I was called to fly a trip from yip-grr-yip carrying a transplant team on both legs. WX was a definite consideration on this trip. The WX at grr was at landing minimums calling for 100VV and 1/2 SM. The WX was better than minimums at yip, dtw was a suitable alternate. We taxied over to pick up the transplant team and depart runway 5 at yip. En route to grr, the WX was 100VV and 1/2 SM on the ATIS. We ran the checklist and I briefed the ILS runway 35 for grr. The tower gave us an RVR report of 1800 ft. Thinking it was too low, I looked over at my copilot and assumed he was doublechking and would have told me if the visibility was too low. He didn't say anything to me so I assumed I was ok to shoot the approach. We shot the approach and at decision ht I got the lead-in strobes and at 100 ft I got the runway in sight. I was fast on the approach and deciding that I wanted one more try at a more stabilized approach, I executed a missed approach and came back in to shoot another approach. During the next approach the RVR came up to 2200 ft, thinking that if my copilot didn't point out that the previous RVR was too low, then I was ok to shoot the approach. I shot the approach. The same sequence of events happened. At decision ht I got the lead-in strobes and at 100 ft I got the runway in sight. I landed the airplane. When we were cleared of the runway, I began questioning the approach and looked at the approach plate. The approach minimums were 2400 ft RVR. I then asked my copilot if he was going to point out to me that I was shooting the approach below minimums. He then told me that he didn't know to look at the RVR. I am fully aware that I am responsible for my actions and that when I heard 1800 ft RVR I should have asked my copilot. I should not have depended on him to point out any problems with the approach. I expected too much from him. Supplemental information from acn 518422: before we departed yip, she made this comment to me: that somebody told her that visibility will prevail over RVR. Inbound to grr, I got the latest WX (tower was closed at the time). The following was reported: 1/2 mi visibility, 1800 ft RVR. At this point, I recall the comment she made before departure, so I thought that visibility is what we needed to initiate the approach legally. Captain reviewed the approach once again and asked me what RVR was needed for the approach. My answer was 2400 ft RVR. Then I was asked what was the reported RVR. I told her 1800 ft. Continued with the second approach, standard callouts. Tower was open by then and we were cleared to land on runway 35. About 30-40 ft above decision ht I called out approach lights and reils. Captain replied 'I'm outside' and continued with landing. This was my first approach that I had to deal with vv, RVR. Lack of experience and probably poor CRM characteristics on my side. To correct this problem, I would try to persuade or inquire my capts when this type of situation arises in the future, because I have the knowledge needed and I felt intimidated for captain experience.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A LEAR 25 FLC MAKES 2 UNAUTH APCHS, ONE TO A LNDG, IN LESS THAN REQUIRED LNDG MINIMUMS AT GRR, MI.

Narrative: AT APPROX XA40 ON JUL/XA/01, I WAS CALLED TO FLY A TRIP FROM YIP-GRR-YIP CARRYING A TRANSPLANT TEAM ON BOTH LEGS. WX WAS A DEFINITE CONSIDERATION ON THIS TRIP. THE WX AT GRR WAS AT LNDG MINIMUMS CALLING FOR 100VV AND 1/2 SM. THE WX WAS BETTER THAN MINIMUMS AT YIP, DTW WAS A SUITABLE ALTERNATE. WE TAXIED OVER TO PICK UP THE TRANSPLANT TEAM AND DEPART RWY 5 AT YIP. ENRTE TO GRR, THE WX WAS 100VV AND 1/2 SM ON THE ATIS. WE RAN THE CHKLIST AND I BRIEFED THE ILS RWY 35 FOR GRR. THE TWR GAVE US AN RVR RPT OF 1800 FT. THINKING IT WAS TOO LOW, I LOOKED OVER AT MY COPLT AND ASSUMED HE WAS DOUBLECHKING AND WOULD HAVE TOLD ME IF THE VISIBILITY WAS TOO LOW. HE DIDN'T SAY ANYTHING TO ME SO I ASSUMED I WAS OK TO SHOOT THE APCH. WE SHOT THE APCH AND AT DECISION HT I GOT THE LEAD-IN STROBES AND AT 100 FT I GOT THE RWY IN SIGHT. I WAS FAST ON THE APCH AND DECIDING THAT I WANTED ONE MORE TRY AT A MORE STABILIZED APCH, I EXECUTED A MISSED APCH AND CAME BACK IN TO SHOOT ANOTHER APCH. DURING THE NEXT APCH THE RVR CAME UP TO 2200 FT, THINKING THAT IF MY COPLT DIDN'T POINT OUT THAT THE PREVIOUS RVR WAS TOO LOW, THEN I WAS OK TO SHOOT THE APCH. I SHOT THE APCH. THE SAME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS HAPPENED. AT DECISION HT I GOT THE LEAD-IN STROBES AND AT 100 FT I GOT THE RWY IN SIGHT. I LANDED THE AIRPLANE. WHEN WE WERE CLRED OF THE RWY, I BEGAN QUESTIONING THE APCH AND LOOKED AT THE APCH PLATE. THE APCH MINIMUMS WERE 2400 FT RVR. I THEN ASKED MY COPLT IF HE WAS GOING TO POINT OUT TO ME THAT I WAS SHOOTING THE APCH BELOW MINIMUMS. HE THEN TOLD ME THAT HE DIDN'T KNOW TO LOOK AT THE RVR. I AM FULLY AWARE THAT I AM RESPONSIBLE FOR MY ACTIONS AND THAT WHEN I HEARD 1800 FT RVR I SHOULD HAVE ASKED MY COPLT. I SHOULD NOT HAVE DEPENDED ON HIM TO POINT OUT ANY PROBS WITH THE APCH. I EXPECTED TOO MUCH FROM HIM. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 518422: BEFORE WE DEPARTED YIP, SHE MADE THIS COMMENT TO ME: THAT SOMEBODY TOLD HER THAT VISIBILITY WILL PREVAIL OVER RVR. INBOUND TO GRR, I GOT THE LATEST WX (TWR WAS CLOSED AT THE TIME). THE FOLLOWING WAS RPTED: 1/2 MI VISIBILITY, 1800 FT RVR. AT THIS POINT, I RECALL THE COMMENT SHE MADE BEFORE DEP, SO I THOUGHT THAT VISIBILITY IS WHAT WE NEEDED TO INITIATE THE APCH LEGALLY. CAPT REVIEWED THE APCH ONCE AGAIN AND ASKED ME WHAT RVR WAS NEEDED FOR THE APCH. MY ANSWER WAS 2400 FT RVR. THEN I WAS ASKED WHAT WAS THE RPTED RVR. I TOLD HER 1800 FT. CONTINUED WITH THE SECOND APCH, STANDARD CALLOUTS. TWR WAS OPEN BY THEN AND WE WERE CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 35. ABOUT 30-40 FT ABOVE DECISION HT I CALLED OUT APCH LIGHTS AND REILS. CAPT REPLIED 'I'M OUTSIDE' AND CONTINUED WITH LNDG. THIS WAS MY FIRST APCH THAT I HAD TO DEAL WITH VV, RVR. LACK OF EXPERIENCE AND PROBABLY POOR CRM CHARACTERISTICS ON MY SIDE. TO CORRECT THIS PROB, I WOULD TRY TO PERSUADE OR INQUIRE MY CAPTS WHEN THIS TYPE OF SIT ARISES IN THE FUTURE, BECAUSE I HAVE THE KNOWLEDGE NEEDED AND I FELT INTIMIDATED FOR CAPT EXPERIENCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.