Narrative:

After completing the after start checklist and receiving clearance to taxi, I noted the 'antiskid' lookup light on when I selected green brakes for the brake check. On the overhead panel, the 'antiskid inoperative' light was illuminated. I also noted the 'autospoiler off' light illuminated on the central status panel. When I selected yellow brakes, those lights extinguished. I pointed out that we had a problem, stopped the aircraft and set the parking brake. We coordinated with ground control to remain parked in the current location for the time being. I asked the first officer to monitor ground control, contacted maintenance control and reported the problem and asked whether we should pull back in to a gate, or if we could remain in our current location to have maintenance check it out. The maintenance controller said we could remain where we were with the engines running. My intentions were to avoid a delay as much as possible. (Had anyone recommended that we return to a gate, we would have done so immediately.) to enhance safety for the mechanics, we elected to shut down the #3 engine. I expected maintenance to do a quick analysis and then advise us as to what steps would be necessary. I pulled out the MEL book to check on whether this discrepancy would be deferrable or not, and while looking it up, the maintenance truck arrived. He stopped approximately 20 ft right in front of the plane. While the driver remained in the truck, a second mechanic approached our lane, opened the east&east bay door under the flight deck, and entered the aircraft. Over the radio, maintenance control asked me to open the hatch in the flight deck floor to allow the mechanic entry onto the flight deck. This mechanic then asked me to select green brakes while keeping the pedals depressed and then he disappeared down into the east&east bay. Suddenly, the aircraft moved forward very briefly not more than an inch or two. I saw that the brake pressure was good with the AC pump on and ptu selected on. My next thought was to be ready to shut off all engines if necessary. I yelled to get the mechanic's attention, but I couldn't hear an answer from him. When he appeared moments later in the floor opening, I stated that the plane had moved briefly. He replied that he 'knew' that 3 brakes would release and that the 4TH one would remain on. Initially, I did not have time to read everything related to the procedures required for this deferral, but in the maintenance column, an item was missed by maintenance -- the requirement to have the aircraft chocked. The mechanics showed up before I had time to read it all, and once they were there, things happened fast. (The reason for this is that my first officer monitored ground control, while I held the brakes. Reading from a manual was not feasible at that time.) additionally, my main focus was on crew procedures. Our FAA inspector is to be credited for pointing out this omission. When I pointed this out to the mechanic, he said 'they' wanted the aircraft pulled in to a gate, something we were not told. He also stated that what had happened was 'water under the bridge.' if the mechanics wanted us in a gate, why didn't maintenance control tell us that? Why didn't the mechanic in the plane tell us what he was about to do? (He could have asked me to return to the gate.) had I known of his intentions to carry out this procedure and what was required, we would have taxied back to a gate. My impression was that he would do a check in the east&east bay, which would shed some light on the problem and then let us know what needed to be done. Clearly, maintenance arrived at the plane with the intentions of carrying out the deferral procedure right away. With that plan in mind, the mechanics had wanted the aircraft in a gate, while maintenance control had told me I could remain on the taxiway, just outside the gate, with the engines running. The mechanic filled out all logbook entries and an MEL sticker placed next to the brake select switch, deferral completed. After they left, we started a new logbook page, completed the appropriate checklists, and restarted the #3 engine. While performing the after start flow items, we noted that when cabin air 'recirculation' was selected, the 'recirculation valve' (nips) caution light illuminated. This second item was then deferred over the radio with maintenance control. Both MEL items were added to the release and fuel numbers were adjusted by dispatch and sent to us via ACARS prior to takeoff. In the future, I will return to the gate, unless I can be certain of maintenance's intentions. The situation can get complicated very quickly when the attention is split between the normal flight deck duties on the ground, while working on a maintenance problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN AVRO RJ85 FLC EXPERIENCES MULTIPLE EQUIP PROBS WHEN LEAVING THE GATE AND ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES WITHIN AN MEL DEFERRAL ON THE RAMP AT MSP, MN.

Narrative: AFTER COMPLETING THE AFTER START CHKLIST AND RECEIVING CLRNC TO TAXI, I NOTED THE 'ANTISKID' LOOKUP LIGHT ON WHEN I SELECTED GREEN BRAKES FOR THE BRAKE CHK. ON THE OVERHEAD PANEL, THE 'ANTISKID INOP' LIGHT WAS ILLUMINATED. I ALSO NOTED THE 'AUTOSPOILER OFF' LIGHT ILLUMINATED ON THE CENTRAL STATUS PANEL. WHEN I SELECTED YELLOW BRAKES, THOSE LIGHTS EXTINGUISHED. I POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD A PROB, STOPPED THE ACFT AND SET THE PARKING BRAKE. WE COORDINATED WITH GND CTL TO REMAIN PARKED IN THE CURRENT LOCATION FOR THE TIME BEING. I ASKED THE FO TO MONITOR GND CTL, CONTACTED MAINT CTL AND RPTED THE PROB AND ASKED WHETHER WE SHOULD PULL BACK IN TO A GATE, OR IF WE COULD REMAIN IN OUR CURRENT LOCATION TO HAVE MAINT CHK IT OUT. THE MAINT CTLR SAID WE COULD REMAIN WHERE WE WERE WITH THE ENGS RUNNING. MY INTENTIONS WERE TO AVOID A DELAY AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. (HAD ANYONE RECOMMENDED THAT WE RETURN TO A GATE, WE WOULD HAVE DONE SO IMMEDIATELY.) TO ENHANCE SAFETY FOR THE MECHS, WE ELECTED TO SHUT DOWN THE #3 ENG. I EXPECTED MAINT TO DO A QUICK ANALYSIS AND THEN ADVISE US AS TO WHAT STEPS WOULD BE NECESSARY. I PULLED OUT THE MEL BOOK TO CHK ON WHETHER THIS DISCREPANCY WOULD BE DEFERRABLE OR NOT, AND WHILE LOOKING IT UP, THE MAINT TRUCK ARRIVED. HE STOPPED APPROX 20 FT RIGHT IN FRONT OF THE PLANE. WHILE THE DRIVER REMAINED IN THE TRUCK, A SECOND MECH APCHED OUR LANE, OPENED THE E&E BAY DOOR UNDER THE FLT DECK, AND ENTERED THE ACFT. OVER THE RADIO, MAINT CTL ASKED ME TO OPEN THE HATCH IN THE FLT DECK FLOOR TO ALLOW THE MECH ENTRY ONTO THE FLT DECK. THIS MECH THEN ASKED ME TO SELECT GREEN BRAKES WHILE KEEPING THE PEDALS DEPRESSED AND THEN HE DISAPPEARED DOWN INTO THE E&E BAY. SUDDENLY, THE ACFT MOVED FORWARD VERY BRIEFLY NOT MORE THAN AN INCH OR TWO. I SAW THAT THE BRAKE PRESSURE WAS GOOD WITH THE AC PUMP ON AND PTU SELECTED ON. MY NEXT THOUGHT WAS TO BE READY TO SHUT OFF ALL ENGS IF NECESSARY. I YELLED TO GET THE MECH'S ATTN, BUT I COULDN'T HEAR AN ANSWER FROM HIM. WHEN HE APPEARED MOMENTS LATER IN THE FLOOR OPENING, I STATED THAT THE PLANE HAD MOVED BRIEFLY. HE REPLIED THAT HE 'KNEW' THAT 3 BRAKES WOULD RELEASE AND THAT THE 4TH ONE WOULD REMAIN ON. INITIALLY, I DID NOT HAVE TIME TO READ EVERYTHING RELATED TO THE PROCS REQUIRED FOR THIS DEFERRAL, BUT IN THE MAINT COLUMN, AN ITEM WAS MISSED BY MAINT -- THE REQUIREMENT TO HAVE THE ACFT CHOCKED. THE MECHS SHOWED UP BEFORE I HAD TIME TO READ IT ALL, AND ONCE THEY WERE THERE, THINGS HAPPENED FAST. (THE REASON FOR THIS IS THAT MY FO MONITORED GND CTL, WHILE I HELD THE BRAKES. READING FROM A MANUAL WAS NOT FEASIBLE AT THAT TIME.) ADDITIONALLY, MY MAIN FOCUS WAS ON CREW PROCS. OUR FAA INSPECTOR IS TO BE CREDITED FOR POINTING OUT THIS OMISSION. WHEN I POINTED THIS OUT TO THE MECH, HE SAID 'THEY' WANTED THE ACFT PULLED IN TO A GATE, SOMETHING WE WERE NOT TOLD. HE ALSO STATED THAT WHAT HAD HAPPENED WAS 'WATER UNDER THE BRIDGE.' IF THE MECHS WANTED US IN A GATE, WHY DIDN'T MAINT CTL TELL US THAT? WHY DIDN'T THE MECH IN THE PLANE TELL US WHAT HE WAS ABOUT TO DO? (HE COULD HAVE ASKED ME TO RETURN TO THE GATE.) HAD I KNOWN OF HIS INTENTIONS TO CARRY OUT THIS PROC AND WHAT WAS REQUIRED, WE WOULD HAVE TAXIED BACK TO A GATE. MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT HE WOULD DO A CHK IN THE E&E BAY, WHICH WOULD SHED SOME LIGHT ON THE PROB AND THEN LET US KNOW WHAT NEEDED TO BE DONE. CLRLY, MAINT ARRIVED AT THE PLANE WITH THE INTENTIONS OF CARRYING OUT THE DEFERRAL PROC RIGHT AWAY. WITH THAT PLAN IN MIND, THE MECHS HAD WANTED THE ACFT IN A GATE, WHILE MAINT CTL HAD TOLD ME I COULD REMAIN ON THE TXWY, JUST OUTSIDE THE GATE, WITH THE ENGS RUNNING. THE MECH FILLED OUT ALL LOGBOOK ENTRIES AND AN MEL STICKER PLACED NEXT TO THE BRAKE SELECT SWITCH, DEFERRAL COMPLETED. AFTER THEY LEFT, WE STARTED A NEW LOGBOOK PAGE, COMPLETED THE APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS, AND RESTARTED THE #3 ENG. WHILE PERFORMING THE AFTER START FLOW ITEMS, WE NOTED THAT WHEN CABIN AIR 'RECIRCULATION' WAS SELECTED, THE 'RECIRCULATION VALVE' (NIPS) CAUTION LIGHT ILLUMINATED. THIS SECOND ITEM WAS THEN DEFERRED OVER THE RADIO WITH MAINT CTL. BOTH MEL ITEMS WERE ADDED TO THE RELEASE AND FUEL NUMBERS WERE ADJUSTED BY DISPATCH AND SENT TO US VIA ACARS PRIOR TO TKOF. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL RETURN TO THE GATE, UNLESS I CAN BE CERTAIN OF MAINT'S INTENTIONS. THE SIT CAN GET COMPLICATED VERY QUICKLY WHEN THE ATTN IS SPLIT BTWN THE NORMAL FLT DECK DUTIES ON THE GND, WHILE WORKING ON A MAINT PROB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.