Narrative:

Departure briefed for runway 31C, mdw, with attention to SID instruction to complete assigned turn within 4 NM of mdw localizer/DME. First officer, who was flying on his first takeoff of 2-DAY trip sequence, acknowledged SID restrs. (This is an experienced first officer, though not personally known to captain, who was on his first trip following requalification after medical leave.) after gear retraction, first officer was late calling for flap retraction, and did not initiate right turn to 100 degrees as assigned. Captain reminded, 'begin your turn.' first officer initiated gradual bank. Captain reminded, 'flaps,' which were retracted. Captain reminded, 'increase turn.' controller asked us to increase rate of turn and said, 'you are outside the SID.' first officer appeared to be disoriented or confused: airspeed increased above 250 KTS, altitude increased to nearly 3200 ft before captain could push yoke forward to reduce pitch. First officer did not call for climb power, so captain disconnected autothrottle while pushing nose down and reducing thrust. Aircraft returned to SID profile and control was returned to first officer for climb on vector. This episode has me wondering just how much leeway a captain may give a first officer before intervening in aircraft control. This is a 'tight' SID, with an error imminent with the slightest failure to follow SID procedures or aircraft handling techniques. I did not expect this from an experienced copilot. In reviewing this situation, I'm not sure that I could have prevented these exceedences without having simply flown the departure myself.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-200 FO FAILS TO FOLLOW THE PROFILE OF THE SID FROM MDW AND ENTERS THE CLASS B AIRSPACE OF ORD DURING A SLOW RATE OF TURN AND AN ALT OVERSHOOT EVENT N OF MDW, IL.

Narrative: DEP BRIEFED FOR RWY 31C, MDW, WITH ATTN TO SID INSTRUCTION TO COMPLETE ASSIGNED TURN WITHIN 4 NM OF MDW LOC/DME. FO, WHO WAS FLYING ON HIS FIRST TKOF OF 2-DAY TRIP SEQUENCE, ACKNOWLEDGED SID RESTRS. (THIS IS AN EXPERIENCED FO, THOUGH NOT PERSONALLY KNOWN TO CAPT, WHO WAS ON HIS FIRST TRIP FOLLOWING REQUALIFICATION AFTER MEDICAL LEAVE.) AFTER GEAR RETRACTION, FO WAS LATE CALLING FOR FLAP RETRACTION, AND DID NOT INITIATE R TURN TO 100 DEGS AS ASSIGNED. CAPT REMINDED, 'BEGIN YOUR TURN.' FO INITIATED GRADUAL BANK. CAPT REMINDED, 'FLAPS,' WHICH WERE RETRACTED. CAPT REMINDED, 'INCREASE TURN.' CTLR ASKED US TO INCREASE RATE OF TURN AND SAID, 'YOU ARE OUTSIDE THE SID.' FO APPEARED TO BE DISORIENTED OR CONFUSED: AIRSPD INCREASED ABOVE 250 KTS, ALT INCREASED TO NEARLY 3200 FT BEFORE CAPT COULD PUSH YOKE FORWARD TO REDUCE PITCH. FO DID NOT CALL FOR CLB PWR, SO CAPT DISCONNECTED AUTOTHROTTLE WHILE PUSHING NOSE DOWN AND REDUCING THRUST. ACFT RETURNED TO SID PROFILE AND CTL WAS RETURNED TO FO FOR CLB ON VECTOR. THIS EPISODE HAS ME WONDERING JUST HOW MUCH LEEWAY A CAPT MAY GIVE A FO BEFORE INTERVENING IN ACFT CTL. THIS IS A 'TIGHT' SID, WITH AN ERROR IMMINENT WITH THE SLIGHTEST FAILURE TO FOLLOW SID PROCS OR ACFT HANDLING TECHNIQUES. I DID NOT EXPECT THIS FROM AN EXPERIENCED COPLT. IN REVIEWING THIS SIT, I'M NOT SURE THAT I COULD HAVE PREVENTED THESE EXCEEDENCES WITHOUT HAVING SIMPLY FLOWN THE DEP MYSELF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.