Narrative:

We were on an IFR flight from ewr to sav. The first officer was flying and I was the PNF. We departed off of runway 22R and were flying the ewr 6 departure. Heading 220 degrees, we were cleared to an altitude of 6000 ft and then given a vector to join the 350 degree radial off of the col VOR. I was still in the process of trying to complete the after takeoff checklist when the departure controller started barking out instructions. Not familiar with flying the departure procedure this way, I looked up the VOR frequency and set in the receiver and dialed up the course. I did the same for the first officer's side. The first officer was confused as to which way he was supposed to turn onto the radial and initially started to turn the wrong way. I told him we needed to turn south and still confused, he did so. Somewhere in between the navigation confusion and me trying to complete checklist items, the first officer climbed through 6000 ft. The controller caught this and told us he needed us back down to 6000 ft due to crossing traffic in front of us at 7000 ft. We climbed at least to 6300 ft before correcting back down. Contributing factors: both of our unfamiliarity with the departure procedure. The first officer's lack of experience in the aircraft, ie, not anticipating the level off with the high rate of climb and not leading the flight director. My failure to properly monitor the first officer while he was flying, ie, getting distraction by other issues such as navigating and performing checklists. This incident could have been avoided if we both would have studied the departure procedure more thoroughly. We would have been able to anticipate rather than react to the controller's instructions, thus avoiding confusion. Also, after departure when crews are flying profiles, making callouts and completing checklists, it becomes very difficult to prioritize when controllers are barking out instructions. This is a critical and busy phase of flight for us. If controllers could lighten the load a bit, it would help.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN EMB145 FLC EXPERIENCES SOME LEVEL OFF CONFUSION DURING THEIR DEP PROC, BEING UNABLE TO FOLLOW ATC'S INSTRUCTIONS AND OVERSHOOT THEIR ASSIGNED ALT 15 MI SW OF EWR, NJ.

Narrative: WE WERE ON AN IFR FLT FROM EWR TO SAV. THE FO WAS FLYING AND I WAS THE PNF. WE DEPARTED OFF OF RWY 22R AND WERE FLYING THE EWR 6 DEP. HDG 220 DEGS, WE WERE CLRED TO AN ALT OF 6000 FT AND THEN GIVEN A VECTOR TO JOIN THE 350 DEG RADIAL OFF OF THE COL VOR. I WAS STILL IN THE PROCESS OF TRYING TO COMPLETE THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST WHEN THE DEP CTLR STARTED BARKING OUT INSTRUCTIONS. NOT FAMILIAR WITH FLYING THE DEP PROC THIS WAY, I LOOKED UP THE VOR FREQ AND SET IN THE RECEIVER AND DIALED UP THE COURSE. I DID THE SAME FOR THE FO'S SIDE. THE FO WAS CONFUSED AS TO WHICH WAY HE WAS SUPPOSED TO TURN ONTO THE RADIAL AND INITIALLY STARTED TO TURN THE WRONG WAY. I TOLD HIM WE NEEDED TO TURN S AND STILL CONFUSED, HE DID SO. SOMEWHERE IN BTWN THE NAV CONFUSION AND ME TRYING TO COMPLETE CHKLIST ITEMS, THE FO CLBED THROUGH 6000 FT. THE CTLR CAUGHT THIS AND TOLD US HE NEEDED US BACK DOWN TO 6000 FT DUE TO XING TFC IN FRONT OF US AT 7000 FT. WE CLBED AT LEAST TO 6300 FT BEFORE CORRECTING BACK DOWN. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: BOTH OF OUR UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE DEP PROC. THE FO'S LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN THE ACFT, IE, NOT ANTICIPATING THE LEVEL OFF WITH THE HIGH RATE OF CLB AND NOT LEADING THE FLT DIRECTOR. MY FAILURE TO PROPERLY MONITOR THE FO WHILE HE WAS FLYING, IE, GETTING DISTR BY OTHER ISSUES SUCH AS NAVING AND PERFORMING CHKLISTS. THIS INCIDENT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF WE BOTH WOULD HAVE STUDIED THE DEP PROC MORE THOROUGHLY. WE WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ANTICIPATE RATHER THAN REACT TO THE CTLR'S INSTRUCTIONS, THUS AVOIDING CONFUSION. ALSO, AFTER DEP WHEN CREWS ARE FLYING PROFILES, MAKING CALLOUTS AND COMPLETING CHKLISTS, IT BECOMES VERY DIFFICULT TO PRIORITIZE WHEN CTLRS ARE BARKING OUT INSTRUCTIONS. THIS IS A CRITICAL AND BUSY PHASE OF FLT FOR US. IF CTLRS COULD LIGHTEN THE LOAD A BIT, IT WOULD HELP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.