Narrative:

Center cleared us to descend to FL180, which we did. Captain was PF and his technique was to hand fly the aircraft from takeoff to leveloff, and from an intermediate altitude on descent to landing, thus he was hand flying the aircraft at the time. Center then cleared us direct to a down track fix. The captain went to FMS to program, made a mistake, tried to correct it, and in the meantime, I had began the reprogramming on my side, just as we are trained to do. I stopped when I realized he was determined to do it all. Meanwhile, the 'hand flown' aircraft started a gradual descent. He got as low as 17500 ft before he completed the recovery. I then completed the FMS update while he continued to hand fly. I had tried to subtlely indicate to him for the 3 previous days of the trip that if he chose to turn off the automation and hand fly the aircraft, he should probably use the PNF to do the 'heads down' stuff like FMS operation, but he insisted on being 'the' pilot. There was no personality conflict -- we got along great, but perhaps I should have been more insistent, though this often leads to potential CRM problems. Summary: captain's insistence on doing everything put everyone at risk and actually increased the workload of the PNF. Instead of watching for traffic or backing up the avionics, the PNF spends all his time backing up the capts. In this instance, we met the inescapable result of this ill-advised 'technique.' thank goodness there was no loss of separation or even worse.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757 CREW OVERSHOT ASSIGNED ALT WHILE DSNDING INTO THE NEW YORK AREA.

Narrative: CTR CLRED US TO DSND TO FL180, WHICH WE DID. CAPT WAS PF AND HIS TECHNIQUE WAS TO HAND FLY THE ACFT FROM TKOF TO LEVELOFF, AND FROM AN INTERMEDIATE ALT ON DSCNT TO LNDG, THUS HE WAS HAND FLYING THE ACFT AT THE TIME. CTR THEN CLRED US DIRECT TO A DOWN TRACK FIX. THE CAPT WENT TO FMS TO PROGRAM, MADE A MISTAKE, TRIED TO CORRECT IT, AND IN THE MEANTIME, I HAD BEGAN THE REPROGRAMMING ON MY SIDE, JUST AS WE ARE TRAINED TO DO. I STOPPED WHEN I REALIZED HE WAS DETERMINED TO DO IT ALL. MEANWHILE, THE 'HAND FLOWN' ACFT STARTED A GRADUAL DSCNT. HE GOT AS LOW AS 17500 FT BEFORE HE COMPLETED THE RECOVERY. I THEN COMPLETED THE FMS UPDATE WHILE HE CONTINUED TO HAND FLY. I HAD TRIED TO SUBTLELY INDICATE TO HIM FOR THE 3 PREVIOUS DAYS OF THE TRIP THAT IF HE CHOSE TO TURN OFF THE AUTOMATION AND HAND FLY THE ACFT, HE SHOULD PROBABLY USE THE PNF TO DO THE 'HEADS DOWN' STUFF LIKE FMS OP, BUT HE INSISTED ON BEING 'THE' PLT. THERE WAS NO PERSONALITY CONFLICT -- WE GOT ALONG GREAT, BUT PERHAPS I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE INSISTENT, THOUGH THIS OFTEN LEADS TO POTENTIAL CRM PROBS. SUMMARY: CAPT'S INSISTENCE ON DOING EVERYTHING PUT EVERYONE AT RISK AND ACTUALLY INCREASED THE WORKLOAD OF THE PNF. INSTEAD OF WATCHING FOR TFC OR BACKING UP THE AVIONICS, THE PNF SPENDS ALL HIS TIME BACKING UP THE CAPTS. IN THIS INSTANCE, WE MET THE INESCAPABLE RESULT OF THIS ILL-ADVISED 'TECHNIQUE.' THANK GOODNESS THERE WAS NO LOSS OF SEPARATION OR EVEN WORSE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.