Narrative:

As we went into position and hold on runway 15, tower changed departure instructions, new clearance climb and maintain 3000 ft and 230 degree heading. Cleared for takeoff shortly after, told to keep visual separation with a departing DASH8 aircraft. Track of the DASH8 was on the dca 185 degree radial. Takeoff was normal. After area to our right was cleared we made a early turn to help ATC with separation off departing aircraft from runway 1. While executing the turn we were instructed to contact departure, aircraft in a right bank and climb of 2500 FPM. Both crew members continued to maintain visual with the departing DASH8. Departure was contacted with no delay, using proper phraseology, flight number, current altitude, altitude climbing to, heading turning to. As I released the push to talk switch we heard the last part of an ATC transmission. We waited to hear the acknowledgement from ATC. Next transmission was 'flight number, you on frequency?' we acknowledge, 'affirmative.' ATC response, 'maintain 2000 ft, you have a DASH8 off your right, 1000 ft above.' we immediately stopped the climb, current altitude 2000 ft, shot through the 2000 ft by 200 ft, corrected and maintained 2000 ft. This was followed by 7 clrncs to turn and climb. I feel this created a safety hazard. Overloaded crew watching engine parameters, traffic, callouts, and physically flying. The T10 phase is one of highest workloads and most dangerous times. ATC at dca pushes the safety envelope, by rushing crews with multiple instructions, last min changes and relying on aircrews to make it happen. They are not taking into consideration a transmission on departure might be missed if they get too aggressive and step on aircrew's transmission. ATC also needs to keep in mind crews might be dealing with an emergency. DASH8 aircraft should not have been turned toward the departing aircraft. All was depending on leveling off at 2000 ft. Too close and too aggressive by ATC.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DO328 CREW HAD ATCT LCL CTLR AND DEP CTLR INTERFAC COORD FAILURE DEPARTING DCA.

Narrative: AS WE WENT INTO POS AND HOLD ON RWY 15, TWR CHANGED DEP INSTRUCTIONS, NEW CLRNC CLB AND MAINTAIN 3000 FT AND 230 DEG HDG. CLRED FOR TKOF SHORTLY AFTER, TOLD TO KEEP VISUAL SEPARATION WITH A DEPARTING DASH8 ACFT. TRACK OF THE DASH8 WAS ON THE DCA 185 DEG RADIAL. TKOF WAS NORMAL. AFTER AREA TO OUR R WAS CLRED WE MADE A EARLY TURN TO HELP ATC WITH SEPARATION OFF DEPARTING ACFT FROM RWY 1. WHILE EXECUTING THE TURN WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT DEP, ACFT IN A R BANK AND CLB OF 2500 FPM. BOTH CREW MEMBERS CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN VISUAL WITH THE DEPARTING DASH8. DEP WAS CONTACTED WITH NO DELAY, USING PROPER PHRASEOLOGY, FLT NUMBER, CURRENT ALT, ALT CLBING TO, HEADING TURNING TO. AS I RELEASED THE PUSH TO TALK SWITCH WE HEARD THE LAST PART OF AN ATC XMISSION. WE WAITED TO HEAR THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FROM ATC. NEXT XMISSION WAS 'FLT NUMBER, YOU ON FREQ?' WE ACKNOWLEDGE, 'AFFIRMATIVE.' ATC RESPONSE, 'MAINTAIN 2000 FT, YOU HAVE A DASH8 OFF YOUR R, 1000 FT ABOVE.' WE IMMEDIATELY STOPPED THE CLB, CURRENT ALT 2000 FT, SHOT THROUGH THE 2000 FT BY 200 FT, CORRECTED AND MAINTAINED 2000 FT. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY 7 CLRNCS TO TURN AND CLB. I FEEL THIS CREATED A SAFETY HAZARD. OVERLOADED CREW WATCHING ENG PARAMETERS, TFC, CALLOUTS, AND PHYSICALLY FLYING. THE T10 PHASE IS ONE OF HIGHEST WORKLOADS AND MOST DANGEROUS TIMES. ATC AT DCA PUSHES THE SAFETY ENVELOPE, BY RUSHING CREWS WITH MULTIPLE INSTRUCTIONS, LAST MIN CHANGES AND RELYING ON AIRCREWS TO MAKE IT HAPPEN. THEY ARE NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION A XMISSION ON DEP MIGHT BE MISSED IF THEY GET TOO AGGRESSIVE AND STEP ON AIRCREW'S XMISSION. ATC ALSO NEEDS TO KEEP IN MIND CREWS MIGHT BE DEALING WITH AN EMER. DASH8 ACFT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TURNED TOWARD THE DEPARTING ACFT. ALL WAS DEPENDING ON LEVELING OFF AT 2000 FT. TOO CLOSE AND TOO AGGRESSIVE BY ATC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.