Narrative:

First officer flying. Captain mentioned he fueled the aircraft (placed order for fueling) the night before. The right fuel gauge showed 3000 pounds. The left fuel gauge showed 2400 pounds. The captain and I discussed and noted the difference. After departure, en route we xfed to balance the tanks. The fuel was now indicating even. During the flight, I was trying to understand why our fuel indications were fluctuating. After engine shutdown in-flight, I noticed the fuel gauge had risen (right side) approximately 700 pounds. I mentioned possible reasons for the change in indication. I suggested that when the gpu was plugged in, with engines off, the indication seemed to rise. Captain flying. During flight, the indication seemed to drop. I felt that a voltage problem was causing the fuel gauge to change its indication. We attempted to determine the reason for our anomaly. We had no reason to believe we would not have sufficient fuel for the flight to ZZZ. The fuel gauge was operating but rising to the high side when on the ground. At no time did we ever have reason to believe we were low on fuel! Fuel indications were actually on the high side. During the flight to ZZZ, I continued to wonder why or what was causing the different readings. I wanted to understand the system better. I checked the volt meter and noticed during flight that it showed 30 volts on both 'generator' position, and on the 'battery' position. (Discussed indications with the captain.) after landing in ZZZ, I noticed the voltage was 28 volts on 'generator' position and 25 bolts on 'battery' position. After engine shutdown, the right fuel gauge again showed about 500 pounds higher than the left fuel gauge indication. Again, I pointed to the fuel gauge and mentioned the indication to the captain. I continued to speculate and inform the captain. The captain was busy calculating the fuel order for the next trip. As first officer, I am not normally a part of this process. At this time, maintenance was on site and discussing the problem with us. The captain and I relayed the known facts to technician #1 and technician #2 of maintenance. After fueling, the right fuel gauge showed about 2600 pounds of fuel. The left fuel gauge showed about 2000 pounds of fuel. Meanwhile, maintenance (technician #2) was intimately involved in our discussion of the problem and suggested the following: (technician #2) 'I could change the cannon plug on the back of the gauge and determine if it is the gauge, if you want.' maintenance switched the plugs and the indication changed indicating a faulty gauge. I could not see the exact indication change from my position, behind the mechanic. With further discussion it was decided maintenance would check the magnetic fuel indicators. The fuel numbers maintenance reported to the captain seemed low. I overheard numbers of roughly 1800 pounds for the left tank and 1300 pounds for the right tank. After hearing these numbers I became concerned our fuel might not be adequate. I pointed this fact out to maintenance and the captain. The fuel gauge showed 4000+ pounds of fuel. The dipstick was around 3100 pounds. As I recall, maintenance was leaning toward the fuel gauges being the more accurate of the 2 methods of measurement. The captain tended to agree and was going with that concept. This made me uncomfortable. At this junction, things get a little confusing. Technician #2 and the captain are leaning toward the gauge indications. I am asserting the position that we really don't know how much fuel we have. After a few more mins of discussion, technician #2 suggested that we need to agree on this decision. I discussed the issues of the unknown and its possible affect on safety and performance. I continually stressed the safety of flight and its legalities. I suggested we take the most conservative approach and discover how much fuel we really had. Technician #2 mentioned he could defuel the aircraft and put a known amount back into the tanks. This was discussed. We asked technician #2 what his opinion would be. It was decided that the fuel gauges were probably more accurate. I still felt the defueling option was the best idea, but felt somewhat overruled by the captain's decision to use fuel gauge indications. I did feel more comfortable about the decision due to maintenance's recommendation and involvement. By the way, I did suggest that we add more fuel as a precaution. The captain overruled my suggestion. All engine indications normal. Fuel indications showed fuel adequate to complete flight! Fuel gauge (right side) continued to rise on engine shutdown. During flight, gauges showed plenty of fuel -- with lowest indication approaching ZZZ on descent, the right engine failed. Emergency engine failure procedures were accomplished, a restart was attempted, the engine quit. The captain declared an emergency and requested fire trucks. A single engine approach was successfully completed and the company was notified after landing. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the first leg of the day started with the airplane already fueled and the right tank indicated 600 pounds high. The reporter said no action was taken and no logbook entry made. The reporter said at the start of the second leg it was noted the right tank indicated 700 pounds but no logbook entry was made. The reporter stated at the termination of the second leg at a maintenance station maintenance was advised of the left and right tank differences. The reporter said maintenance swapped the indicator connectors and decided the indicators were in error. The reporter stated that maintenance did not have a fuel quantity test and calibration unit as the company did not own one. The reporter stated maintenance suggested sticking the tanks after fueling and when this was accomplished the readings came out with a 900 pound error in the right tank. The reporter said maintenance suggested defueling and then metering the fuel into the right tank but was overruled by the captain. The reporter stated no one suggested deferring the right tank system as inoperative, which would have forced the metering of the fuel into the tank per the MEL requirements. The reporter stated being uneasy about the captain's and maintenance's decision to rely on the gauges and stressed the safety of flight. The reporter said I suggested adding more fuel but again was overruled by the captain. The reporter said the airplane was again dispatched with no logbook write-up on the right tank. The 3RD leg was flown and no fueling was accomplished. The reporter stated on the 4TH leg return flight to the maintenance station on descent about 14 mi out the right engine flamed out from fuel starvation. The reporter stated an emergency was declared and a single engine landing was accomplished.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A FOKKER F27 ON DSCNT AT 6500 FT DECLARED AN EMER DUE TO R ENG FLAMEOUT CAUSED BY FUEL STARVATION.

Narrative: FO FLYING. CAPT MENTIONED HE FUELED THE ACFT (PLACED ORDER FOR FUELING) THE NIGHT BEFORE. THE R FUEL GAUGE SHOWED 3000 LBS. THE L FUEL GAUGE SHOWED 2400 LBS. THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED AND NOTED THE DIFFERENCE. AFTER DEP, ENRTE WE XFED TO BAL THE TANKS. THE FUEL WAS NOW INDICATING EVEN. DURING THE FLT, I WAS TRYING TO UNDERSTAND WHY OUR FUEL INDICATIONS WERE FLUCTUATING. AFTER ENG SHUTDOWN INFLT, I NOTICED THE FUEL GAUGE HAD RISEN (R SIDE) APPROX 700 LBS. I MENTIONED POSSIBLE REASONS FOR THE CHANGE IN INDICATION. I SUGGESTED THAT WHEN THE GPU WAS PLUGGED IN, WITH ENGS OFF, THE INDICATION SEEMED TO RISE. CAPT FLYING. DURING FLT, THE INDICATION SEEMED TO DROP. I FELT THAT A VOLTAGE PROB WAS CAUSING THE FUEL GAUGE TO CHANGE ITS INDICATION. WE ATTEMPTED TO DETERMINE THE REASON FOR OUR ANOMALY. WE HAD NO REASON TO BELIEVE WE WOULD NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT FUEL FOR THE FLT TO ZZZ. THE FUEL GAUGE WAS OPERATING BUT RISING TO THE HIGH SIDE WHEN ON THE GND. AT NO TIME DID WE EVER HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE WE WERE LOW ON FUEL! FUEL INDICATIONS WERE ACTUALLY ON THE HIGH SIDE. DURING THE FLT TO ZZZ, I CONTINUED TO WONDER WHY OR WHAT WAS CAUSING THE DIFFERENT READINGS. I WANTED TO UNDERSTAND THE SYS BETTER. I CHKED THE VOLT METER AND NOTICED DURING FLT THAT IT SHOWED 30 VOLTS ON BOTH 'GENERATOR' POS, AND ON THE 'BATTERY' POS. (DISCUSSED INDICATIONS WITH THE CAPT.) AFTER LNDG IN ZZZ, I NOTICED THE VOLTAGE WAS 28 VOLTS ON 'GENERATOR' POS AND 25 BOLTS ON 'BATTERY' POS. AFTER ENG SHUTDOWN, THE R FUEL GAUGE AGAIN SHOWED ABOUT 500 LBS HIGHER THAN THE L FUEL GAUGE INDICATION. AGAIN, I POINTED TO THE FUEL GAUGE AND MENTIONED THE INDICATION TO THE CAPT. I CONTINUED TO SPECULATE AND INFORM THE CAPT. THE CAPT WAS BUSY CALCULATING THE FUEL ORDER FOR THE NEXT TRIP. AS FO, I AM NOT NORMALLY A PART OF THIS PROCESS. AT THIS TIME, MAINT WAS ON SITE AND DISCUSSING THE PROB WITH US. THE CAPT AND I RELAYED THE KNOWN FACTS TO TECHNICIAN #1 AND TECHNICIAN #2 OF MAINT. AFTER FUELING, THE R FUEL GAUGE SHOWED ABOUT 2600 LBS OF FUEL. THE L FUEL GAUGE SHOWED ABOUT 2000 LBS OF FUEL. MEANWHILE, MAINT (TECHNICIAN #2) WAS INTIMATELY INVOLVED IN OUR DISCUSSION OF THE PROB AND SUGGESTED THE FOLLOWING: (TECHNICIAN #2) 'I COULD CHANGE THE CANNON PLUG ON THE BACK OF THE GAUGE AND DETERMINE IF IT IS THE GAUGE, IF YOU WANT.' MAINT SWITCHED THE PLUGS AND THE INDICATION CHANGED INDICATING A FAULTY GAUGE. I COULD NOT SEE THE EXACT INDICATION CHANGE FROM MY POS, BEHIND THE MECH. WITH FURTHER DISCUSSION IT WAS DECIDED MAINT WOULD CHK THE MAGNETIC FUEL INDICATORS. THE FUEL NUMBERS MAINT RPTED TO THE CAPT SEEMED LOW. I OVERHEARD NUMBERS OF ROUGHLY 1800 LBS FOR THE L TANK AND 1300 LBS FOR THE R TANK. AFTER HEARING THESE NUMBERS I BECAME CONCERNED OUR FUEL MIGHT NOT BE ADEQUATE. I POINTED THIS FACT OUT TO MAINT AND THE CAPT. THE FUEL GAUGE SHOWED 4000+ LBS OF FUEL. THE DIPSTICK WAS AROUND 3100 LBS. AS I RECALL, MAINT WAS LEANING TOWARD THE FUEL GAUGES BEING THE MORE ACCURATE OF THE 2 METHODS OF MEASUREMENT. THE CAPT TENDED TO AGREE AND WAS GOING WITH THAT CONCEPT. THIS MADE ME UNCOMFORTABLE. AT THIS JUNCTION, THINGS GET A LITTLE CONFUSING. TECHNICIAN #2 AND THE CAPT ARE LEANING TOWARD THE GAUGE INDICATIONS. I AM ASSERTING THE POS THAT WE REALLY DON'T KNOW HOW MUCH FUEL WE HAVE. AFTER A FEW MORE MINS OF DISCUSSION, TECHNICIAN #2 SUGGESTED THAT WE NEED TO AGREE ON THIS DECISION. I DISCUSSED THE ISSUES OF THE UNKNOWN AND ITS POSSIBLE AFFECT ON SAFETY AND PERFORMANCE. I CONTINUALLY STRESSED THE SAFETY OF FLT AND ITS LEGALITIES. I SUGGESTED WE TAKE THE MOST CONSERVATIVE APCH AND DISCOVER HOW MUCH FUEL WE REALLY HAD. TECHNICIAN #2 MENTIONED HE COULD DEFUEL THE ACFT AND PUT A KNOWN AMOUNT BACK INTO THE TANKS. THIS WAS DISCUSSED. WE ASKED TECHNICIAN #2 WHAT HIS OPINION WOULD BE. IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE FUEL GAUGES WERE PROBABLY MORE ACCURATE. I STILL FELT THE DEFUELING OPTION WAS THE BEST IDEA, BUT FELT SOMEWHAT OVERRULED BY THE CAPT'S DECISION TO USE FUEL GAUGE INDICATIONS. I DID FEEL MORE COMFORTABLE ABOUT THE DECISION DUE TO MAINT'S RECOMMENDATION AND INVOLVEMENT. BY THE WAY, I DID SUGGEST THAT WE ADD MORE FUEL AS A PRECAUTION. THE CAPT OVERRULED MY SUGGESTION. ALL ENG INDICATIONS NORMAL. FUEL INDICATIONS SHOWED FUEL ADEQUATE TO COMPLETE FLT! FUEL GAUGE (R SIDE) CONTINUED TO RISE ON ENG SHUTDOWN. DURING FLT, GAUGES SHOWED PLENTY OF FUEL -- WITH LOWEST INDICATION APCHING ZZZ ON DSCNT, THE R ENG FAILED. EMER ENG FAILURE PROCS WERE ACCOMPLISHED, A RESTART WAS ATTEMPTED, THE ENG QUIT. THE CAPT DECLARED AN EMER AND REQUESTED FIRE TRUCKS. A SINGLE ENG APCH WAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED AND THE COMPANY WAS NOTIFIED AFTER LNDG. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE FIRST LEG OF THE DAY STARTED WITH THE AIRPLANE ALREADY FUELED AND THE R TANK INDICATED 600 LBS HIGH. THE RPTR SAID NO ACTION WAS TAKEN AND NO LOGBOOK ENTRY MADE. THE RPTR SAID AT THE START OF THE SECOND LEG IT WAS NOTED THE R TANK INDICATED 700 LBS BUT NO LOGBOOK ENTRY WAS MADE. THE RPTR STATED AT THE TERMINATION OF THE SECOND LEG AT A MAINT STATION MAINT WAS ADVISED OF THE L AND R TANK DIFFERENCES. THE RPTR SAID MAINT SWAPPED THE INDICATOR CONNECTORS AND DECIDED THE INDICATORS WERE IN ERROR. THE RPTR STATED THAT MAINT DID NOT HAVE A FUEL QUANTITY TEST AND CALIBRATION UNIT AS THE COMPANY DID NOT OWN ONE. THE RPTR STATED MAINT SUGGESTED STICKING THE TANKS AFTER FUELING AND WHEN THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED THE READINGS CAME OUT WITH A 900 LB ERROR IN THE R TANK. THE RPTR SAID MAINT SUGGESTED DEFUELING AND THEN METERING THE FUEL INTO THE R TANK BUT WAS OVERRULED BY THE CAPT. THE RPTR STATED NO ONE SUGGESTED DEFERRING THE R TANK SYS AS INOP, WHICH WOULD HAVE FORCED THE METERING OF THE FUEL INTO THE TANK PER THE MEL REQUIREMENTS. THE RPTR STATED BEING UNEASY ABOUT THE CAPT'S AND MAINT'S DECISION TO RELY ON THE GAUGES AND STRESSED THE SAFETY OF FLT. THE RPTR SAID I SUGGESTED ADDING MORE FUEL BUT AGAIN WAS OVERRULED BY THE CAPT. THE RPTR SAID THE AIRPLANE WAS AGAIN DISPATCHED WITH NO LOGBOOK WRITE-UP ON THE R TANK. THE 3RD LEG WAS FLOWN AND NO FUELING WAS ACCOMPLISHED. THE RPTR STATED ON THE 4TH LEG RETURN FLT TO THE MAINT STATION ON DSCNT ABOUT 14 MI OUT THE R ENG FLAMED OUT FROM FUEL STARVATION. THE RPTR STATED AN EMER WAS DECLARED AND A SINGLE ENG LNDG WAS ACCOMPLISHED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.