An altitude overshoot when the cleared altitude is not armed in the autoflt system and the cockpit i...

Attributes
ACN	522330
Time
Date	200108
Day	Sat
Local Time Of Day	1201 To 1800
Place
Locale Reference	intersection : giber
State Reference	MI
Altitude	msl bound lower : 27500 msl bound upper : 28000
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	DC-10 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Phase	descent : intermediate altitude
Flight Plan	IFR
Aircraft 2
Flight Phase	descent : intermediate altitude
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Person 2
Qualification	pilot : atp pilot : flight engineer
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 168 flight time total : 9000 flight time type : 700
ASRS Report	522330
Events
Anomaly	altitude deviation : overshoot non adherence : clearance non adherence : published procedure
Resolutory Action	controller : issued new clearance controller : issued advisory flight crew : returned to assigned altitude
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Cabin Crew Human Performance Flight Crew Human Performance
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	Pilot Deviation

Narrative:

Unfortunately this is a case of too many distractions in the cockpit. A classic set-up. Fortunately our altitude excursion did not create a conflict. Nearing the end of a sea-dtw leg we were cleared direct giber intersection and then cleared from FL330 to FL280 with 'a good rate' of descent as requested by ATC. Just prior to this, the lead flight attendant had finished a busy service and had joined us in the cockpit. He had flown with the first officer before, and they were sharing animated stories of good times on layovers. The stories were interrupted by the descent clearance to FL280. I acknowledged the clearance and verified FL280 as the first officer set it in the altitude window on the mode control panel. Quickly back to the story, I failed to ensure that the new altitude was armed in the flight mode annunciator. It wasn't, though we don't know exactly why, either the first officer didn't pull the altitude select knob to arm the altitude capture, or he didn't pull it hard enough, or it disarmed somewhere and we didn't catch it. Then, more distractions, a second flight attendant came into the cockpit apologizing profusely because she had failed to share a huge box of donuts that a pass-riding flight attendant had brought for the crew. While checking out the donuts and ribbing the flight attendant for excluding us, we both missed the '2000 ft to go' and '1 to go' calls and we were at 27500 ft before the first officer caught it and climbed us back to FL280. Center called as we leveled at the assigned FL280 and reminded us of our cleared altitude, asking us to verify level at FL280. We did that and began our critique of a bad situation. Note: the so was not involved in all of this as he was in the lavatory. Too much talk, too many people, too little SOP. Too much levity, too little monitoring of descent. Too much yakin' and complacency, too little flying, a dangerous combination!

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ALT OVERSHOOT WHEN THE CLRED ALT IS NOT ARMED IN THE AUTOFLT SYS AND THE COCKPIT IS FULL OF OTHER SOCIAL DISTRACTIONS PROVIDED BY CABIN CREW MEMBERS.

Narrative: UNFORTUNATELY THIS IS A CASE OF TOO MANY DISTRACTIONS IN THE COCKPIT. A CLASSIC SET-UP. FORTUNATELY OUR ALT EXCURSION DID NOT CREATE A CONFLICT. NEARING THE END OF A SEA-DTW LEG WE WERE CLRED DIRECT GIBER INTXN AND THEN CLRED FROM FL330 TO FL280 WITH 'A GOOD RATE' OF DSCNT AS REQUESTED BY ATC. JUST PRIOR TO THIS, THE LEAD FLT ATTENDANT HAD FINISHED A BUSY SVC AND HAD JOINED US IN THE COCKPIT. HE HAD FLOWN WITH THE FO BEFORE, AND THEY WERE SHARING ANIMATED STORIES OF GOOD TIMES ON LAYOVERS. THE STORIES WERE INTERRUPTED BY THE DSCNT CLRNC TO FL280. I ACKNOWLEDGED THE CLRNC AND VERIFIED FL280 AS THE FO SET IT IN THE ALT WINDOW ON THE MODE CTL PANEL. QUICKLY BACK TO THE STORY, I FAILED TO ENSURE THAT THE NEW ALT WAS ARMED IN THE FLT MODE ANNUNCIATOR. IT WASN'T, THOUGH WE DON'T KNOW EXACTLY WHY, EITHER THE FO DIDN'T PULL THE ALT SELECT KNOB TO ARM THE ALT CAPTURE, OR HE DIDN'T PULL IT HARD ENOUGH, OR IT DISARMED SOMEWHERE AND WE DIDN'T CATCH IT. THEN, MORE DISTRACTIONS, A SECOND FLT ATTENDANT CAME INTO THE COCKPIT APOLOGIZING PROFUSELY BECAUSE SHE HAD FAILED TO SHARE A HUGE BOX OF DONUTS THAT A PASS-RIDING FLT ATTENDANT HAD BROUGHT FOR THE CREW. WHILE CHKING OUT THE DONUTS AND RIBBING THE FLT ATTENDANT FOR EXCLUDING US, WE BOTH MISSED THE '2000 FT TO GO' AND '1 TO GO' CALLS AND WE WERE AT 27500 FT BEFORE THE FO CAUGHT IT AND CLBED US BACK TO FL280. CTR CALLED AS WE LEVELED AT THE ASSIGNED FL280 AND REMINDED US OF OUR CLRED ALT, ASKING US TO VERIFY LEVEL AT FL280. WE DID THAT AND BEGAN OUR CRITIQUE OF A BAD SIT. NOTE: THE SO WAS NOT INVOLVED IN ALL OF THIS AS HE WAS IN THE LAVATORY. TOO MUCH TALK, TOO MANY PEOPLE, TOO LITTLE SOP. TOO MUCH LEVITY, TOO LITTLE MONITORING OF DSCNT. TOO MUCH YAKIN' AND COMPLACENCY, TOO LITTLE FLYING, A DANGEROUS COMBINATION!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

An altitude overshoot when the cleared altitude is not armed in the autoflt system and the cockpit is full of other social distractions provided by cabin crew members.