Narrative:

I was the captain on flight xx, the first officer was flying. When he called for flaps 40 degrees, I positioned the flap lever to 40 degrees (airspeed was 142 KIAS). The flap indicator showed split flaps. The 2 needles were split at the flaps 30 degree position with 1 needle at the beginning of the 30 degree position band and the other needle at the end of the flaps 30 degree band. I repos the flap lever to the 30 degree position, adjusted the reference and landing speeds to the appropriate flaps 30 degrees airspds, verified with the first officer that there were no control problems and we landed. I elected to leave the flap lever at 30 degrees, and the flaps at their current position so the mechanics would see the problem as it had occurred. I taxied to the gate at XXX, called for contract maintenance and also called our maintenance and also called our maintenance control through dispatch. I had tried resetting the flap indicator circuit breaker with no success. The contract mechanic conferred with our maintenance control and went about his business. The contract mechanic could not get the flaps to move with the flap lever and the 'B' hydraulic system. He was able to get the flaps to move via the alternate method using the standby hydraulic system. I was then advised by dispatch or XXX operations (I can't remember which) that my crew and I were to be switching to aircraft ZZZ coming into gate (next door). I then sent my crew to gate and I went to XXX operations to make sure everyone knew what was happening. My first officer went with me. When we were in XXX operations, the operations coordinator advised me that maintenance control wanted to talk to me. The maintenance controller working the desk advised me that my aircraft was fixed and that I was to fly that aircraft to phx. I asked him what the problem had been. He stated contract mechanic had noted that the jack screws were dry and that he was able to get the flaps to move normally now with the flap lever and the 'B' hydraulic system, so the problem was fixed. I told him I would not take the aircraft. He asked me what it took for me to fly the aircraft because it was fixed. I told him that the aircraft was not fixed. I told him that for me to accept the aircraft, a problem had to be idented as the cause, corrective actions taken, all being documented then I wanted to run the flaps through myself. Then I'd take the aircraft. He then said that the jack screws were dry and he wanted me to take the aircraft to phx and have the jack screws lubricated there. I refused that scenario. I instead took aircraft ZZZ and continued my trip to phx. When I got to phx, I called maintenance control, told him I had calmed down (I was aghast earlier that anyone at maintenance control would try and push an unsafe aircraft on a captain, and also suggest flying it to phx without lubricating the jack screws). He read from the maintenance manual concerning the flap problem. The area he covered concerned overspding the flaps. I took his reading of that area to infer that he thought he had done just that. I told him the airspeed was 138 KTS. Later my first officer corrected me and said he was certain it was 142 KTS, because he was really trying to 'nail' the approach. I informed maintenance that since we had not overspd the flaps, that was not the cause of the split flaps. He informed me that another captain had taken the aircraft and had not encountered any problems, so everything was fine. I asked maintenance where the aircraft was flown from. He said smf. I said 'so he hasn't landed yet, so you don't know if he had any problems, do you?' there was a long pause after which maintenance answered no. I wished maintenance good luck and hung up. When I arrived in abq (phx-abq) after the next leg, I was given a note by the operations agent to call QQQQ at dispatch. QQQQ told me that the captain who took aircraft was filing a report. QQQQ told me that the contract mechanic had lubricated the jack screws with motor oil, that our maintenance control then pushed the aircraft on the captain as fixed, and off he went.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 HAD TRAILING EDGE FLAPS FAIL TO EXTEND TO 40 UNITS. CONTRACT MAINT OPERATED FLAPS IN ALTERNATE. AIRPLANE WAS OK'ED FOR SVC.

Narrative: I WAS THE CAPT ON FLT XX, THE FO WAS FLYING. WHEN HE CALLED FOR FLAPS 40 DEGS, I POSITIONED THE FLAP LEVER TO 40 DEGS (AIRSPD WAS 142 KIAS). THE FLAP INDICATOR SHOWED SPLIT FLAPS. THE 2 NEEDLES WERE SPLIT AT THE FLAPS 30 DEG POS WITH 1 NEEDLE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 30 DEG POS BAND AND THE OTHER NEEDLE AT THE END OF THE FLAPS 30 DEG BAND. I REPOS THE FLAP LEVER TO THE 30 DEG POS, ADJUSTED THE REF AND LNDG SPDS TO THE APPROPRIATE FLAPS 30 DEGS AIRSPDS, VERIFIED WITH THE FO THAT THERE WERE NO CTL PROBS AND WE LANDED. I ELECTED TO LEAVE THE FLAP LEVER AT 30 DEGS, AND THE FLAPS AT THEIR CURRENT POS SO THE MECHS WOULD SEE THE PROB AS IT HAD OCCURRED. I TAXIED TO THE GATE AT XXX, CALLED FOR CONTRACT MAINT AND ALSO CALLED OUR MAINT AND ALSO CALLED OUR MAINT CTL THROUGH DISPATCH. I HAD TRIED RESETTING THE FLAP INDICATOR CIRCUIT BREAKER WITH NO SUCCESS. THE CONTRACT MECH CONFERRED WITH OUR MAINT CTL AND WENT ABOUT HIS BUSINESS. THE CONTRACT MECH COULD NOT GET THE FLAPS TO MOVE WITH THE FLAP LEVER AND THE 'B' HYD SYS. HE WAS ABLE TO GET THE FLAPS TO MOVE VIA THE ALTERNATE METHOD USING THE STANDBY HYD SYS. I WAS THEN ADVISED BY DISPATCH OR XXX OPS (I CAN'T REMEMBER WHICH) THAT MY CREW AND I WERE TO BE SWITCHING TO ACFT ZZZ COMING INTO GATE (NEXT DOOR). I THEN SENT MY CREW TO GATE AND I WENT TO XXX OPS TO MAKE SURE EVERYONE KNEW WHAT WAS HAPPENING. MY FO WENT WITH ME. WHEN WE WERE IN XXX OPS, THE OPS COORDINATOR ADVISED ME THAT MAINT CTL WANTED TO TALK TO ME. THE MAINT CTLR WORKING THE DESK ADVISED ME THAT MY ACFT WAS FIXED AND THAT I WAS TO FLY THAT ACFT TO PHX. I ASKED HIM WHAT THE PROB HAD BEEN. HE STATED CONTRACT MECH HAD NOTED THAT THE JACK SCREWS WERE DRY AND THAT HE WAS ABLE TO GET THE FLAPS TO MOVE NORMALLY NOW WITH THE FLAP LEVER AND THE 'B' HYD SYS, SO THE PROB WAS FIXED. I TOLD HIM I WOULD NOT TAKE THE ACFT. HE ASKED ME WHAT IT TOOK FOR ME TO FLY THE ACFT BECAUSE IT WAS FIXED. I TOLD HIM THAT THE ACFT WAS NOT FIXED. I TOLD HIM THAT FOR ME TO ACCEPT THE ACFT, A PROB HAD TO BE IDENTED AS THE CAUSE, CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN, ALL BEING DOCUMENTED THEN I WANTED TO RUN THE FLAPS THROUGH MYSELF. THEN I'D TAKE THE ACFT. HE THEN SAID THAT THE JACK SCREWS WERE DRY AND HE WANTED ME TO TAKE THE ACFT TO PHX AND HAVE THE JACK SCREWS LUBRICATED THERE. I REFUSED THAT SCENARIO. I INSTEAD TOOK ACFT ZZZ AND CONTINUED MY TRIP TO PHX. WHEN I GOT TO PHX, I CALLED MAINT CTL, TOLD HIM I HAD CALMED DOWN (I WAS AGHAST EARLIER THAT ANYONE AT MAINT CTL WOULD TRY AND PUSH AN UNSAFE ACFT ON A CAPT, AND ALSO SUGGEST FLYING IT TO PHX WITHOUT LUBRICATING THE JACK SCREWS). HE READ FROM THE MAINT MANUAL CONCERNING THE FLAP PROB. THE AREA HE COVERED CONCERNED OVERSPDING THE FLAPS. I TOOK HIS READING OF THAT AREA TO INFER THAT HE THOUGHT HE HAD DONE JUST THAT. I TOLD HIM THE AIRSPD WAS 138 KTS. LATER MY FO CORRECTED ME AND SAID HE WAS CERTAIN IT WAS 142 KTS, BECAUSE HE WAS REALLY TRYING TO 'NAIL' THE APCH. I INFORMED MAINT THAT SINCE WE HAD NOT OVERSPD THE FLAPS, THAT WAS NOT THE CAUSE OF THE SPLIT FLAPS. HE INFORMED ME THAT ANOTHER CAPT HAD TAKEN THE ACFT AND HAD NOT ENCOUNTERED ANY PROBS, SO EVERYTHING WAS FINE. I ASKED MAINT WHERE THE ACFT WAS FLOWN FROM. HE SAID SMF. I SAID 'SO HE HASN'T LANDED YET, SO YOU DON'T KNOW IF HE HAD ANY PROBS, DO YOU?' THERE WAS A LONG PAUSE AFTER WHICH MAINT ANSWERED NO. I WISHED MAINT GOOD LUCK AND HUNG UP. WHEN I ARRIVED IN ABQ (PHX-ABQ) AFTER THE NEXT LEG, I WAS GIVEN A NOTE BY THE OPS AGENT TO CALL QQQQ AT DISPATCH. QQQQ TOLD ME THAT THE CAPT WHO TOOK ACFT WAS FILING A RPT. QQQQ TOLD ME THAT THE CONTRACT MECH HAD LUBRICATED THE JACK SCREWS WITH MOTOR OIL, THAT OUR MAINT CTL THEN PUSHED THE ACFT ON THE CAPT AS FIXED, AND OFF HE WENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.