37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
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Attributes | |
ACN | 524737 |
Time | |
Date | 200109 |
Day | Wed |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
ASRS Report | 524737 |
Events | |
Anomaly | other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | other |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | FAA Company |
Primary Problem | Ambiguous |
Narrative:
In sum: an air carrier B777 pilot voices his concerns about his company's handling of safety and security issues now and in the past: 1) a previous suggestion regarding DC10's relative to the hydraulic system and rudder systems checks was submitted and subsequently resulted in procedural changes on that aircraft. The reporter is pleased with that result. 2) flex cuffs are issued to capts at this airline with no instruction in their use. The reporter developed a short course in the proper use of these cuffs. It was submitted to the carrier training and management pilots. The result was a brochure covering their use. The reporter feels that the information contained in his unused course would have been valuable to the crews involved in the recent hijackings of 09/tue/01 and should be reconsidered for use. The reporter indicated that he has been involved in police work and training on this type of issue for over 30 years. 3) on the issue of knives on aircraft: crews have been previously restricted to knives with blades no longer than 4 inches. Crews are now prohibited from carrying knives and are now required to carry a side cutter for the purpose of removing nylon flex cuffs when required. Local security has been known to allow passengers to carry knives up to 4 inches prior to 9/tue/01. The question is raised, is this local security decision or the policy of the airline? Knives, as reported to the reporter in the 1980's through a training video by an expert in their use, would be the weapons of choice in a close contact situation such as an aircraft. They would be preferable to a pistol. This purported expert reports that he shifted to carrying a carbon-composite knife to avoid security problems. The knife is as effective as a metal one and can puncture kevlar according to the expert. With all this in mind the information was submitted to the company training and management. It was accepted with a shrug of the shoulders and nothing came of it. 4) air carrier policy on response to hijackings is recommended to be: use overwhelming force to subdue hijacker, which is a direct reversal of previous policy of cooperation to reach the desired destination of the hijacker. Install an impenetrable cockpit door. Remove easy access to the cockpit by cabin crewmembers. Provide, within the cockpit area, a crew rest and lavatory facility. 5) the reporter is concerned about the possibility of problems with the B777 entertainment system and the lack of the ability to remove power from it in the situation where it malfunctions, overheats and causes smoke, fumes, or fire. Uncontrolled fire in first class on a previous flight. Access was required to the lower electronic and equipment area to access circuit breakers to remove power. There is no crew training for this activity. There are no circuit breaker diagrams for use of these below main cabin panels. Previous reports to NASA have been submitted. Company response is considered unsatisfactory.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN ACR PLT OFFERS SUGGESTIONS ON SAFETY AND SECURITY AT HIS AIRLINE.
Narrative: IN SUM: AN ACR B777 PLT VOICES HIS CONCERNS ABOUT HIS COMPANY'S HANDLING OF SAFETY AND SECURITY ISSUES NOW AND IN THE PAST: 1) A PREVIOUS SUGGESTION REGARDING DC10'S RELATIVE TO THE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM AND RUDDER SYSTEMS CHECKS WAS SUBMITTED AND SUBSEQUENTLY RESULTED IN PROCEDURAL CHANGES ON THAT ACFT. THE REPORTER IS PLEASED WITH THAT RESULT. 2) FLEX CUFFS ARE ISSUED TO CAPTS AT THIS AIRLINE WITH NO INSTRUCTION IN THEIR USE. THE RPTR DEVELOPED A SHORT COURSE IN THE PROPER USE OF THESE CUFFS. IT WAS SUBMITTED TO THE CARRIER TRAINING AND MANAGEMENT PLTS. THE RESULT WAS A BROCHURE COVERING THEIR USE. THE RPTR FEELS THAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN HIS UNUSED COURSE WOULD HAVE BEEN VALUABLE TO THE CREWS INVOLVED IN THE RECENT HIJACKINGS OF 09/TUE/01 AND SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED FOR USE. THE RPTR INDICATED THAT HE HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN POLICE WORK AND TRAINING ON THIS TYPE OF ISSUE FOR OVER 30 YEARS. 3) ON THE ISSUE OF KNIVES ON AIRCRAFT: CREWS HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY RESTRICTED TO KNIVES WITH BLADES NO LONGER THAN 4 INCHES. CREWS ARE NOW PROHIBITED FROM CARRYING KNIVES AND ARE NOW REQUIRED TO CARRY A SIDE CUTTER FOR THE PURPOSE OF REMOVING NYLON FLEX CUFFS WHEN REQUIRED. LOCAL SECURITY HAS BEEN KNOWN TO ALLOW PASSENGERS TO CARRY KNIVES UP TO 4 INCHES PRIOR TO 9/TUE/01. THE QUESTION IS RAISED, IS THIS LOCAL SECURITY DECISION OR THE POLICY OF THE AIRLINE? KNIVES, AS RPTED TO THE RPTR IN THE 1980'S THROUGH A TRAINING VIDEO BY AN EXPERT IN THEIR USE, WOULD BE THE WEAPONS OF CHOICE IN A CLOSE CONTACT SITUATION SUCH AS AN ACFT. THEY WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO A PISTOL. THIS PURPORTED EXPERT RPTS THAT HE SHIFTED TO CARRYING A CARBON-COMPOSITE KNIFE TO AVOID SECURITY PROBLEMS. THE KNIFE IS AS EFFECTIVE AS A METAL ONE AND CAN PUNCTURE KEVLAR ACCORDING TO THE EXPERT. WITH ALL THIS IN MIND THE INFO WAS SUBMITTED TO THE COMPANY TRAINING AND MANAGEMENT. IT WAS ACCEPTED WITH A SHRUG OF THE SHOULDERS AND NOTHING CAME OF IT. 4) ACR POLICY ON RESPONSE TO HIJACKINGS IS RECOMMENDED TO BE: USE OVERWHELMING FORCE TO SUBDUE HIJACKER, WHICH IS A DIRECT REVERSAL OF PREVIOUS POLICY OF COOPERATION TO REACH THE DESIRED DEST OF THE HIJACKER. INSTALL AN IMPENETRABLE COCKPIT DOOR. REMOVE EASY ACCESS TO THE COCKPIT BY CABIN CREWMEMBERS. PROVIDE, WITHIN THE COCKPIT AREA, A CREW REST AND LAVATORY FACILITY. 5) THE RPTR IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PROBLEMS WITH THE B777 ENTERTAINMENT SYSTEM AND THE LACK OF THE ABILITY TO REMOVE POWER FROM IT IN THE SIT WHERE IT MALFUNCTIONS, OVERHEATS AND CAUSES SMOKE, FUMES, OR FIRE. UNCONTROLLED FIRE IN FIRST CLASS ON A PREVIOUS FLT. ACCESS WAS REQUIRED TO THE LOWER ELECTRONIC AND EQUIP AREA TO ACCESS CIRCUIT BREAKERS TO REMOVE POWER. THERE IS NO CREW TRAINING FOR THIS ACTIVITY. THERE ARE NO CIRCUIT BREAKER DIAGRAMS FOR USE OF THESE BELOW MAIN CABIN PANELS. PREVIOUS RPTS TO NASA HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED. COMPANY RESPONSE IS CONSIDERED UNSATISFACTORY.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.