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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 525339 |
Time | |
Date | 200108 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : ptk.airport |
State Reference | MI |
Altitude | msl single value : 31000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zob.artcc tower : ptk.tower |
Operator | general aviation : corporate |
Make Model Name | Gulfstream III |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Navigation In Use | other |
Flight Phase | descent : intermediate altitude |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : corporate |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 125 flight time total : 5300 flight time type : 1500 |
ASRS Report | 525339 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : corporate |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | altitude deviation : undershoot altitude deviation : crossing restriction not met other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance controller : separated traffic flight crew : overrode automation other |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
On aug/fri/01, we had a part 91 flight in our gulfstream III from apf-ptk. It was the copilot's leg and on our initial descent into ptk, our clearance was to descend to FL310 within 5 mins. All checklists on descent were complete and our FMS's were armed for the descent profile. To be at FL310 at the desired time called for 2000 FPM. The copilot began a 1000 FPM descent and refused to increase that rate to accomplish the desired altitude restr. After 5 verbal warnings from me, I demanded an increase in his rate of descent. However, by this time, to meet our restr, our descent needed to be 3900 FPM. I immediately pulled both throttles back to idle and steepened our descent to achieve our restr. By the time I finally took over the controls, I realized we were going to be high on our descent path. I told center of our difficulties and he acknowledged and put us on a vector to resolve any conflicts. On the ground, I questioned the copilot about his actions. His response was he was not paying close attention and he was sorry. I believe many factors led to this situation. First and most importantly, as a young captain and an older copilot, there was a great deal of 'I should be in your seat-itis.' I strongly believe this attitude should be more thoroughly covered in CRM courses/training. At the very least, in the future, I will include this into my preflight briefing.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A G3 FLC UNDERSHOOTS THEIR ASSIGNED XING ALT WHEN THE FO FAILS TO RESPOND TO THE PIC'S ALERTS REGARDING HIS RATE OF DSCNT 125 MI S OF DTW, MI.
Narrative: ON AUG/FRI/01, WE HAD A PART 91 FLT IN OUR GULFSTREAM III FROM APF-PTK. IT WAS THE COPLT'S LEG AND ON OUR INITIAL DSCNT INTO PTK, OUR CLRNC WAS TO DSND TO FL310 WITHIN 5 MINS. ALL CHKLISTS ON DSCNT WERE COMPLETE AND OUR FMS'S WERE ARMED FOR THE DSCNT PROFILE. TO BE AT FL310 AT THE DESIRED TIME CALLED FOR 2000 FPM. THE COPLT BEGAN A 1000 FPM DSCNT AND REFUSED TO INCREASE THAT RATE TO ACCOMPLISH THE DESIRED ALT RESTR. AFTER 5 VERBAL WARNINGS FROM ME, I DEMANDED AN INCREASE IN HIS RATE OF DSCNT. HOWEVER, BY THIS TIME, TO MEET OUR RESTR, OUR DSCNT NEEDED TO BE 3900 FPM. I IMMEDIATELY PULLED BOTH THROTTLES BACK TO IDLE AND STEEPENED OUR DSCNT TO ACHIEVE OUR RESTR. BY THE TIME I FINALLY TOOK OVER THE CTLS, I REALIZED WE WERE GOING TO BE HIGH ON OUR DSCNT PATH. I TOLD CTR OF OUR DIFFICULTIES AND HE ACKNOWLEDGED AND PUT US ON A VECTOR TO RESOLVE ANY CONFLICTS. ON THE GND, I QUESTIONED THE COPLT ABOUT HIS ACTIONS. HIS RESPONSE WAS HE WAS NOT PAYING CLOSE ATTN AND HE WAS SORRY. I BELIEVE MANY FACTORS LED TO THIS SIT. FIRST AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, AS A YOUNG CAPT AND AN OLDER COPLT, THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF 'I SHOULD BE IN YOUR SEAT-ITIS.' I STRONGLY BELIEVE THIS ATTITUDE SHOULD BE MORE THOROUGHLY COVERED IN CRM COURSES/TRAINING. AT THE VERY LEAST, IN THE FUTURE, I WILL INCLUDE THIS INTO MY PREFLT BRIEFING.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.