Narrative:

I was giving a multi engine commercial student flight instruction in a PA44 (piper seminole). The student is in the us on a visa, and has a limited command and comprehension of english. He had experience in single engine operations, but this day we would be making his first single engine landing. The student was briefed on the ground. We were flying from ZZZ1 to ZZZ in the late afternoon. I purposely chose ZZZ airport, a low traffic, nontwred airport with a long runway, as the location to conduct my student's first single engine landing in order to reduce the distractions which may have affected the safety of the flight. When we were aprox 15 NM away from ZZZ airport at aprox 4500 ft AGL, I reduced the power on one engine to idle (simulating an engine failure). The student was having difficulty recalling engine failure procedures and hesitated to act. I repeatedly tried to explain that we would simulate feathering on the idle engine and land at the nearest airport, as if troubleshooting procedures had already been performed and resulted in failure to restart the engine. During this time, the gear warning horn circuit breaker was pulled to reduce the additional distraction of the loud honking, so the student could hear me more easily and concentrate on the instruction I was giving, and I could better understand the difficulty he was having taking my instruction. After the horn stopped sounding, I explained the instructions until it was clear that the student understood we would be making a single engine landing at ZZZ. By this time, we were fairly close to ZZZ airport. I expected the student to undertake standard approach procedures, which should have been routine for students at his level, and waited as long as I could before reminding him to request airport traffic advisories through CTAF frequency. The student then made a CTAF request and waited for a response. No one reported, therefore, I expected the student to proceed by obtaining ASOS information for surface winds. Again, I waited as long as reasonable, but when the student failed to act, I tuned in the ASOS frequency and reminded the student to note the surface winds for ZZZ airport. At this point, we agreed the most favorable landing runway based on current winds was runway 26. During this time, we continued descending to tpa. The student entered the pattern contrary to the standard entry, on a tight downwind leg slightly right of the extended centerline for the upward leg of runway 26. I was concerned about the poor entry, and began scanning for other aircraft near ZZZ airport, particularly any aircraft departure on runway 26. I expected the student to realize and correct the poor pattern entry. When the student made no corrections, I instructed him to make a 90 degree right turn and commence reentry into the pattern. The student began the right turn and I continued scanning for other aircraft. The student then began turning back toward the runway before we had reached the downwind leg, still too close to the runway to set up for a normal pattern. I instructed the student to cease the turn and wait until we reached a more appropriate distance. A short time later, after completing the 270 degree turn back on downwind, the student placed the airplane in an acceptable position (but still closer than the ideal pattern). At this point, the airplane was abeam the touchdown point. The student began the before landing checklist. Forgetting to extend the gear first, he confirmed the fuel valves were on then started to set the power on the good engine. The student accidentally bumped the throttle on the idle engine, causing the airplane to yaw. He then extended the flaps to 10 degrees, and went back to the throttle quadrant. The student then asked me to confirm what the proper power settings should be. I told him to the proper settings, but he didn't understand and asked again. At this time, our altitude was becoming low and we were close in because the student had crept toward the runway while completing the downwind leg. Therefore, I told the student I would set the power so he could concentrate on completing the turn to final and aligning us with the runway. I set the power, propellers, mixture and cowl flaps. The air was a little bumpy, so the student had some difficulty dampening the yaw of the airplane. As the student rolled out on the extended centerline, I reached over and moved the gear lever to the down position. At the same time, the student began to fully extend the flaps. I stopped the student and instructed him not to extend the flaps more than 25 degrees. The student questioned why not to use full flaps, and I told him it would create too much drag for the limited amount of power available from only one engine. The student apparently did not understand my instructions, and again grabbed the flap lever. Again, I stopped him and told him not to extend the flaps more than 25 degrees because it causes too much drag in case of a go around procedure, and would greatly reduce the airplane's ability to climb. The student did not understand and began asking more questions. I was not sure what he was having trouble understanding, and decided we would need to address his questions later, as the student needed to prepare for landing. I told the student I would explain it to him on the ground, and instructed him to focus on landing the airplane. I resumed the before landing checklist and reminded the student to turn on the fuel boost pumps, which he did. I then reminded the student to check his seat belt and make sure it was secured, which he did. As the student continued to proceed with the landing, I verbally guided him through the approach. He held the proper airspeed while maintaining the descent. The descent path was on track and it appeared we would land in the touchdown zone. Once 'over the fence,' the student slowly reduced the power on the good engine. The landing looked good and we were aligned with the runway centerline. I expected a smooth landing and waited for the wheels to touch. Suddenly, I heard scraping which sounded like the tail skid or propellers contacting the runway. After landing the airplane, it was confirmed the propeller tips were damaged and the tail skid was scuffed. I immediately advanced power and propellers to full fwd on both engines and pitched up the airplane, realizing what had happened (the gear was not down and locked). I climbed to aprox 500 ft AGL, made a left turn to enter the pattern, and began troubleshooting procedures. I looked at the position of the gear lever to confirm it was down, and noticed the three green lights were not illuminated. I continued troubleshooting and noticed the circuit breaker for the gear warning horn was in a popped position. I pushed the circuit breaker back in and moments later, felt the gear extend. I confirmed the green lights were on and the nose gear was visible through the mirror. At that point, I assumed the warning horn circuit breaker also controled power to the landing gear, which was why the gear had not previously extended. I then proceeded to land the airplane on runway 31 without further incident. Contributing factors: the student wsa having difficulty recalling previously learned procedures, which required more instruction and more actual assistance, distracting me from focusing on the single engine landing procedures we were practicing. We experienced a frustrating inability to communicate due to the student's limited grasp of the english language, creating a distraction, reducing the amount of time available for completing procedures and interrupting the usual pattern of instruction during flight. While I put down the gear lever, the student repeatedly attempted to put in full flaps despite my instructions, and repeatedly questioned my instructions, which distracted me from confirming that the gear had extended. The student did not enter the pattern properly, requiring an additional turn and reentry on the downwind leg, which delayed the usual procedure of extending the landing gear. Human performance consideration: factors affecting the quality of human performance: communication difficulty and resulting frustration. Multiple distractions (combination of distractions). Too much trust in competence of student (or complacency). Possible that life/financial stress contributed, perhaps subconsciously. Actions or inaction: realize now that the gear warning horn circuit breaker should not have been pulled because it also disables the landing gear. Failure to confirm that the landing gear was extended.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PIPER SIMINOLE HAS PROP STRIKE UPON TOUCHDOWN DURING MULTIENG TRAINING DUE TO THE LNDG GEAR NOT BEING EXTENDED. INSTRUCTOR MADE GAR SAVING THE ACFT FROM FURTHER DAMAGE.

Narrative: I WAS GIVING A MULTI ENG COMMERCIAL STUDENT FLT INSTRUCTION IN A PA44 (PIPER SEMINOLE). THE STUDENT IS IN THE U.S. ON A VISA, AND HAS A LIMITED COMMAND AND COMPREHENSION OF ENGLISH. HE HAD EXPERIENCE IN SINGLE ENG OPS, BUT THIS DAY WE WOULD BE MAKING HIS FIRST SINGLE ENG LANDING. THE STUDENT WAS BRIEFED ON THE GND. WE WERE FLYING FROM ZZZ1 TO ZZZ IN THE LATE AFTERNOON. I PURPOSELY CHOSE ZZZ ARPT, A LOW TFC, NONTWRED ARPT WITH A LONG RWY, AS THE LOCATION TO CONDUCT MY STUDENT'S FIRST SINGLE ENG LANDING IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE DISTRACTIONS WHICH MAY HAVE AFFECTED THE SAFETY OF THE FLT. WHEN WE WERE APROX 15 NM AWAY FROM ZZZ ARPT AT APROX 4500 FT AGL, I REDUCED THE PWR ON ONE ENG TO IDLE (SIMULATING AN ENG FAILURE). THE STUDENT WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY RECALLING ENG FAILURE PROCEDURES AND HESITATED TO ACT. I REPEATEDLY TRIED TO EXPLAIN THAT WE WOULD SIMULATE FEATHERING ON THE IDLE ENG AND LAND AT THE NEAREST ARPT, AS IF TROUBLESHOOTING PROCS HAD ALREADY BEEN PERFORMED AND RESULTED IN FAILURE TO RESTART THE ENG. DURING THIS TIME, THE GEAR WARNING HORN CIRCUIT BREAKER WAS PULLED TO REDUCE THE ADDITIONAL DISTRACTION OF THE LOUD HONKING, SO THE STUDENT COULD HEAR ME MORE EASILY AND CONCENTRATE ON THE INSTRUCTION I WAS GIVING, AND I COULD BETTER UNDERSTAND THE DIFFICULTY HE WAS HAVING TAKING MY INSTRUCTION. AFTER THE HORN STOPPED SOUNDING, I EXPLAINED THE INSTRUCTIONS UNTIL IT WAS CLR THAT THE STUDENT UNDERSTOOD WE WOULD BE MAKING A SINGLE ENG LANDING AT ZZZ. BY THIS TIME, WE WERE FAIRLY CLOSE TO ZZZ ARPT. I EXPECTED THE STUDENT TO UNDERTAKE STD APCH PROCEDURES, WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN ROUTINE FOR STUDENTS AT HIS LEVEL, AND WAITED AS LONG AS I COULD BEFORE REMINDING HIM TO REQUEST ARPT TFC ADVISORIES THROUGH CTAF FREQ. THE STUDENT THEN MADE A CTAF REQUEST AND WAITED FOR A RESPONSE. NO ONE RPTED, THEREFORE, I EXPECTED THE STUDENT TO PROCEED BY OBTAINING ASOS INFO FOR SURFACE WINDS. AGAIN, I WAITED AS LONG AS REASONABLE, BUT WHEN THE STUDENT FAILED TO ACT, I TUNED IN THE ASOS FREQ AND REMINDED THE STUDENT TO NOTE THE SURFACE WINDS FOR ZZZ ARPT. AT THIS POINT, WE AGREED THE MOST FAVORABLE LNDG RWY BASED ON CURRENT WINDS WAS RWY 26. DURING THIS TIME, WE CONTINUED DSNDING TO TPA. THE STUDENT ENTERED THE PATTERN CONTRARY TO THE STD ENTRY, ON A TIGHT DOWNWIND LEG SLIGHTLY RIGHT OF THE EXTENDED CENTERLINE FOR THE UPWARD LEG OF RWY 26. I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE POOR ENTRY, AND BEGAN SCANNING FOR OTHER ACFT NEAR ZZZ ARPT, PARTICULARLY ANY ACFT DEP ON RWY 26. I EXPECTED THE STUDENT TO REALIZE AND CORRECT THE POOR PATTERN ENTRY. WHEN THE STUDENT MADE NO CORRECTIONS, I INSTRUCTED HIM TO MAKE A 90 DEG RIGHT TURN AND COMMENCE REENTRY INTO THE PATTERN. THE STUDENT BEGAN THE RIGHT TURN AND I CONTINUED SCANNING FOR OTHER ACFT. THE STUDENT THEN BEGAN TURNING BACK TOWARD THE RWY BEFORE WE HAD REACHED THE DOWNWIND LEG, STILL TOO CLOSE TO THE RWY TO SET UP FOR A NORMAL PATTERN. I INSTRUCTED THE STUDENT TO CEASE THE TURN AND WAIT UNTIL WE REACHED A MORE APPROPRIATE DISTANCE. A SHORT TIME LATER, AFTER COMPLETING THE 270 DEG TURN BACK ON DOWNWIND, THE STUDENT PLACED THE AIRPLANE IN AN ACCEPTABLE POS (BUT STILL CLOSER THAN THE IDEAL PATTERN). AT THIS POINT, THE AIRPLANE WAS ABEAM THE TOUCHDOWN POINT. THE STUDENT BEGAN THE BEFORE LANDING CHECKLIST. FORGETTING TO EXTEND THE GEAR FIRST, HE CONFIRMED THE FUEL VALVES WERE ON THEN STARTED TO SET THE PWR ON THE GOOD ENG. THE STUDENT ACCIDENTALLY BUMPED THE THROTTLE ON THE IDLE ENG, CAUSING THE AIRPLANE TO YAW. HE THEN EXTENDED THE FLAPS TO 10 DEGS, AND WENT BACK TO THE THROTTLE QUADRANT. THE STUDENT THEN ASKED ME TO CONFIRM WHAT THE PROPER PWR SETTINGS SHOULD BE. I TOLD HIM TO THE PROPER SETTINGS, BUT HE DIDN'T UNDERSTAND AND ASKED AGAIN. AT THIS TIME, OUR ALT WAS BECOMING LOW AND WE WERE CLOSE IN BECAUSE THE STUDENT HAD CREPT TOWARD THE RWY WHILE COMPLETING THE DOWNWIND LEG. THEREFORE, I TOLD THE STUDENT I WOULD SET THE PWR SO HE COULD CONCENTRATE ON COMPLETING THE TURN TO FINAL AND ALIGNING US WITH THE RWY. I SET THE PWR, PROPS, MIXTURE AND COWL FLAPS. THE AIR WAS A LITTLE BUMPY, SO THE STUDENT HAD SOME DIFFICULTY DAMPENING THE YAW OF THE AIRPLANE. AS THE STUDENT ROLLED OUT ON THE EXTENDED CENTERLINE, I REACHED OVER AND MOVED THE GEAR LEVER TO THE DOWN POS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE STUDENT BEGAN TO FULLY EXTEND THE FLAPS. I STOPPED THE STUDENT AND INSTRUCTED HIM NOT TO EXTEND THE FLAPS MORE THAN 25 DEGS. THE STUDENT QUESTIONED WHY NOT TO USE FULL FLAPS, AND I TOLD HIM IT WOULD CREATE TOO MUCH DRAG FOR THE LIMITED AMOUNT OF PWR AVAILABLE FROM ONLY ONE ENG. THE STUDENT APPARENTLY DID NOT UNDERSTAND MY INSTRUCTIONS, AND AGAIN GRABBED THE FLAP LEVER. AGAIN, I STOPPED HIM AND TOLD HIM NOT TO EXTEND THE FLAPS MORE THAN 25 DEGS BECAUSE IT CAUSES TOO MUCH DRAG IN CASE OF A GAR PROCEDURE, AND WOULD GREATLY REDUCE THE AIRPLANE'S ABILITY TO CLIMB. THE STUDENT DID NOT UNDERSTAND AND BEGAN ASKING MORE QUESTIONS. I WAS NOT SURE WHAT HE WAS HAVING TROUBLE UNDERSTANDING, AND DECIDED WE WOULD NEED TO ADDRESS HIS QUESTIONS LATER, AS THE STUDENT NEEDED TO PREPARE FOR LANDING. I TOLD THE STUDENT I WOULD EXPLAIN IT TO HIM ON THE GND, AND INSTRUCTED HIM TO FOCUS ON LANDING THE AIRPLANE. I RESUMED THE BEFORE LANDING CHECKLIST AND REMINDED THE STUDENT TO TURN ON THE FUEL BOOST PUMPS, WHICH HE DID. I THEN REMINDED THE STUDENT TO CHECK HIS SEAT BELT AND MAKE SURE IT WAS SECURED, WHICH HE DID. AS THE STUDENT CONTINUED TO PROCEED WITH THE LANDING, I VERBALLY GUIDED HIM THROUGH THE APCH. HE HELD THE PROPER AIRSPEED WHILE MAINTAINING THE DESCENT. THE DESCENT PATH WAS ON TRACK AND IT APPEARED WE WOULD LAND IN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE. ONCE 'OVER THE FENCE,' THE STUDENT SLOWLY REDUCED THE PWR ON THE GOOD ENG. THE LANDING LOOKED GOOD AND WE WERE ALIGNED WITH THE RWY CENTERLINE. I EXPECTED A SMOOTH LANDING AND WAITED FOR THE WHEELS TO TOUCH. SUDDENLY, I HEARD SCRAPING WHICH SOUNDED LIKE THE TAIL SKID OR PROPS CONTACTING THE RWY. AFTER LANDING THE AIRPLANE, IT WAS CONFIRMED THE PROP TIPS WERE DAMAGED AND THE TAIL SKID WAS SCUFFED. I IMMEDIATELY ADVANCED PWR AND PROPS TO FULL FWD ON BOTH ENGS AND PITCHED UP THE AIRPLANE, REALIZING WHAT HAD HAPPENED (THE GEAR WAS NOT DOWN AND LOCKED). I CLIMBED TO APROX 500 FT AGL, MADE A LEFT TURN TO ENTER THE PATTERN, AND BEGAN TROUBLESHOOTING PROCS. I LOOKED AT THE POS OF THE GEAR LEVER TO CONFIRM IT WAS DOWN, AND NOTICED THE THREE GREEN LIGHTS WERE NOT ILLUMINATED. I CONTINUED TROUBLESHOOTING AND NOTICED THE CIRCUIT BREAKER FOR THE GEAR WARNING HORN WAS IN A POPPED POS. I PUSHED THE CIRCUIT BREAKER BACK IN AND MOMENTS LATER, FELT THE GEAR EXTEND. I CONFIRMED THE GREEN LIGHTS WERE ON AND THE NOSE GEAR WAS VISIBLE THROUGH THE MIRROR. AT THAT POINT, I ASSUMED THE WARNING HORN CIRCUIT BREAKER ALSO CTLED PWR TO THE LNDG GEAR, WHICH WAS WHY THE GEAR HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY EXTENDED. I THEN PROCEEDED TO LAND THE AIRPLANE ON RWY 31 WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: THE STUDENT WSA HAVING DIFFICULTY RECALLING PREVIOUSLY LEARNED PROCS, WHICH REQUIRED MORE INSTRUCTION AND MORE ACTUAL ASSISTANCE, DISTRACTING ME FROM FOCUSING ON THE SINGLE ENG LANDING PROCS WE WERE PRACTICING. WE EXPERIENCED A FRUSTRATING INABILITY TO COMMUNICATE DUE TO THE STUDENT'S LIMITED GRASP OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, CREATING A DISTRACTION, REDUCING THE AMOUNT OF TIME AVAILABLE FOR COMPLETING PROCS AND INTERRUPTING THE USUAL PATTERN OF INSTRUCTION DURING FLT. WHILE I PUT DOWN THE GEAR LEVER, THE STUDENT REPEATEDLY ATTEMPTED TO PUT IN FULL FLAPS DESPITE MY INSTRUCTIONS, AND REPEATEDLY QUESTIONED MY INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH DISTRACTED ME FROM CONFIRMING THAT THE GEAR HAD EXTENDED. THE STUDENT DID NOT ENTER THE PATTERN PROPERLY, REQUIRING AN ADDITIONAL TURN AND REENTRY ON THE DOWNWIND LEG, WHICH DELAYED THE USUAL PROC OF EXTENDING THE LANDING GEAR. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATION: FACTORS AFFECTING THE QUALITY OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE: COMMUNICATION DIFFICULTY AND RESULTING FRUSTRATION. MULTIPLE DISTRACTIONS (COMBINATION OF DISTRACTIONS). TOO MUCH TRUST IN COMPETENCE OF STUDENT (OR COMPLACENCY). POSSIBLE THAT LIFE/FINANCIAL STRESS CONTRIBUTED, PERHAPS SUBCONSCIOUSLY. ACTIONS OR INACTION: REALIZE NOW THAT THE GEAR WARNING HORN CIRCUIT BREAKER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PULLED BECAUSE IT ALSO DISABLES THE LANDING GEAR. FAILURE TO CONFIRM THAT THE LNDG GEAR WAS EXTENDED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.